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Abstract
With the advent of the Internet, open distributed computing such as peer-to-peer le
sharing and grid computing has become increasingly popular. As these systems exhibit
an increasing level of online interactions and cooperations among individuals and orga-
nizations, there is also an increasing need for dynamic and secure sharing of resources
across the boundaries of dierent administrative domains. Traditional identity-based ac-
cess control often bases its authorization solely on the authentication of a user to a known
identity, and becomes unsuitable for open systems, where the interacting parties could
be total strangers to each other, yet still have the need for rapid and secure resource
sharing. Another aspect of authorization in open distributed computing is that it often
involves interactions among multiple parties. Such interactions can have dependencies
among each other, and have to be interleaved in a certain order for the authorization to
succeed. Many existing authorization approaches assume that authorizations are between
two parties (either a client and a server, or two symmetric parties with no client-server
relationship), and cannot be readily applied to the problem of solving authorization issues
among multiple parties. Other approaches either make assumptions that cannot be gener-
alized, or lack important features like providing the participating parties with autonomy
and customization. The goal of the thesis is to provide new approaches to automatic,
secure, and ecient trust establishment among multiple parties in an open distributed
environment.
Automated trust negotiation (ATN) is a promising approach to establishing trust be-
tween two entities without any prior knowledge of each other. ATN uses gradual trust
establishment by iterative credential exchanges, thus avoiding unsecured disclosure of sen-
sitive information. Yet the fact that it applies to only two parties makes it inadequate
to solve many real-world authorizations that involve online input from third parties. In-
spired by ATN, we introduce multiparty trust negotiation (MTN) as a new approach to
multiparty authorization. We propose a declarative language to specify MTN policies, a
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generic negotiation protocol to orchestrate MTN without a centralized moderator, and two
negotiation strategies to drive MTN with dierent tradeos between privacy and negotia-
tion speed. Both the negotiation strategies we propose guarantee that each participating
party's authorization policies are satised, and that the negotiation succeeds as long as a
possible authorization exists.
While MTN provides an eective solution to trust establishment among multiple par-
ties in an interactive way, it does not support features like delegation and redissemination
control. What is still missing is a general authorization framework that can be used to
model and reason about the runtime behavior of a diverse set of peers in an open system,
and provides a rich set of features to satisfy their assorted authorization requirements.
Motivated by these needs, we introduce the PeerAccess authorization framework. Peer-
Access provides a declarative language to describe a peer's access control policies, and
supports delegation, disclosure control, and redissemination control. While it is easy to
verify a proof of authorization encoded in PeerAccess, the multilateral and distributed
nature of multiparty authorization makes it dicult to construct such proofs. To facili-
tate distributed proof construction, we propose query routing rules to allow each peer to
customize its proof search behavior based on knowledge about where to get a certain cre-
dential. Congured with dierent query routing rules, PeerAccess is able to emulate the
runtime behaviors of other trust management systems, which makes PeerAccess general
enough to serve as a reasoning framework for authorization in heterogeneous distributed
systems. Finally we extend PeerAccess's release control constructs so that they can be
used to reason about the dissemination control of aggregated information derived based
on sources received from other parties, including both declassication and reclassication.
This makes PeerAccess the rst framework to provide systematic and exible access con-
trol for aggregated resources. Such capability is essential to multiparty authorization in
an open distributed environment, without which a peer will be uncomfortable authorizing
any qualied external party to access its sensitive information for any practical use, thus
eectively closing up the system.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Since the emergence of the Internet, it has ourished with far reaching impact on every
aspect of our society. With widely available network connectivity, more and more open
distributed applications are getting popular, e.g., peer-to-peer (P2P) le sharing, media
streaming and pod broadcasting, business-to-business (B2B) e-commerce, grid computing,
and wireless emergency response and coalition systems. While these systems vary in many
aspects, they share characteristics such as openness, distribution, and autonomy. A system
is open in that, instead of restricting access to only a predened set of requesters, it grants
access to whoever satises the authorization policies and follows the right procedures. The
components of a distributed system can be geographically distributed, so can the users.
Each participating party in an open distributed system has autonomy in deciding whom
he is willing to interact with and what access policies he enforces to protect his resources.
Identity based access control (IBAC) has become unsuitable for open distributed sys-
tems. Traditionally, IBAC requires preregistration of a user's identity. Once a user's
identity is authenticated, the authorization decision will be made based on the identity
alone. This presents several challenges in an open distributed environment. Since every
user's identity must be registered with the service provider, account management becomes
hard to scale for services with a large number of users. While a user's identify is relatively
stable, his functional role within an organization and the according access privileges can
change overtime. These changes need to be propagated to collaborating administrative
domains from time to time, in order to maintain the consistency of privilege assignment.
The communication and synchronization overhead involved can have signicant impact
on the performance of a system with a large number of users if such changes happen
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frequently. On the client side, a user often needs to maintain multiple accounts in order
to get access to resources in dierent administrative domains, which can become di-
cult and unmanageable; e.g., dierent sites have dierent password strength requirements
and aging policies, which forces one to have dierent passwords. It can be challenging
to remember these dierent passwords; sometimes it is even dicult to remember the
dierent account names on dierent systems. In the case where strangers need to talk to
each other for dynamic resource sharing, e.g., a disaster recovery coalition that involves
multiple teams equipped with mobile ad hoc networking devices, the interacting parties
have no prior knowledge about each other, and cannot base their authorization decisions
on identities that they do not even know.
Instead of basing the authorization solely on a requester's identity, attributed based
access control (ABAC) makes authorization decisions based on the requester's attributes
as attested to by X.509v3 attribute certicates [35] using public key cryptography [28].
Since the digital credentials are signed, they are veriable and non-repudiable, which
makes them a reliable proof for the attributes attested to. A digital driver license for
Alice signed by the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) proves her name and date of
birth. Her digital student ID proves her registration in the university. Suppose Best
Motorvehicle World (BMW), an online auto dealer sells cars to only those with a valid
driver license. In addition, it also gives a special discount to university students. Alice can
show her digital driver license to prove that she is eligible for purchasing a car from BMW,
and show her digital student ID signed by the university to prove that she is qualied for
the discount. BMW uses the DMV and university's public keys to verify that Alice's driver
license and student ID are indeed signed by the DMV and the university respectively. To
further verify that Alice is owner of the two credentials, BMW can verify that Alice does
have the private keys associated with her two public keys shown in the credentials. BMW
has no prior knowledge about Alice, nor does Alice have a pre-registered account with
BMW. Yet by showing digitally signed credentials, Alice proves that she satises the
dealer's authorization policy for a student discount. By eliminating the need for BMW
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of any direct contact with the DMV or the university, ABAC shows a clear advantage
here, solving the scalability problem associated with identity registration and information
sharing across dierent management domains. Basic approaches in ABAC include trust
negotiation and distributed proofs of authorization.
Automated trust negotiation (ATN) has become a promising approach to establishing
trust between two parties without any prior knowledge about each other [83, 84, 74]. Both
parties have access control policies to limit outsiders' access to their sensitive resources,
and neither takes it for granted that any other party can be trusted until a certain at-
tributes, as specied in the access control policies, are proven. Let us revisit the previous
car purchase example. Alice initially requests a student discount from BMW. As BMW's
policy says that only a licensed driver and registered student can be authorized for this
discount, it asks Alice for her driver license and student ID. Since Alice's driver license
contains sensitive information such as age and address, she feels uncomfortable giving it
to just anyone. To get some level of assurance, Alice asks BMW to disclose a certicate
signed by the car company Tata to show that BMW is an authorized dealer for Nano,
the brand of car that Alice is looking for. BMW shows Alice its dealer license from Tata,
which assures Alice that it is indeed an authorized Nano dealer. Alice is now willing to
show BMW her driver's license and student ID. Having veried that Alice does satisfy
the student discount requirement, BMW nally gives Alice the discount. The above ne-
gotiation process in shown in Figure 1.1. As we can see, the trust negotiation contains a
sequence of bilateral credential disclosures. Less sensitive credentials are disclosed rst, to
build up enough trust to disclose more sensitive credentials. The negotiation ends when
the provider's authorization policies are satised, or it becomes clear that trust will not
be established.
Real world authorization decisions often involve more than two parties. For example,
when one submits an online application for purchase of automobile insurance, the insur-
ance company needs to evaluate the buyer's driving record and credit scores to reduce the
risk of the sale. The authorization process can be decomposed into a number of two-party
3
Request the student’s discount 
Driver license and student ID? 
Alice 
Indeed an authorized dealer?  
Dealer authorization 
Driver license and student ID 
Grant the discount BM 
Figure 1.1: Example of trust negotiation
negotiations, i.e., one negotiation between the insurance company and the buyer for the
purchase, another between the insurance company and the DMV for the buyer's driving
record, and a third between the insurance company and the credit bureau for the buyer's
credit scores. However, decomposition is insucient to reduce an automated multiparty
authorization into standalone two-party trust negotiations, because individual negotia-
tions may depend on one another, and therefore need to be interleaved in a certain order
for the overall negotiation to succeed. For example, the negotiation between the insurance
company and the buyer cannot nish until the insurance company gets the result from the
negotiation between the insurance company and the credit bureau for the credit report,
which in turn requires the insurance company to get the buyer's authorization for a credit
check. For such a multiparty authorization, we need a policy language expressive enough
to describe the dependencies between the participating parties and their requests, and a
systematic and automated way to decompose the authorization into multiple two-party
negotiations and interleave them in an order that respects the dependencies. We also need
a way to detect cycles of dependencies and handle them appropriately at runtime. Overall,
we need a new authorization paradigm, Multiparty Trust Negotiation (MTN), where a ne-
gotiation can be automatically carried out among multiple parties in accordance with each
party's authorization policies. To this direction, we dene a policy language, Distributed
Authorization and Release Control Language (DARCL), to specify authorization policies
that are suitable for MTN. To orchestra the negotiation process among multiple parties
without a centralized moderator, we propose the diusion negotiation protocol, which
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allows the participating parties to carry the negotiation in a distributed fashion. Building
on top of the diusion negotiation protocol, we propose dierent negotiation strategies to
drive MTN with dierent trade o between privacy and negotiation speed, and examine
the safety, completeness, and eciency of these strategies.
While MTN provides an interactive, ecient, and secure solution to trust establish-
ment, its interactive nature requires all the negotiating parties to be online. It does not
provide direct support for much desired features like delegation and re-dissemination con-
trol. From a theoretical perspective, we are also interested in a more general framework
that can be used to not only specify distribute authorization policies, but also reason
about the runtime behavior of a diverse set of peers. We found none of the theories
developed for authorization include all the features that we needed to reason about the
runtime behavior of real world open systems, or to account for all the actions that parties
in such systems need to take at runtime. The need was particularly acute in the area of
reasoning about helpful third parties at runtime, such as information brokers, credential
and policy repositories, and third-party authorization services. A peer Alice may need to
contact several such parties as she attempts to construct a proof that she is authorized
to use a particular service, and she needs a principled way to determine who to contact,
what to ask for, what kind of answers to expect, and when to give up. She needs a way to
explain who she is and why she is asking for help, as her intended purpose may determine
whether a third party is willing to help her, or may inuence the answer that it gives her.
Alice also needs a way to set limits on what can be done with the personal information
that she gives out, and to determine what she is allowed to do with the information that
others give to her. She needs to be able to interact successfully with parties that push
information to her, and with parties that she must query to get information. Existing
works ([10, 14, 16, 18, 33, 34, 37, 42, 49, 63, 77, 79, 84, 93], to mention just a few) study
useful pieces of the picture, but we found that the separate pieces often did not t to-
gether to form a solution to real world situations. For example, real world peers do not
exhaustively try to answer all queries they receive, as in [7]. A peer may behave quite
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dierently depending on who is asking for help and why they are asking for help. We want
a way to talk about sticky policies [40, 58] (release policies that are permanently attached
to the information they protect), but also want to be able to describe non-sticky policies
within the same open system. Integrating all these features together, we propose the
PeerAccess framework and language to model and reason about multiparty authorization
in open distributed systems.
Before a service request can be authorized in an attribute-based distributed authoriza-
tion system like PeerAccess, a certain credentials have to be collected to prove that the
according access control policies are satised. Since the proof is encoded as well-structured
logic formulas, verifying its correctness is straightforward. The process to construct such
a proof, however, is often interactive, multilateral, and distributed, involving multiple par-
ties iteratively requesting credentials from one another before presenting their own relevant
credentials; we call this a distributed proof of authorization. Construction of such a proof
can be carried out in multiple ways. A resource provider can passively wait for its clients
to gather all the credentials required for them to gain access; others can take a proactive
approach by directly requesting all credentials from the appropriate issuers on behalf of
their client. To move away from these two extremes, which raise issues of eciency and
completeness, we propose query routing rules to customize distributed credential collection
in open systems, which give peers autonomy in deciding whether and how they respond to
authorization requests. We provide a distributed proof construction algorithm that peers
can use to reason about authorizations based on the access control policies and query
routing rules. This algorithm is congurable, sound, and complete with regard to the
search space covered by query routing rules. By conguring dierent query routing rules,
we can not only use exible strategies to improve the performance of distributed proofs
of authorization, but also emulate other distributed trust management frameworks and
serve as a reasoning framework for multiparty authorization in heterogeneous distributed
systems.
Over the years, many aspects of the transfer of information from one party to another
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have commanded the attention of the security and privacy community. The diversity
of the participating parties and the dierent sensitivity levels of resources to be shared
complicate the management of information ow in multiparty authorization. The original
owner controlled sticky release policies in PeerAccess are strong in many aspects; yet
there is no mechanism provided to reason about the release policies for new information
derived from information received from other peers. Released information can have various
levels of sensitivity: facts that are public, sensitive private information that requires its
original owner's permission for its future dissemination, or even information that requires
control over the release of the conclusions reached using that information. Some situations
also call for declassication of information, which requires a two-pronged approach: the
original owner retains control over the dissemination of sensitive information and sensitive
conclusions reached using that information, but when the information is used to reach
conclusions that are suciently non-sensitive, the original owner's control can be removed
for the dissemination of those conclusions. By introducing new release control constructs,
PeerAccess is able to specify dissemination control policies and reason about release and
declassication. We give case studies of the use of our language to control the release of
aggregated open source software, multimedia content and medical information.
In this thesis, we provide new approaches to automating dynamic, secure, and ecient
trust establishment among multiple parties in open distributed systems. We make a
number of contributions to multiparty authorization, from both theoretical and practical
perspectives.
In proposing MTN as a new approach to multiparty authorization, we make the fol-
lowing contributions:
1. We propose MTN as a new authorization paradigm for open distributed systems,
and show that it features the same level of security and exibility as two party trust
negotiation, yet provides the capability of establishing trust among multiple parties.
2. We dene DARCL as the rst distributed policy language that supports both autho-
rization and release control in a unied way. DARCL policies can take the source and
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destination of each credential disclosure into consideration, allowing policy-writers
to specify ner-grained access control constraints than existing languages such as
[23, 49, 37, 10]. This level of enhanced expressiveness is particularly useful in speci-
fying MTN-based access control policies.
3. We present a lightweight distributed negotiation protocol for MTN, whose simplicity
and decentralized nature make it well-suited for peer-to-peer environments.
4. We provide two MTN negotiation strategies with dierent tradeos between privacy
and negotiation speed. Both the two strategies guarantee that every participating
party's authorization policies are satised, and that the negotiation succeeds as long
as there exists a possible authorization.
In proposing PeerAccess as a language for specifying distributed authorization poli-
cies and a framework to reason about the runtime behavior of peers in open distributed
systems, we make the following contributions:
1. PeerAccess is a generic and extensible framework for multiparty authorization. We
know of no preexisting approach that allows one to reason about the runtime be-
havior of a very diverse set of peers, some of whom push information, some pull
information, and some mix the two paradigms. We also present a formal semantics
for the PeerAccess authorization language, and a proof theory that is both sound
and complete.
2. PeerAccess allows one to model the local reasoning of individual peers who are
unaware of the internal state of other peers, and also allows one to reason about
possible future global evolution of the system (e.g., for safety or liveness analysis).
PeerAccess supports peer autonomy in choice of run-time behavior, by encoding it
as a set of meta policies. Autonomy support is an important feature in that it allows
PeerAccess to closely model real world authorization scenarios in an open distributed
environment, where a peer values autonomy and will often not cooperate unless its
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autonomy is respected and has the freedom to make authorization decisions on its
own resources.
3. PeerAccess provides a rich set of release constructs that can be used to specify re-
lease and re-dissemination control policies. Particularly, our logic can be used to
derive release policies for aggregated information at run time, and allows exible
dissemination control of aggregated information by supporting full enforcement and
declassication of the original information sources' release policies. To our knowl-
edge, PeerAccess is the rst authorization framework that provides systematic and
exible access control for aggregated information.
In proposing query routing rules as a practical approach to proof construction in open
distributed systems, we make the following contributions:
1. Query routing rules are suciently exible to model the proof construction behaviors
of other trust management systems such as QCM [32]. This makes PeerAccess the
rst authorization framework that can be used to reason about the runtime behavior
of other trust management systems, and to reason about the runtime behavior when
dierent peers use dierent proof construction algorithms.
2. We give a distributed algorithm to construct proofs of authorization based on query
routing rules. This algorithm limits the search space to that covered by the query
routing rules, and guarantees completeness of search within this space, providing a
signicant performance gain over blind brute-force search in open distributed sys-
tems.
3. We leave the decisions on how to handle a particular request to the meta level poli-
cies, as opposed to embedding them in the authorization policies, as query routing
rules operate at the meta policy level and are orthogonal to the authorization poli-
cies. This level of independence makes it possible for query routing rules to work
with a variety of underlying policy languages.
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The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we propose MTN as an
extension to ATN to support multiparty authorization. In Chapter 3, we introduce the
PeerAccess framework, present its semantics and proof theory, and discuss its applications.
In Chapter 4, we propose query routing rules as a way to customize distributed proof
construction, and show how they can be used make PeerAccess emulate the runtime
behavior of other trust management systems. In Chapter 5, we propose new release policies
to add support for declassication and re-classication in re-dissemination control. We
discuss related work in Chapter 6, and give our conclusions in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 2
Multiparty Trust Negotiation
2.1 Introduction
A conventional authorization system is closed in the sense that it only gives access to a pre-
registered set of users, and all important properties of a user are known in advance, before
the user requests authorization. In open distributed systems like the Web, however, often
strangers have to interact with one another to receive or provide services. When two par-
ties interact to reach an authorization decision, automated trust negotiation (ATN) is an
eective approach to establishing trust without any prior knowledge of each other. Under
ATN, each party has authorization policies based on digital credentials to limit outsiders'
access to its sensitive resources. When an outsider requests access to a sensitive resource,
the ensuing trust negotiation includes a sequence of bilateral credential disclosures. Less
sensitive credentials are disclosed rst, to build up enough trust such that credentials that
are more sensitive can be disclosed. The negotiation succeeds when it gets to the point
both parties' authorization policies for access are satised, or fails when it becomes clear
that trust will not be established, or either party breaks o the negotiation. If trust is
established, the resource requester is authorized to access the owner's resource.1
While ATN is well suited for establishing trust between two strangers, it becomes in-
adequate when more than two parties are involved, which is often the case in real world
authorization scenarios. For example, an online purchase of automobile insurance involves
interactions among the buyer, the insurance company, the DMV for the buyer's driving
records, and credit bureaus for the buyer's credit scores. Similarly, a grid resource allo-
1This chapter is based on the material originally published in [94].
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cation [62] can involve the requester, the resource owner, the Community Authorization
Service (CAS) server, and one or more authorization proxies. One possible solution is
to decompose a multiparty authorization process into a number of standalone two-party
negotiations. Such a decomposition, however, can become dicult, as individual negotia-
tions may depend on one another, and therefore need to be interleaved in a certain order
for the overall negotiation to succeed. For example, the negotiation between the insurance
company and the buyer cannot nish until the insurance company gets the result from the
negotiation between the insurance company and the credit bureau for the credit report,
which in turn requires the insurance company to get the buyer's authorization for a credit
check. In some cases, the dependencies can even form a cycle, which complicates decom-
position. To solve all these issues, we propose a new authorization paradigm, multiparty
trust negotiation (MTN), that can automatically carry out a negotiation among multiple
parties in accordance with each party's authorization policies.
We also propose Distributed Authorization and Release Control Language (DARCL),
to specify authorization policies that are suitable for MTN. In addition, DARCL can be
used to specify release control policies. Copyright, privacy, and security considerations
often lead users to restrict the ow of sensitive information. Inappropriate disclosures can
cause privacy breaches and serious damage such as identity theft. In such situations, a
release control policy is used to specify the conditions under which a piece of information
can be disclosed (sent) to another party. Release policies are related to authorization poli-
cies, which govern access to arbitrary resources under a \pull" paradigm. For example, an
authorization policy decides whether Alice can access a highly classied database, while a
release control policy decides who will be told that Alice has such a privilege. Some policy
languages clearly distinguish between these two kinds of policies [16], and put restrictions
on how they can be used together; e.g., one cannot base an authorization decision on a
release control condition. In our proposed DARCL policy language, authorization and
release control are naturally integrated: an authorization can be based on a release condi-
tion, and vice versa. Further, DARCL allows the policy writer to specify both the source
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and destination of each disclosure, so that an authorization decision can be based not only
on the content of received information, but also on its source. This feature allows DARCL
to specify a certain MTN policies that other languages cannot. For example, DARCL
makes it easy to say that before Alice gives Bob access to a certain resource, Bob has to
disclose some of his qualications to Alice, and a third party Carl has to vouch for Bob.
A trust negotiation protocol species high-level conventions for communication between
negotiating parties, including permissible message types and formats, how to start and
end a negotiation, and when it is one's turn to send a message. In the most common form
of two-party negotiation protocol [83, 84, 30, 42], each party takes turns sending messages
until the negotiation succeeds or fails. It is harder to dene a protocol that works for more
than two parties. If we allow one peer to assume the role as a negotiation moderator, the
moderator can organize the negotiation into multiple rounds. In each round, a peer sends
requests to others and replies to requests it receives in previous rounds. The negotiation
continues until at a certain round, the moderator declares the success or failure of the
negotiation. Unfortunately, the centralized control of the moderator approach directly
contradicts the autonomous nature of open distributed systems. For example, we need to
be able to allow negotiating parties to leave and rejoin the negotiation on the y, making
the moderator's job complex and hard to scale. Ideally, an MTN protocol should be
distributed and free of centralized control.
We make the following contributions in this chapter:
1. We propose MTN as a new paradigm for establishing trust in open distributed
systems, while leveraging the eectiveness of two-party ATN. We extend and redene
concepts and theories developed for ATN, so that we can use them to establish trust
among multiple parties.
2. We dene DARCL as the rst distributed policy language that supports both autho-
rization and release control in a unied way. DARCL policies can take the source
and destination of each credential disclosure into consideration, allowing policy-
writers to specify ner-grained access control constraints than with existing lan-
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guages [23, 49, 37, 10].
3. We present a lightweight distributed protocol for MTN, whose decentralized nature
makes it well-suited for peer-to-peer environments.
4. We provide two MTN negotiation strategies that are safe and complete, with dier-
ent tradeos between privacy and negotiation speed.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we dene the DARCL
policy language and related concepts. In Section 2.3 we dene MTN protocols and strate-
gies, and introduce the diusion negotiation protocol. We present an eager negotiation
strategy in Section 2.4 and a more cautious strategy in Section 2.5. Finally we summarize
in Section 2.6.
2.2 The DARCL Policy Language
In this chapter, we model a distributed system as a nite set of peers, who each possess
a nite knowledge base and communicate with each other by exchanging messages about
their resources and services. Following the popular trend in trust management [37, 23, 47,
48], we propose a declarative policy language, DARCL, based on Datalog. The syntax of
DARCL is given in Figure 2.1. A peer's authorization policy for access to a resource or
service consists of a set of DARCL rules specifying the conditions that must be satised
before the access to the service can be granted.
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rule ::= disclosure  disclosure ^    ^ disclosure
disclosure ::= peer"credential>peer
credential ::= peer.credential name(term; : : : ; term)
term ::= peer j value
peer ::= variable j peer name
value ::= variable j string
variable ::= x j y j : : :
peer name ::= Alice j Bob j : : :
credential name ::= string
Figure 2.1: Syntax of DARCL
In DARCL, credentials are signed predicates, which can be used to represent at-
tributes of subjects and authorizations for access to resources and services. DARCL
abstracts away several properties of real-world credentials such as X.509 certicates, re-
taining only those needed to reason about distributed authorization. In the credential
University:isRegisteredStudent(Alice), University is the issuer who signs the creden-
tial, Alice is the subject, and isRegisteredStudent is the credential name. A credential
can have more than one subject. In this chapter, values of DARCL credential names and
peer names will have more than one letter, to distinguish them from variables such as x
and y; and peer names will not be used as string-valued terms. We can instantiate a vari-
able in a DARCL formula by replacing all its occurrences with a constant. If a DARCL
formula does not contain any variables, then it is ground.
We use peer0 "C >peer1 to denote a disclosure, the sending of a message from one peer
to another, where peer0 is the source and peer1 is the destination of the message, and C
is its content. The head of each DARCL rule contains a disclosure. A rule's body can
be empty, in which case the head of the rule is a fact. Intuitively, Alice"C0>Bob in a
rule's head means Alice authorizes the disclosure of C0 to Bob, and Bob"C1>Alice in a
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rule's body means Alice has received C1 from Bob. DARCL rules must also satisfy three
additional constraints, which simplify rule specication and prevent certain nonsensical
policies. Let S0 "C0>D0  S1 "C1>D1, : : : ; Sn "Cn>Dn be a rule in Alice's authorization
policy.
1. For every i 2 [0; n], either Si or Di must be Alice; when the rule's body is not empty,
the source S0 of the disclosure in the rule's head must be Alice. This is because Alice
can only base her authorization decisions on her local state, i.e., her own policies
plus the credentials that have been sent to her. What kind of credential another
party Bob sends to Carl is beyond Alice's knowledge; similarly, Alice cannot force
Bob to disclose a credential. To make the rule look simpler, we can omit Si (or Di)
from the rule when it equals Alice. We, however, choose to keep them in this thesis
so that it is easier for the reader to tell the source and destination of any disclosure.
2. If the issuer of the credential C0 in the head is not Alice and the rule's body is not
empty, then C0 must be one of the credentials Ci in the body, 1  i  n. In other
words, before Alice can disclose a credential signed by somebody else, she must have
received it.
3. Every variable in the rule body must also occur in the head. Under this constraint,
if the disclosure in the head of a rule is ground after variable instantiations, so are
the disclosures in the body of the rule. As enforced in our inference rules shown
later, at runtime every disclosed credential will be ground.
When the source and destination of a disclosure are the same peer, e.g., Alice"C >Alice,
we call it a singular-disclosure. We use the singular-disclosure Alice"C >Alice to represent
the fact that Alice possesses the credential C. If the issuer of C is not Alice, Alice"C >Alice
means Alice has received C. If Alice is the issuer of C, then Alice"C >Alice means Alice
is willing to sign or has signed C, depending on whether it is in the head or body of
the rule. For simplication, we abbreviate a singular-disclosure Alice"C >Alice as just
C. This simplication causes no confusion, because restriction 1 tells us that C in Alice's
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knowledge base must stand for Alice"C >Alice, and not Bob"C >Bob. If a disclosure's
source and destination are dierent, we call it a remote disclosure. If an authorization
rule's head is a remote disclosure, then it is a release control rule. The collection of all a
peer's policies and credentials is its knowledge base.
In practice, credentials are often stored with their issuers or their subjects [53, 22]; in
such a case, the source of a disclosure can be constrained to be the credential's issuer or
one of its subjects. Such constraints are easy to express in DARCL but not built into the
language, because we want to support additional scenarios, such as when the distribution
of credentials is outsourced to a third party.
2.2.1 Policy Examples
We use two examples to show how DARCL can be used to specify release control and
authorization policies.
Example 1 Consider the following set of rules in Alice's knowledge base:
(1) Bob:trusts(Carrie)  Bob"Bob:trusts(Carrie)>Alice
(2) Alice"Bob:trusts(Carrie)>Diana  Bob:trusts(Carrie)
(3) Alice"Bob:trusts(Carrie)>x  Bob"Bob:trusts(Carrie)>Alice ^
Carrie"Bob:trusts(Carrie)>Alice
(4) Alice:trusts(x)  Diana:trusts(x)
(5) Alice"Alice:trusts(Diana)>x  Alice:trusts(x)
Rule (1) is trivial: it says that if Bob tells Alice that he trusts Carrie, Alice knows that
he trusts Carrie. Rule (2) says that if Alice knows that Bob trusts Carrie, Alice will tell
Diana about it. Rule (3) says that if both Bob and Carrie tell Alice that Bob trusts
Carrie, Alice will tell everybody about it; Alice's intuition is that since both Bob and
Carrie are open with her about it, they probably do not treat it as a secret. Rule (4) says
that Alice will trust anyone that she knows that Diana trusts. Rule (5) says that Alice
will tell everyone she trusts about the fact that she trusts Diana. The dierence between
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a singular-disclosure d = Alice:trusts(Diana) and a regular disclosure Alice"d>Eddie
is clear: the former states that Alice trusts Diana, while the latter states to whom Alice
discloses that fact. Note that if we restrict the rules to use singular-disclosures only,
DARCL shrinks to a variant of existing Datalog-based authorization languages, such as
those used in [23, 49, 37]. These languages deal with authorization but not release control,
and cannot specify rules like (3).
Example 2 Suppose Alice, a Canadian national, would like to apply for a digital Mexi-
can visa so that she can enter Mexico as a tourist. For security considerations, the Mexican
government has a new policy that requires its visa department, Embassy of Mexico (EM),
not to issue a visa for any Canadian national unless the applicant presents a valid Cana-
dian passport and passes the background check of Mexico's security agency, Direccion
Federal de Seguridad (DFS). To respect privacy, DFS will not release Alice's background
check result to EM unless DFS gets Alice's permission to do so rst. For convenience
and security considerations, DFS, as a security agency, deals directly with EM, but not
directly with any individual; therefore, any communication between Alice and the DFS
has to go through EM. Alice is willing to give EM what it requests, provided that she can
verify that EM has a digital certicate signed by the Mexican government (MG) to show
that EM really is the ocial Mexican embassy. EM, on the other hand, is willing to show
its certicate signed by MG to anyone. In summary, there are the following policies.
1. EM will issue the visa to Alice if (a) Alice discloses her digital passport and autho-
rization for EM to do a background check through EM, and (b) EM receives DFS's
clearance for Alice.
2. If Alice gives EM her authorization for DFS to disclose any personal information to
EM, EM will disclose this authorization to DFS.
3. EM is willing to show its certicate signed by MG to anyone.
4. DFS will issue clearance for Alice to EM if Alice passes the background check and
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allows DSF to release the result to EM.
5. Alice will give her digital passport and background check authorization to EM if
EM has a valid certicate signed by MG.
In DARCL, these policies are as follows:
EM:
EM "EM:visa(x)>x  x"Canada:passport(x)>EM ^
x"x:OkToRelease(DFS ; EM)>EM ^ DFS "DFS :clear(x)>EM
EM "x:OkToRelease(DFS ; EM)>DFS  x"x:OkToRelease(DFS ; EM)>EM
EM "MG:ocialEmbassy(EM)>x
DFS:
DFS "DFS :clear(x)>EM  EM "x:okToRelease(DFS ; EM)>DFS ^
DFS :clear(x)
Alice:
Alice"Alice:okToRelease(DFS ; x)>x  x"MG:ocialEmbassy(x)>Alice
Alice"Canada:passport(Alice)>x  x"MG:ocialEmbassy(x)>Alice ^
Canada:passport(Alice)
We will revisit these examples in subsequent sections.
2.2.2 Inference Rules
Our next step is to show how authorization decisions can be made based on DARCL
policies. Sometimes a peer can make an authorization decision based on only its local
authorization policies. Other times, an authorization decision is collectively based on
the peer's local policies and the information it receives from other peers. Accordingly,
DARCL has two types of inference rules, local and global. From a logical perspective, the
local inference rules are used to derive new facts or rules within a peer's knowledge base,
while the global inference rules, together with the local inference rules, can be used to
derive new facts based on more than one peer's knowledge base. From authorization's
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perspective, local inference rules tell what authorization decisions a peer can make solely
based on his authorization policies and the messages he has already received from others,
and the global inference rule tells what messages a peer can send to other peers.
Local Inference Rules A peer A can use the following local derivation rules.
 Instantiation. From a rule r in A's knowledge base, derive an instance of r by
replacing all occurrences of the same variable in r with another variable or literal.
 Knowledge. From B "d>A or A"d>B in A's knowledge base, derive A"d>A.
 Modus ponens. From a rule d0  d1 ^    ^ dn and facts di, 1  i  n in A's
knowledge base, derive d0.
Global Inference Rules
 Delivery. From A"d>B in A's knowledge base, where d is ground, derive A"d>B
in B's knowledge base.
A derivation that uses only the local inference rules within a peer's knowlegebase is
called a local derivation. A derivation that uses both local and global inference rules is
called a global derivation.
Returning to Example 1, let us see how we can use the inference rules to decide whether
Alice can tell Edward that she trusts Diana. Suppose Diana trusts Edward and has told
Alice about it; i.e., Alice's knowledge base has Diana"Diana:trusts(Edward)>Alice.
By the knowledge rule, we derive Diana:trusts(Edward). Applying instantiation and
modus ponens on rule (4), we get Alice:trusts(Edward). Repeating the same derivations
on rule (5), we get Alice"Alice:trusts(Diana)>Edward; i.e., Alice can tell Edward that
she trusts Diana.
If we apply both the local and global inference rules to all policies in everyone's knowl-
edge bases and conduct global derivations, we can reason about every possible authoriza-
tion that any peer can ever make. Continuing with Example 1, if we apply the global
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inference rule on Alice"Alice:trusts(Diana)>Edward in Alice's knowledge base, we de-
rive Alice"Alice:trusts(Diana)>Edward in Edward's knowledge base.
Although it is theoretically interesting to reason about authorizations globally, in
practice there is no omniscient authority to reason about everyone's policies in an open
distributed system. Before Alice approves an authorization request from Bob, she may
request credentials from Bob and other peers, which can trigger more rounds of credential
requests and disclosures. MTN is such a process, where peers conduct multilateral mes-
sage exchanges to collectively make an authorization decision without losing each peer's
autonomy; i.e., at any moment, each peer's authorization decisions are still based on its
current local policies.
2.2.3 Disclosure Sequences
We say a ground disclosure d = Alice"C >Bob is unlocked if d is already in Alice's knowl-
edge base, or d can be derived in Alice's knowledge base using the local inference rules;
otherwise, d is locked. Suppose d is locked, and will be unlocked if Alice receives disclo-
sures d1; : : : ; dn from other peers; we say d is unlocked by d1; : : : ; dn. We say a ground
disclosure e is a relevant disclosure for d if e derives e by the knowledge rule, or there
exists an instantiation r0 of rule r that has d as its head and e is a disclosure in the body
of r0. If e is a relevant disclosure for d, then every relevant disclosure for e is also a relevant
disclosure for d.
A ground disclosure is safe if it is unlocked at the time it takes place. For example,
Alice can safely disclose C to Bob if Alice"C >Bob is unlocked in Alice's knowledge base.
We dene a disclosure sequence Seq as [d1; : : : ; dn], where each di = Si "Ci>Di is a remote
disclosure representing Si disclosing Ci to Di, and each di+1 takes place after di. Seq is a
safe disclosure sequence for dn (or simply safe) if each di is safe at the time it takes place.
More specically, every di must either be unlocked before the rst disclosure in S takes
place, or be unlocked once di 1 has taken place. When Seq is safe, [d1; : : : ; di] is a safe
disclosure sequence for di, which gives us the following proposition.
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Proposition 2.1 If [d1; : : : ; dn] is a safe disclosure sequence, then there is a safe disclo-
sure sequence for di with at most i disclosures, for every 1  i  n.
The existence of a safe disclosure sequence S for d = Bob"C >Alice means that if the
disclosures take place in the order given in S, resource owner Bob can eventually safely
grant Alice access to resource C, without violating any peer's authorization policy. Suppose
that in Example 2, DFS clears Alice's background checking by signing DFS :clear(Alice);
then there is the following safe disclosure sequence that leads to EM sending a signed visa
to Alice.
[ EM "MG:ocialEmbassy(EM)>Alice, Alice"Canada:passport(Alice)>EM ,
Alice"Alice:okToRelease(DFS ; EM)>EM ,
EM "Alice:okToRelease(DFS ; EM)>DFS ,
DFS "DFS :clear(Alice)>EM , EM "EM:visa(Alice)>Alice ]
The goal of MTN is to nd such a safe disclosure sequence.
2.2.4 Semantics
We provide a local and global semantics for DARCL based on the least Herbrand model.
Suppose a distributed system has a nite set N of peers, where each peer A has policy
(knowledge base) PA. The current state of the system is captured by a distributed set
of DARCL rules P = f(A;PA) j A 2 Ng, which we also call a system conguration. We
dene an interpretation for P as I = f(A; IA) j A 2 Ng, where IA is a set of ground
disclosures. The local semantics decides what a peer can disclose based on its local rules
and facts, whereas the global semantics decides what a peer can eventually disclose and
receive within the system.
We dene a local model I for P as follows.
1. A ground singular disclosure d = A">A is locally true in I at A i d 2 IA.
2. A ground remote disclosure d = B ">C is locally true in I at A i fd;A">Ag 
IA, and A equals B or C.
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3. A ground rule of the form d0  d1 ^    ^ dn is locally true in I at A i either d0 is
locally true in I at A, or there exists di, 1  i  n, such that di is not locally true
in I at A.
4. A non-ground rule or disclosure is locally true in I at A i each of its ground instances
is locally true in I at A.
5. A system conguration P is locally true in I i for every A 2 N , and every rule r
in PA, r is locally true in I at A. In this case, we call I a local model for P, and IA
a local model for PA
Dene the intersection of two interpretations I and I 0 as
I \ I 0 = f(A; IA \ I 0A) j A 2 Ng
Theorem 2.1 Let I and I 0 each be a local model for P. The intersection I \ I 0 is still a
local model for P.
Proof. We show that for every A 2 N , and every rule r in PA, r is locally true in I \ I 0
at A. The rule r can be a ground singular disclosure, a ground remoate disclosure, a
ground rule, or a non-ground rule. We exam each of the these dierent cases.
1. Ground singular disclosure. Based on the denition of local model, r is in both
IA and I 0A, which means r is also in IA \ I 0A. So r is locally true in I \ I 0 at A.
2. Ground remote disclosure. Suppose r = A">B; thus we have r;A">Ag 
IA and r;A">Ag  I 0A, which means r;A">Ag  (IA\ I 0A); i.e., r is locally true
in I \ I 0 at A. It is the same case when r equals B ">A.
3. Ground rule. Let r be d0  d1 ^    ^ dn; thus either d0 is locally true in I at
A, or there exists di, 1  i  n, such that di is not locally true in I at A. It is the
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same case with I 0. If d0 is locally true at A in both I and I 0, then it is also true at
A in I \ I 0. If di is not locally true in I or I 0, it is not locally true in I \ I 0 either.
So either d0 is locally true in I \ I 0 at A, or some di is not locally true in I \ I 0 at
A, which means r is locally true in I \ I 0 at A.
4. Non-ground rule. Since each of r's ground instances r0 is locally true in both I
and I 0 at A, r0 is locally true in I \ I 0 at A. Thus r is locally true in I \ I 0 at A.
Let P be the intersection of all P's local models. Based on the above theorem, P is still
a local model for P; we call P the canonical local model for P.
Similarly, we dene a global model I for P.
1. A ground singular disclosure d = A">A is globally true in I, i d is locally true
in I at A.
2. A ground remote disclosure d = A">B is globally true in I, i d is locally true in
I at both A and B.
3. A ground rule of the form d0  d1 ^    ^ dn is globally true in I, i either d0 is
globally true in I, or di is not globally true in I for some 1  i  n.
4. A non-ground rule or disclosure is globally true in I at A i each of its ground
instances is globally true in I at A.
5. A system conguration P is globally true in I i for every A 2 N , and every rule r
in PA, r is globally true in I. In this case, we call I a global model for P.
Let P be the intersection of all P's global models. P is still a global model for P; we call
P the canonical global model for P.
The local and global derivations are sound with respect to their corresponding seman-
tics, and they are complete for inference of ground facts, which is sucient for serving the
purpose of MTN-based authorization.
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Theorem 2.2 Let P be the current system conguration, and let d be a ground disclosure.
 Dislcosure d can be derived at A using local inference rules, i d is locally true in P
at A.
 Disclosure d can be derived uisng local and global inference rules, i d is globally
true in P.
Proof. We argue the soundness of local derivations by stepping through the local infer-
ence rules one by one and showing that every derived rule/fact is in fact true according
to the local semantics.
 Instantiation. If r is locally true at A, then all instances of r is locally true at A.
 Knowledge. If a ground disclosure A"d>B is locally true at A, we have A"d>A2
A, which means A"d>A is also locally true at A. The same argument follows for
B "d>A is locally true at A
 Modus ponens. If a ground rule d0  d1 ^    ^ dn and all its body facts di,
1  i  n, are locally true at A, then d0 has to be locally true, otherwise we get a
conict that at least one di is not true.
The proof for the soundness of derivations using both local and global inference rules
follows the above arguments. Additionally, the delivery rule for remote disclosure A"d>B
from A to B does not change the trueness of A"d>B 2 IB, based on the denition of the
global semantics.
We start the proof of the completeness of local derivations by translating every disclo-
sure S "A:p(t1; : : : ; tn)>D into a regular Datalog atom p0(A;S;D; t1; : : : ; tn). By trans-
lating all dislcosures, we translate evert DARCL rule r into a reguar Datlog rule r0. The
translation can also go the other direction around, and establishes a one-to-one mapping
of rules between A's original rule set PA and the transalted rule set P 0A. For any local
derivation of r at A, there is also a derivation in P 0A, and vice versa. Let H 0A be the least
Herbrand model of P 0A, and let HA be the corresponding set of ground facts by reversing
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translating each ground fact in H 0A. Based on the denition of the least Herbrand model
and the denition of local models, it follows that HA is also a local model for PA. Given
that PA is the intersection of all PA's local models, we have that HA equals PA; i.e.,
PA is the least Herbrand model of PA. For any ground fact d that is true in PA, the
corresponding fact d0 is also true in P 0A. Using the same line of argument employed to
show the completeness of the least Herbrand model for Datalog, which P 0A is, we prove
that d0 has a derivation in P 0A. Translating this derivation, we get that d has a valid local
derivation in P at A.
To prove the completeness of global derivations, we employ the same translation de-
scribed above for facts and rules. We put all translated facts and rules from all peers in
P into set U . Thus U is a set of regular Datalog rules. There are three inference rules
in U , instantiation, knowledge, and modus ponens, corresponding to the three local infer-
ence rules in P. The instantiation and modus ponens rules in U remain unchanged from
P, while the knowledge rule has slight dierence. More specically, p0(A;S;D; t1; : : : ; tn)
derives both p0(A;S; S; t1; : : : ; tn) and p0(A;D;D; t1; : : : ; tn), which means both the sender
and receiver of a disclosure know about the disclosed fact. The global derivation rule in P
is no longer needed in U , as rules in U are not directly tied to any peer's knowledge base.
Now we argue that every derivation for d0 in U translates into a valid global derivation
for d in P, using the local and/or global inference rules. We prove this by examing each
derivation steps, starting from the rst. The translation of an instantiation or knowledge
rule is trivial. Let us exam the case of modus ponens. Suppose we used the rule r0 =
d00  d01 ^    ^ d0n and facts d0i, 1  i  n0 to derive ground fact d00. Suppose the
source of the corresponding disclosure d0 is A, then the corresponding rule r must be in
A's knowledge base already. For each d0i, the corresponding disclosure d can be either
A"c>B or B "c>A. In the latter case, if d is not aleady in A's knowledge base, then d
must be in B's knowledge base. Applying the delivery inference rule, we can derive d in
A's knowledge base. Thus we have all facts di, 1  i  n0, in A's knowledge base, and can
further apply modus ponens to derive d0 at A.
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Let H 0U be the least Herbrand model of U , and HU be the reverse-translated set
of ground disclsoures. Let H be an interpreation for P, where for each peer A in P,
HA = fB "c>C j B "c>C 2 HU ; A equals B or Cg. Based on the denition of global
models, we argue that for every rule r0 that is true in H 0U , the correspoding reverse-
translated rule r is also globally true in H; thus H is a global model for P. Similarly, for
any P's global model, its corresponding set of translated ground facts is also a model for U .
Since P is the intersection of all P's global models, H equals P, otherwise we would have
a Herbrand model for U that is a proper subset of H 0U , which contradicts the denition of
the least Herbrand model. Finally, for any ground disclosure d that is globally true in P,
we know the corresponding ground fact d0 is in H 0U . Using the same line of argument for
the completeness of the least Herbrand model for Datalog, we know that d0 can be derived
in U . Reverse translating the derivation for d0, we get a valid global derivation for d.
Based on the denition of safe disclosure sequences, we can easily convert a safe disclo-
sure sequence for remote disclosure d into a global derivation for d, and vice versa. Thus
we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2.1 For every remote disclosure d, there is a safe disclosure sequence for d i
d is globally true in P.
2.3 MTN Protocols and Strategies
In our model of an open system, peers negotiate with each other by sending messages,
following the conventions specied by a negotiation protocol. Protocols can be specied at
dierent levels. At the lowest level, a protocol denes how messages can be encoded and
transferred through a particular medium. For our purpose of trust negotiation research,
we are primarily concerned with high-level message-passing conventions regarding how to
start a negotiation, when it is a particular peer's turn to send a message, what the formats
of the messages are, and how to tell whether a negotiation succeeds or fails. On top of a
common negotiation protocol, a peer employs a negotiation strategy, which is its plan of
action to achieve a certain goal, e.g., reaching a successful conclusion to the negotiation
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ParticipateInMTN () f
while willing to participate do
if the incoming message queue is empty then
Wait a short period of time for new messages
if there is a new message in the incoming message queue then
Choose such a message m and remove it from the queue
Record m's receipt time as the current time
ProcessMessage(m)
g
/* message handler */
ProcessMessage (m) f
/* Mreceived and Msent store received and sent messages respectively */
Mreceived =Mreceived [ fmg
If m is a disclosure, add m to the local knowledge base L
Apply the local negotiation strategy with parametersMreceived,Msent, and L, which
returns a list of messages M
/* send the messages to their intended recipients */
if M is not empty then
for every message k in M do
Send k to its specied recipient
Record k's sending time as the current time
Msent =Msent [ fkg
g
Figure 2.2: The diusion negotiation protocol
as soon as possible. More specically, a negotiation strategy decides the content of each
message, i.e., what messages to send back in reply to a received message.
We propose a completely distributed MTN protocol that allows the negotiation to
proceed without any centralized control. Party A starts a negotiation by sending a ground
request r = ?B "R>A to another party B. We call A the originator and r the originating
request of the MTN. After the originating request is sent, no peer sends any message
as part of this negotiation, unless it rst receives a message. Once a party receives a
message, it sends a nite number (possibly zero) of messages to other parties, and then
remains \silent" until it receives another message. This protocol for MTN falls into the
general class of protocols that Dijkstra and Scholten describe as diusing computation [24],
provided that the number of messages that each party sends within a single negotiation is
nite, which always has to be true for the negotiation to be useful. We therefore call this
MTN protocol the diusion protocol. An MTN succeeds when the requested disclosure in
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the originating request is actually made (e.g., when Bob actually grants Alice access to
his resource). An MTN terminates when none of the parties sends or receives any more
messages.
We give the pseudocode for the diusion protocol in Figure 2.2. A peer willing to
participate in an MTN is either waiting for messages from other peers, or processing
received messages. Incoming messages are put in a queue until processed. The choice
of which queued message to process next is a strategic decision; for the purpose of this
thesis, any choice is satisfactory (FIFO, LIFO, random, giving higher priority to certain
peers or message types, etc.).
Each incoming message is stamped with a receipt time when it is processed, and
each outgoing message is stamped with a sending time. Both timestamps represent the
party's local time; in other words, we do not assume a globally consistent time clock. We
do assume that if a peer Alice sends (respectively, processes) message 1 and later sends
(resp. processes) message 2, then Alice's timestamp for message 1 is earlier than her
timestamp for message 2. Messages already processed or being processed are stored in the
set Mreceived, while those already sent to others are stored in the set Msent. A message
can be a disclosure d, a request for d (denoted ?d), a denial to disclose d (denoted as !d),
or any other type of message that is specic to the strategy that the participating parties
adopt. To process a new message m, the local party Pthis adds m to Mreceived, and calls
its local negotiation strategy with Mreceived, Msent, and its local authorization rules L.
The negotiation strategy returns a list of messages, which P subsequently sends to the
appropriate recipients. The diusion protocol is strategy-neutral, meaning that dierent
MTNs can use dierent strategies while following the same protocol.
We make the following assumptions and simplications. For clarity, Figure 2.2 is
written as though only one negotiation takes place at a time. To support multiple con-
current negotiations, the originating request should include a new globally unique session
ID, and the protocol should associate that session ID with each message sent as part
of the negotiation. Similarly, the message handler ProcessMessage and the negotia-
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tion strategies given in subsequent sections should all be parameterized with the session
ID so that they deal each negotiation separately. While we do not explicitly deal with
lost or delayed messages, in practice they can be detected through predened timeouts
and handled accordingly. We require that peers communicate through secured channels,
and all the credentials exchanged are digitally signed, thus veriable, nonforgeable and
nonrepudiable.
2.4 Eager Strategies
A party can adopt an eager strategy if it is eager to bring the negotiation to a successful
conclusion as soon as possible. To speed up the negotiation, an eager strategy aggres-
sively requests relevant remote disclosures and is willing to make requested disclosures as
soon as they become unlocked. The rst eager strategy that we present is a relatively
unsophisticated version, which we call the basic eager strategy (BES).
2.4.1 Basic Eager Strategy
Figure 2.3 gives the BES strategy. For a participating peer Pthis, the goal is to calculate
Dnew, the set of unlocked disclosures that are requested by other parties, but not disclosed
yet; and Qnew, the set of disclosures that Pthis would like to request from other parties.
The current message m has the latest timestamp in Mreceived. If m is a disclosure d,
we calculate Dunlocked, the set of disclosures that are unlocked by d and other previously
received disclosures. Since there is no need to disclose unrequested credentials or make
the same disclosure to the same peer twice, we intersect Dunlocked and the disclosures
Qreceived that other parties requested from Pthis, then subtract Dsent, which contains all
disclosures already sent, and nally get Dnew. If m happens to be a request for disclosure
d that is unlocked already, we can simply set Dnew to be fdg. If, however, d is still locked,
we calculate the set Drelevant of all relevant remote disclosures for d, then subtract all
disclosures Pthis received and all disclosures Pthis requested from others, which gives us
Qnew, the new disclosures that Pthis will request from others in order to unlock d. Adding
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1. BasicEagerStrategy (Mreceived, Msent, L) f
2. Let Pthis be the current peer
3. m = the latest message in Mreceived
4. Qsent = set of disclosures Pthis requested from others
5. Qreceived = set of disclosures others requested from Pthis
6. Qnew = ;
7. Dsent = set of disclosures Pthis sent to others
8. Dreceived = set of disclosures Pthis received from others
9. Dnew = ;
10.
11. if m is a disclosure d then
12. /* Calculate new disclosures Dnew that Pthis will send to other parties */
13. Dunlocked = all disclosures unlocked by d and other disclosures in Dreceived
14. Dnew = Dunlocked \Qreceived  Dsent
15. else if m is a request for disclosure d then
16. if d is already unlocked then
17. Dnew=fdg
18. else
19. /* Calculate new disclosures Qnew that Pthis will request from others */
20. Drelevant = all relevant remote disclosures for d
21. Qnew = Drelevant  Dreceived  Qsent
22.
23. Return the list of messages composed of disclosures in Dnew and requests for
disclosures in Qnew
24. g
Figure 2.3: The basic eager strategy
the disclosures in Dnew and the requests for the disclosures in Qnew, we get the messages
that Pthis will send as a response to m.
We are particularly interested in two basic properties of a strategy: safety and com-
pleteness. A strategy is safe if every disclosure in the negotiation is safe. Assume that
every peer involved in the negotiation follows the same strategy  and is willing to par-
ticipate, and there is no loss of messages. Then strategy  is complete if the negotiation
succeeds whenever there is a safe disclosure sequence for the originating request.
Theorem 2.3 The BES strategy is both safe and complete.
Proof. BES creates new disclosures in only two places, line 14 and 17. In both cases, the
newly added disclosures are unlocked already, which proves the strategy's safety. We use
mathematical induction on the length of the safe disclosure sequence for the originating
31
request to prove its completeness. Let ?d =?Alice"C >Bob be the originating request
in the negotiation, and S be a safe disclosure sequence for d. If the length of S is 1,
d is unlocked already at the beginning of the negotiation. Thus when Alice processes
the request ?d, the condition in line 16 is satised and d is added to the set of items to
be disclosed, which means that the negotiation is successful. Suppose the negotiation is
successful when the length of S is k. Consider the case when S's length is k + 1. If d is
unlocked, the negotiation is trivially successful as shown before. Suppose that d is unlocked
by fd1; d2; : : : ; dmg and each di, 1  i  m, precedes d in S. Then Alice has a rule in her
knowledge base that instantiates to the ground rule d d1^  ^dm^dm+1^  ^dm+m0 ,
where dm+1; : : : ; dm+m0 can already be derived from Alice's local knowledge base. Alice
will request each di from the appropriate party, which can be viewed as a sub-negotiation
with originating request ?di. By Theorem 2.1, di has a safe disclosure sequence whose
length is at most k, which implies that the sub-negotiation for di will succeed. Thus Alice
will receive all di, and d subsequently gets unlocked and disclosed to Bob. By induction,
we conclude that the BES strategy is complete.
2.4.2 Full Eager Strategy
BES guarantees every negotiation to succeed if the negotiation has a safe disclosure se-
quence. If, however, there is no safe disclosure sequence, the original requester will not
hear anything back about its originating request, which also means that it is unable to
decide when to declare that the negotiation has failed. Presumably, we could solve this
issue by requiring the participating parties to respond with an explicit denial message
when the requested disclosure cannot be made. For example, if Alice nds no rule that
can be used to unlock the originating request she receives, she can just explicitly deny this
request. The decision to deny a request, nonetheless, is not always easy to make. Suppose
Alice's decision on whether to disclose d1 depends on whether Bob discloses d2, Bob's
decision on d2 depends on whether Carl discloses d3, and Carl's decision on d3 depends on
whether Alice discloses d1. With such a circular dependency, if nobody makes a decision
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1. FullEagerStrategy (Mreceived, Msent, L) f
2. Let Pthis be the current peer
3. m = the latest message in Mreceived
4. M1 = ;
5. /* A data message is a disclosure or a disclosure request */
6. if m is a data message then
7. M1 = BasicEagerStrategy(Mreceived;Msent; L)
8. else
9. m must be an ACK message &e, for some e 2Msent. Mark e as ACKed.
10.
11. M2 = ;
12. T = the set of all data messages that Pthis received and has not ACKed yet.
13. if all data messages that Pthis sent have been ACKed or Pthis is the originator
then
14. add to M2 an ACK message for every message in T
15. else
16. add to M2 an ACK message for every message in T , except the one with the
earliest receipt time
17.
18. Return M1 [M2
19. g
Figure 2.4: The full eager strategy
until he or she hears from the dependent party, the negotiation gets deadlocked. When
a deadlock happens and no one sends or receives any messages, the subnegotiation that
spawned the deadlock cycle has eectively terminated. In the absence of deadlock, an
MTN under the BES strategy also always terminates. This is because the set of peers
is nite and BES does not repeat messages: each request or disclosure is sent from one
party to another at most once and there are only nitely many potential relevant queries
and disclosures. Given the completeness of BES, the original requester can declare failure
of the negotiation if the originating request has not been granted when the negotiation
terminates. So the problem of detecting the failure of an MTN under BES can be reduced
to the detection of the termination of the MTN.
Dijkstra and Scholten give a signaling scheme [24] that can detect the termination
of a diusion computation. Their signaling scheme tracks the balance of messages and
signals on each edge between two nodes and centers around a number of invariants on these
balances. By enhancing and simplifying their signaling scheme to match the characteristics
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of MTN, we provide a simple acknowledgment (ACK) scheme that can be superimposed
on top of BES and detect the termination of an MTN. This results in an extension of
BES, which we call the Full Eager Strategy (FES). We use two types of messages in FES,
data messages and ACK messages. A data message is either a disclosure or a disclosure
request, as used in BES. An ACK message (&m) acknowledges (abbreviated as ACKs) a
data message m. Each data message gets ACKed exactly once in FES. A peer's state is
disengaged if all the data messages it sent have been ACKed and it has ACKed all the
data messages it received; otherwise, its state is engaged.
Figure 2.4 gives the FES strategy. For a newly received message m, we rst check its
type. If m is a data message, we apply the BES strategy, and get a set of messages M1
that the current peer Pthis will send out. On the other hand, if m is an ACK message for
a data message e that Pthis sent out earlier, we mark e as ACKed. We then calculate the
set of data messages that Pthis is going to ACK. If every data message that Pthis sent out
has been ACKed or Pthis is the originator of the MTN, we ACK all messages in T , the
set of data messages received by Pthis and not ACKed yet. If not all data messages Pthis
sent have been ACKed, Pthis ACKs all in T , except the one that has the earliest receipt
timestamp.
Theorem 2.4 The FES strategy is both safe and complete.
Proof. Since the ACK scheme in FES is superimposed on BES, all data messages are still
sent and processed the same way as in BES, which means BES's safety and completeness
are not aected. Therefore FES is also safe and complete.
Theorem 2.5 In every MTN under FES, the originator's state will eventually become
disengaged. At that point, the negotiation has terminated.
Proof. Suppose when the originator's state becomes disengaged, Alice's state is still
engaged. Then either Alice has not ACKed a data message that she received, or has not
received an ACK for a data message mo that she sent. In the latter case, since Alice is
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not the originator, she must have sent mo as a response to some data message mi that
she received. As mo is still not ACKed, either mi is not ACKed yet, or there exists a
message that Alice received earlier than mi and has not ACKed. In any case, Alice cannot
have ACKed all the data messages she received. Let mA be the earliest data message that
Alice received and has not been ACKed yet. Suppose mA comes from Bob. Since mA is
not ACKed and the originator is disengaged, Bob cannot be the originator. Following the
same analysis for Alice, we infer that Bob cannot have ACKed all the message that he
received. Let mB be the earliest data message that he received and has not been ACKed
yet. Continue on, and we get a chain of messages, mA, mB, mC , : : :. As there are only a
nite number of parties in the MTN, the chain has to form a cycle at some point. Without
loss of generality, assume the chain starts a cycle at Zachary, where Zachary has a data
message mZ that comes from Bob, and mZ is the earliest data message that Zachary
has not yet ACKed. Assume Bob sent mA to Alice as a response to a data message mj
Bob received. Since mA has not been ACKed, either Bob has not ACKed mj or Bob has
another un-ACKed message received earlier than mj . Since mB is the earliest un-ACKed
data message that Bob received, we have that Bob sent mA to Alice after Carl sent mB to
Bob. Denote this situation as mA  mB. Continuing on, we have mB  mC , mC  mD,
. . . , mZ  mB, which exhibits a contradiction. So Alice's state has to be disengaged. We
further get that all parties are disengaged. Since all the data messages have been ACK'ed,
no one can send (or receive) any ACK message unless they receive (or send, resp.) another
data message. No one can receive another data message unless somebody sends a new
data message. Yet if we examine the FES strategy, we nd that a peer cannot send a
message unless its current state is engaged. Thus we conclude that no one can send or
receive any message, i.e., the MTN has terminated.
We now show that the MTN is guaranteed to terminate. If the MTN never terminates,
there has to be an innite sequence of messages that can be sent between the parties.
Similar to BES, however, the FES strategy does not repeat messages: each data message
is sent from one party to another at most once, each data message is ACKed at most
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once, and there are only nitely many dierent relevant data messages, which prevents an
innite message sequence. So the MTN always terminates.
Now we show that when the negotiation terminates, the originator is in the disengaged
state. Suppose Alice is the originator and her state is still engaged after the termination.
Then the last time Alice sent or received a message, there must have been at least one
data message that Alice sent and that has not been ACKed; otherwise, Alice would have
become disengaged. Let mA be such a data message, and assume this message was sent to
Bob. Following the same analysis for Alice, we get the existence of an un-ACKed message
mB, sent by Bob. Continuing on, we get a sequence of messages mA, mB, mC , : : :. Since
there are only nitely many parties, the sequence has to form a cycle at some point, i.e.,
there exists mZ in the sequence, such that mZ is an un-ACKed data message and was sent
to x, with mx occurring before mZ in the sequence. Alice, as the originator, has ACKed
all the data messages she received; so x cannot be Alice. Bob has ACKed all the message
he received, except mA; so x cannot be Bob. Continuing on, we nd that x cannot be
anyone such that mx occurs before mZ in the sequence, which contradicts the assumption
that the sequence forms a cycle at mZ . Thus Alice has to be in the disengaged state when
the MTN terminates.
2.5 Cautious Strategy
As the eager strategies aggressively explore possible routes to speed up the negotiation
by requesting all relevant remote disclosures at the same time, some pending requests
become unnecessary and irrelevant when their alternatives are successfully explored. Con-
sequently, the participating parties may send more messages to one another than strictly
necessary. For example, when all parties are willing to participate, FES will eventually
nd all proofs that the originating request holds, rather than stopping and canceling all
pending requests once it nds the rst successful proof. Since credentials can contain
sensitive and valuable information, some parties will place a high priority on their pri-
vacy and would prefer to disclose fewer of their credentials, even at the cost of increased
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1. CautiousStrategy (Mreceived, Msent, L) f
2. Let Pthis be the current peer
3. m = the latest message in Mreceived
4.
5. if m is a request for a disclosure d then
6. e = d
7. else
8. m must be a disclosure d or a denial !d.
9. Let ?e be the latest request in Mreceived that has not been denied or disclosed,
and for which d is relevant.
10. if no such ?e exists then
11. /* The originating request of the negotiation must be for d. If m is a dis-
closure, the MTN has succeeded; otherwise, m is a denial message, and the
MTN has failed. */
12. Return ;
13. if e is already unlocked then
14. Return feg
15. Let S be the set containing all remote disclosures f such that (1) f is relevant to
e, (2) f has not been received by Pthis, (3) if Pthis has requested f , that request
has been denied; and (4) Pthis has not requested f since it received ?e
16. if S is empty then
17. /* There are no more disclosures that Pthis can request to unlock e */
18. Return f !e g
19. Pick one disclosure g from S
20. Return f?gg
21. g
Figure 2.5: The cautious strategy
negotiation time.
To meet these needs, we propose the cautious strategy, which aims to reduce credential
disclosures by making fewer requests in the rst place. Under the cautious strategy, when
Alice receives a request for a disclosure d that is still locked, she selects only one relevant
remote disclosure to request from another party, instead of concurrently requesting all
relevant remote disclosures that are still missing in her knowledge base. If the selected
disclosure request gets denied, she requests another relevant remote disclosure, and re-
peats the process until she runs out of options; at that point she explicitly denies the
request for d. Since the MTN is distributed among multiple parties, Alice may eventually
have sent multiple unanswered requests, and special care must be taken to avoid circular
dependencies and prevent deadlock.
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Figure 2.5 describes the cautious strategy. We rst examine the type of the message
m newly received by the current peer Pthis. If m is a request for disclosure d, we record
this information in e and save e for later reference. If m is a disclosure d or a denial
for disclosure !d, we examine Pthis's received messages to nd the disclosure e that Pthis
was trying to unlock at the time that it requested d. If no such e exists, d must be the
disclosure in the originating request; in this case, since the originating request has been
answered, we can tell whether the negotiation has succeeded or failed. In other cases, we
need to continue to process the request for disclosure e. If e is unlocked already, we add it
to the return message so that it gets subsequently disclosed. If e is still locked, we examine
e's relevant remote disclosures to nd those that Pthis can potentially request. Let q be
the latest request for e in Pthis's received messages, and f be any of e's relevant remote
disclosures that are not present in Pthis's knowledge base. If we requested f already and
have not received a response to that request, we should not request f again, as otherwise
a cyclic dependency is established. If f was requested after q's receipt time and denied
already, there is no need to repeat the request for f , because the request for f will be
denied again. If there are no more relevant remote disclosures to request, we have to deny
the request for e.
Line 19 of the cautious strategy involves a strategic decision. Based on Alice's past
experience, if she thinks that a received request e is likely to be denied eventually, she can
choose to request the relevant remote disclosures for e that are most likely to be denied,
to minimize the expected amount of eort that she must expend before she can deny e.
If she expects that e will not be denied and she wants to grow her knowledge base, she
might prefer to send as many requests as possible (to gather as much new information as
possible) before concluding that e holds. Under this approach, she needs to delay making
new requests that are likely to unlock e, until she has made as many other relevant requests
as possible.
Theorem 2.6 The cautious strategy is both safe and complete. Further, every negotiation
under the cautious strategy eventually terminates, with the original request either denied
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or disclosed (granted).
Proof The cautious strategy makes the decision to authorize a disclosure only at line 5,
under the condition that the disclosure is already unlocked. This guarantees safety.
To show completeness, we induct on the length of the safe disclosure sequence for the
originating request. Let ?d =?Alice"C >Bob be the originating request in the negotiation,
and Seq be a safe disclosure sequence for d. When the length of Seq is 1, d is unlocked at
the beginning of the negotiation. Thus when Alice processes the request ?d, the condition
in line 5 is satised and d is returned for disclosure, which means the negotiation is
successful. Suppose the negotiation is successful when the length of Seq is k. Consider
the case when Seq's length is k+1. If d is unlocked, the negotiation is trivially successful as
shown before. Suppose that d is unlocked by U = fd1; : : : ; dmg, where each di, 1  i  m,
precedes d in Seq. When Alice receives the request ?d, she will determine the set of d's
relevant remote disclosures, which is a superset of U . Assume for the moment that every
request ?di Alice sends to another peer is eventually either granted or denied. In this case,
unless Alice has unlocked d already, she will eventually request all di. Alice's request for
di can be viewed as a sub-negotiation. By Theorem 2.1, di has a safe disclosure sequence
whose length is at most k, which means the sub-negotiation for di will succeed, i.e., di will
be disclosed to Alice. So unless Alice has unlocked d already, she will eventually receive
all di. Then d is unlocked and she will disclose it to Bob. By induction, we conclude that
the cautious strategy is complete.
Now we show that every request in the cautious strategy is eventually granted or
denied. Before the negotiation starts, we draw a tree with only its root node N0, and mark
N0 as the current node. When Alice receives the originating request ?d0 =?Alice"C >Bob,
we add an edge from the current node to a new node N1, labeling the edge as d0. We
record the current node as N1. Now Alice must (1) grant d0 (line 14), (2) deny d0 (line
18), or (3) issue an additional request for a remote relevant disclosure d1 from some peer
Carl to unlock d0 (line 19). In the rst two cases, we mark the edge N0N1 between the
current node and its parent node as visited, and mark the current node's parent N0 as the
39
new current node. Now the current node is the root node, and all edges of the tree have
been visited. Since each ongoing request (one that has been neither granted or denied) is
represented by an unvisited edge, there are now no ongoing queries in the system. In case
(3), we draw an edge from the current node to a new node N2, label the edge as d1, and
mark the current node as N2.
Meanwhile, Carl also has to follow one of the same three cases as Alice. So as the
negotiation evolves, the following invariants are always true: (a) the ongoing requests
correspond to the unvisited edges, which form a path all the way from the current node
to the root node; (b) when the current node is the root node, the originating request has
been granted or denied, there are no ongoing requests in the system, and all messages
have been delivered. Since there are only nitely many peers, each edge is marked with
a disclosure in an ongoing request, and there cannot be two identical ongoing requests
due to the constraints in line 15, we know that the path from the current node to the
root has only a nite number of edges. The number of remote relevant disclosures for a
requested disclosure di is always nite at every peer, which means each node in the tree
can have only nitely many children. Thus the tree we can draw is nite even in the limit;
i.e., every path to the root has a nite length, and each node has only a nite number
of children. This guarantees that the root node will eventually become the current node.
Thus the originating request always gets granted or denied; when it happens, the MTN
terminates.
2.6 Summary
To allow trust to be established between more than two parties, we have proposed MTN
as a new approach to multiparty authorization. MTN extends and reinvents the core
concepts and theories of ATN, while also addressing the new challenges of coordinating
interleaved communication between parties, detecting circular dependencies, and provid-
ing scalability in a fully decentralized environment. Our solution approach addresses all
key aspects of MTN, including the policy language, negotiation protocols, and strategies.
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The DARCL policy language is designed for MTN, yet can also serve as a general purpose
policy language. DARCL policies can base authorization decisions on credential distribu-
tions, allowing the policy writer to specify ner-grained security constraints than in other
policy languages, without loss of exibility. Our diusion negotiation protocol provides a
lightweight, eective set of communication conventions that supports a fully distributed
approach to MTN, without relying on trusted third parties to coordinate the negotiation.
Our eager and cautious negotiation strategies are safe and complete, with dierent trade-
os between privacy and speed: the eager strategy is willing to disclose more credentials
than the cautious strategy, in order to speed up the negotiation.
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Chapter 3
The PeerAccess Framework
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we show that MTN is a exible and secure approach to estab-
lishing trust among multiple parties. MTN's interactive nature, however, requires all the
participating parties involved in the authorization to be online. If Alice does not have
enough time to make all the authorizations that she is supposed to and would like to des-
ignate Bob to make some decisions on her behalf, she cannot easily do so within the MTN
framework; i.e., MTN does not provide direct support for delegation. Another aspect
that is not addressed in MTN is redissemination control: after Alice receives a credential
from Bob, it is up to Bob's discretion whom he is willing to re-disseminate this credential
to. In another word, Alice loses control of a credential once she discloses it to Bob. But
in the real world, Alice may want Bob to sign a non-disclosure form so that he cannot
further disclose anything from Alice without her explicit permission. These requirements
were not readily addressed in MTN and prompted us to create a general framework that
can satisfy the assorted authorization needs of a diverse set of peers in open distributed
systems.1
Researchers have examined many of the separate aspects of distributed authorization.
For example, [7] studies the problem of creating distributed proofs under an information
pull paradigm, when all peers cooperate to the maximum extent possible. The authors of
[53] study the problem of nding needed credentials at runtime, and propose a solution
based on credential typing (e.g., query the issuer to nd a certain kind of credential). Other
1This chapter is based on the material originally published in [85].
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papers [30, 6] present a runtime system for constructing distributed proofs of authorization,
given authoritative information on where to go to nd needed credentials. In a similar
way, in [37, 38, 10, 11] policies encode information about where to go to nd certain needed
facts. These and the other works cited above study useful pieces of the picture, but we
found that the separate pieces often did not t together to form a solution to real-world
authorization needs. For example, real-world peers do not exhaustively try to answer all
queries they receive, as in [7]. In fact, a peer may behave quite dierently depending on
who is asking for help and why they are asking for help. We wanted a way to talk about
sticky policies [40] (release policies that are permanently attached to the information they
protect), but also wanted to be able to describe non-sticky policies within the same open
system. In [6], credentials have sticky release policies, and those policies are propagated
to all conclusions derived using those credentials. This interesting approach will be too
restrictive for many situations, and it is embedded into the syntax of the language, making
it hard to change.
A type-based credential discovery system, as in [53], is not exible enough to model the
evolving behavior of credential and authorization servers in computational grids, where
there is often no visible relationship between the party whose signature Alice wishes to
have on a fact and the party Alice must go to to obtain that signature. In [30, 37, 10, 11],
information on where to obtain each credential is expressed by labeling each credential
occurrence in a policy with exactly one peer. Credential location hints are axed inside the
policy and must be replicated in each rule, although the strategy for nding a credential
often depends on the credential class and not on the rule where the credential is referred
to|a kind of replication that may introduce errors. In general, decoupling access control
policies from meta-policies such as credential fetching strategies, release policies, etc.,
seems a good policy engineering principle, and a step towards declarative authorization
control.
Armed with a laundry list of features that we needed to reason about authorization in
open systems, and a set of intended uses, we set out to design a logic-based authorization
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framework called PeerAccess. PeerAccess features a declarative and expressive underlying
policy language with a formal semantics and proof theory. To address the needs of dis-
semination control as well as re-dissemination control, PeerAccess provides sticky release
policies where only the original owner of a resource controls where the resource can be
released to. PeerAccess allows one to model the local reasoning of individual peers who
are unaware of the internal state of other peers, and also allows one to reason about pos-
sible future global evolution of the system's properties such as safety and liveness. Peers
maintain local autonomy since each can have their own release control policies.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We introduce the architecture and
describe the language in section 3.2, then present PeerAccess knowledge bases in section
3.3, release policies in section 3.4, semantics and xpoint characterization in section 3.5,
proof theory in section 3.6, proof hints and queries in section 3.7, and nally summarize
in section 3.8.
3.2 Framework and Language
The PeerAccess framework supports a possibly innite set of peers, each with its own
separate knowledge base (KB) of policy-related information (Figure 3.1). Peers commu-
nicate with one another by pushing information in messages, or by pulling information
through queries. The high-level behavior of each peer (i.e., what information it pushes
and to whom, whose queries it tries to answer, how hard it tries to answer them, and
the kinds of answers it gives) is determined by declarative event-condition-action rules for
that peer. The lower-level behavior of each peer is determined by the contents of its KB,
which include its own local knowledge and information that it has received from others.
Its KB includes tight controls on what information it can send out or receive in messages,
and hints regarding what peers to contact for help if it is trying to prove certain types
of conclusions. At a high level, the language for KBs and messages can be thought of
as logic programs with an open-world semantics, plus two modal operators related to the
said operator in [43] (to provide nonrepudiation for message contents and justication of
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Figure 3.1: PeerAccess architecture and KB structure
proof results), plus a sprinkling of second-order constructs to allow declarative specica-
tion of information release policies and hints about how to construct proofs (but without
introducing high runtime complexity).
The PeerAccess policy language consists of a modal language|called the base lan-
guage|and a modal metalanguage, each with a separate countable pool of variables.
Roughly speaking, the base language species basic access control policies and related
rules; the metalanguage species metapolicies that determine the dynamic behavior of
the system.
The base policy language is based on standard Datalog atoms, built from a count-
ably innite supply of constants (to model open domains). A distinguished subset of
the constants, N , contains all possible peer names. The set of predicates is application
dependent. We italicize variable names, to distinguish them from constants, functions,
and predicate names. At the base level, modal atoms, called facts, are expressions of the
form \P signs" or \P lsigns", where P 2 N and  is a Datalog atom. A rule is an
expression f0  f1 ^    ^ fn, where each fi is a fact and n  0. Facts are special cases of
rules, where n = 0. If f0 is of the form \P signs", then the rule or fact is directly signed
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by P ; otherwise, f0 has the form \P lsigns" and the rule or fact is logically signed by
P . (We will omit the signatures on equality and inequality atoms, since all peers agree on
the truth of such atoms.)
Intuitively, the terms of the metalanguage consists of all formulas in the language
(viewed as strings), and the predicates of the metalanguage describe the properties of
those strings. More precisely, the set of metaterms includes the metavariables plus a
distinct function name s for each symbol s of the two languages (predicates, variables,
constants, and logical connectives), subject to the restriction that s = s. In this way,
each base or metaexpression e can be represented by a metaterm e built with the naming
functions.2 The nonmodal atoms of the metalanguage are built in the usual way from
metapredicates, metaterms, and base terms. Facts are dened as above, i.e., as modal
metalanguage atoms. Rules have the same form as above; their bodies may contain both
base facts and metafacts, while the head f0 must belong to the metalanguage. Variable
instantiations must map metavariables to metaterms and base variables to base terms, so
that every instance of a well-formed expression is well-formed, too. To enhance readability,
we shall often write e as e; the context will always make clear whether e playing the role
of a term or a rule.
Each peer has a separate knowledge base (Figure 3.1) of facts, rules, and received
messages. Each KB contains the following nite sets of formulas:
1. Its base policies, which are rules over the base language.
2. All messages it ever received from other peers. Each message is a nite set of rules.
(In this thesis, we will not make use of the set of messages sent by a peer, other than
avoiding sending a peer the same message twice.)
3. Its release policies, containing rules about release predicates.
2This construction also allows many metaterms that do not correspond to legal ex-
pressions in the underlying language. For example, consider metaterms Alice and
Age(Manager(Alice;Bob ^ Carla;Carla David)), where Age and Manager are base predicates.
An implementation of PeerAccess can disallow these nonsensical terms, but their presence does not aect
the underlying theory.
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4. Its hints for nding proofs, containing rules about where to look for a particular
credential.
5. Other metalevel policies, such as exposure policies to lter out received messages
that the peer is not interested in, and ECA style policies to customize a peer's high
level behavior.
Denition 3.1 (KB) A PeerAccess global KB P contains one local KB for each peer:
P = f(j;Pj) j j 2 Ng
where Pj is peer j's local KB, i.e., the set of all messages it has received and its base,
release, and proof hint policies; and N is the set of all peer names in the language.
We will omit \global" and \local" when referring to a KB, when the context is clear.
3.3 Base Policies
Intuitively, the directly signed fact \Alice signs " in Bob's KB means that Alice has
asserted in a non-repudiable manner that  holds at Alice|e.g., Alice has digitally signed
 and sent out a message whose contents have eventually made their way to Bob. The
logically signed fact \Alice lsigns " in Bob's KB means that Bob has nonrepudiable
evidence that leads to the conclusion that Alice would be willing to digitally sign , if
shown this evidence. The meaning of directly and logically signed rules is similar: Alice
sends her directly signed rule to Bob to convince him that the logically signed counterpart
of the rule (created by replacing \signs" by \lsigns" in the rule head) is true at Alice.
We assume that whenever Alice wants to send a message to Bob, she succeeds in
sending the message, Bob receives it successfully, and Bob is able to verify that its contents
have not been tampered with and were actually signed by their reputed signers.
We present the formal semantics for signs and lsigns in Section 3.5; for the moment,
it suces to explain the three major characteristics of signs and lsigns that must hold in
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every KB interpretation at every peer:
1. If a directly signed rule is true at a peer Alice, then its logically signed counterpart
is also true at Alice.
2. If facts f1 through fn and the logically signed rule f  f1 ^    ^ fn are all true at
a peer Alice, then f is also true at Alice.
3. If a rule logically signed by Alice is true at Alice, then so is its directly signed
counterpart.
Before any peer has sent out any message, we require that each local KB contain only
self-signed statements. This ensures that if Alice's KB eventually contains a fact directly
signed by Bob, then Bob's KB does also.
Our running example models the behavior of the Community Authorization Service
(CAS) [62] under several dierent possible trust assumptions. CAS is a third-party au-
thorization service that simplies the task of making a resource available on a high-
performance computing grid, by ooading authorization reasoning from the resource
manager to CAS. For example, consider the shake table, an earthquake simulation de-
vice that is managed by Bob, under the following possible scenarios.The examples will
only be fully meaningful to the reader after we have presented the PeerAccess formal se-
mantics. Conversely, the formal semantics will be very hard to follow unless the reader
has an intuition about what PeerAccess is trying to accomplish. We resolve this impasse
by presenting simple examples before the semantics.
Example 1a In this example, Bob owns and brokers all access to the shake table, and
makes and directly signs his own authorization decisions. In particular, Alice will be able
to access the shake table if \Bob signs auth(shaketable, Alice)" is true at Bob. Bob may
store a list of authorized users/groups internally, or he may delegate his reasoning to CAS
as follows:
Bob:
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Bob signs auth(shaketable, X)  CAS signs auth(shaketable, X)
Bob's base policy says that he will give Alice access if he has a statement directly signed
by CAS, saying that Alice is authorized. If Bob's KB interpretation satises \Bob lsigns
auth(shaketable, Alice)", then it also satises \Bob signs auth(shaketable, Alice)".
Example 2a Let us change Bob's KB by one letter:
Bob:
Bob signs auth(shaketable, X)  CAS lsigns auth(shaketable, X)
Now Bob wants a logical signature on CAS's proof of authorization, rather than requiring
a direct signature from CAS. In other words, Bob is now asking for a proof that would
convince CAS that Alice is authorized to access the shake table. The pieces of the proof
need not come directly from CAS. For example, for greater protection against attack,
CAS could pre-sign its authorization-related rules and facts o line, and push them to
a repository CAS-DB that does not have access to CAS's private keys. Then CAS-DB's
base policies and received messages can be as follows:
CAS-DB:
CAS signs auth(shaketable, X)  CAS signs authgroup(shaketable, G)
^ CAS signs member(G, X)
CAS signs authgroup(shaketable, earthquake)
CAS signs member(earthquake, Alice)
To convince Bob that Alice can access the shake table, it suces to send Bob a message
containing CAS-DB's rule and facts. Once Bob receives this message and incorporates
its contents into his KB, the three principles outlined earlier guarantee that CAS lsigns
auth(shaketable, Alice) is true at Bob.
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Example 3a If the body of CAS-DB's rule uses `lsigns' instead of `signs', then we have
the possibility that the proof of group membership is dened by other rules:
CAS-DB:
CAS signs auth(shaketable, X)  CAS lsigns authgroup(shaketable, G)
^ CAS lsigns member(G, X)
CAS signs member(G, X)  O lsigns member(G, X) ^ CAS lsigns owner(G, O)
CAS signs authgroup(R, G)  O lsigns authgroup(R, G) ^ CAS lsigns owner(R, O)
Here CAS is not responsible for maintaining the lists of current group members or autho-
rized groups. Instead this task is delegated to the owners of each group and resource. The
group owners may have cached their signed group membership lists at CAS-DB, or may
provide them on demand to CAS-DB or to the group members, as discussed later.
3.4 Release Policies
In PeerAccess, peers exchange information by sending messages to one another. Every
fact and rule that a peer Alice sends out in a message must be true at Alice and must
also be releasable. A release policy signed by peer P gives the conditions under which P
thinks that it is permissible for a fact or rule  to be sent in a message from peer S to
peer R. In this thesis, we will consider release policies over the srelease (sticky-release)
predicate, which take the following forms:
P signs srelease (; S;R) f1 ^    ^ fn
P lsigns srelease (; S;R) f1 ^    ^ fn
where P , S, and R are peer names or variables;  is a term over the release policy language
(e.g., a base rule or a proof hint (dened later)); and f1 through fn are facts, with n  0.
Intuitively, srelease semantics stipulate that a peer Alice can send peer R a fact or rule 
directly signed by Bob if (1)  is true at Alice, and (2) \Bob lsigns srelease(, Alice, R)",
\R = Alice", or \R = Bob" is true at Alice. In other words, Alice can only send out a
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formula signed by Bob if she is sending it to herself or to Bob, or she can prove that Bob
thinks that it is okay for her to send the message out. Further, Alice can only send out
facts and rules that she believes to be true.
The srelease policies are sticky: the signer of a particular piece of information retains
control over its future dissemination to other peers. (Of course, a malicious peer can
choose to violate the conditions in a sticky policy, if it is not afraid of the potential legal
and social ramications of doing so.) As abuse and leakage of information by the recip-
ient could violate the privacy of the original information owner with potentially serious
consequences, sticky policies are desirable and even legally mandated in many situations.
Additional release predicates, however, can be dened to t the needs of a particular
set of peers, including limited forms of declassication and the ability to spread rumors
(lsigned and unsigned formulas) and lies (formulas not true locally). There are other sit-
uations that may require a graceful approach to declassication of information, or even
stronger control over the use of released information (e.g., control over the dissemination
of conclusions reached by using that information), which we will address in chapter 5. In
another variation, a direct but unsigned communication \auth(Alice, shaketable)" from
CAS might convince Bob that \CAS lsigns auth(Alice, shaketable)" is true, but CAS could
repudiate such a statement as a \rumor", and Bob would be unable to use CAS's message
to convince a third party that \CAS lsigns auth(Alice, shaketable)" is true. While such
a variation is interesting in its own right, in this research we conne our attention to the
release of directly signed rules. The three principles given earlier regarding the meaning
of signatures on base facts and rules also apply directly to release policy facts and rules.
Let us revisit examples 1-3 to see the eect of release policies.
Example 1b (Bob makes and signs his own authorization decisions for the resource he
owns.) For Bob to be able to tell Alice that she is authorized, Bob can use rules of the
form:
Bob:
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Bob signs srelease(Bob signs auth(X, Y ), Bob, Y )
Bob signs srelease(Bob signs auth(X, Y ), Y , X)
Bob's rst release fact says that he will release an authorization decision to the principal
who is authorized by that decision. This allows Bob to tell Alice that she is authorized to
access the shake table. However, this may not be enough for Alice to be able to use that
authorization, e.g., if she has to present that authorization to the shake table herself. To
do so, Alice must know that Bob says that it is okay for her to release his authorization
decision to the shake table. Bob's second release fact accomplishes this goal. By the
principles given above, Bob can send a directly signed version of his second release fact
to Alice. If he sends her his authorization decision and the release policy, her KB will
contain:
Alice:
Bob signs auth(shaketable, Alice)
Bob signs srelease(Bob signs auth(X, Y ), Y , X)
At this point, Alice can access the shake table by sending it \Bob signs auth(shaketable,
Alice)", because that formula is satised in her interpretation, and so is \Bob lsigns
release(auth(shaketable, Alice), Alice, shaketable)".
While Bob's proposed release rules are a good start, they are insucient for use on the
computational grids that CAS is designed for. The problem is that on those grids, Alice
delegates her authority to a subjob, which in turn delegates its authority to a subjob, and
so on, until eventually a subjob accesses the shake table. The rules given above only allow
Alice to give her decision directly to one party, who cannot release it further. To allow
Alice to release the authorization to someone who could in turn release it again, Bob can
add the following rule to his release policies:
Bob lsigns srelease(Bob signs auth(X, Y ), Z, W )  Z 6= Bob
The principles outlined earlier imply that Bob can release this new release policy to anyone.
If the policy is too generous for Bob's tastes, he could add restrictions on the recipient W
52
to the body of the rule, e.g., W must be a member of NeesGrid, a friend of Bob, a proxy
of Alice, etc. He could even require that he himself certify the property in question, e.g.,
Bob lsigns member(NeesGrid, W ). Any such restrictions in the policy will also limit the
set of peers that Bob can disclose the policy to.
One weakness of this version of Bob's release policies is that he does not allow Alice to
impose her own additional controls on who is allowed to see \Bob signs auth(shaketable,
Alice)". If the shake table were a sensitive resource, Alice might not want her authorization
to be released to just anyone. To x this problem, Bob can replace his third release policy
by the following:
Bob:
Bob signs srelease(Bob signs auth(X, Y ), Z, W )  
Z 6= Bob ^ Y lsigns condRelease(Bob signs auth(X, Y ), Z;W )
Here Bob's original srelease condition, Z 6= Bob, has been augmented with a second
condition that says that the authorized principal (e.g., Alice) must also agree that Bob's
statement can be released from peer Z to peer W . With this additional restriction, \Bob
signs auth(shaketable, Alice)" can only be sent to additional peers when both Bob and
Alice agree that it can be sent.
Even this new version of Bob's release policies might not satisfy Alice, who might wish
to unilaterally impose additional release constraints of her own on the information from
Bob that passes through her hands. For example, if Bob is a child and Alice is his mother,
Bob might be willing to pass his own information on to anyone. To protect her family's
privacy, however, Alice may wish to limit the further disclosure of Bob's information, at
least in the case where that information has passed through her hands. Peers can impose
such controls if we employ a release predicate with more restrictive semantics than srelease.
Let us now loosen the restriction that Bob makes his own authorization decisions, and
have Bob delegate part of that task to CAS. To accomplish this, we add two additional
rules to Bob's KB:
Bob:
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Bob signs auth(shaketable, X)  CAS signs auth(shaketable, X)
Bob signs srelease(Bob signs auth(shaketable, X)  
CAS signs auth(shaketable, X), Z, W )
Bob publicly declares that he relies on CAS for his authorization decisions. His rst release
policy allows him to send a directly signed version of his rule to Alice when she wants
to access the shake table. When Alice obtains releasable evidence from CAS that she
is authorized to access the shake table (i.e, \CAS signs auth(shaketable, Alice)", along
with \CAS signs srelease (CAS signs auth(R;X); Y; Z)"), she can present the fact \CAS
signs auth(shaketable, Alice)" to Bob along with his delegation rule. (She can present the
rule to him because he signed it. So, she can send the rule back to Bob even though he
does not send her a copy of his release policy for the rule.) CAS's fact and Bob's rule
together imply that Bob lsigns auth(shaketable, Alice), so Bob should be convinced that
Alice can access the shake table. At this point, \Bob lsigns auth(shaketable, Alice)" is
true at Bob, from which it follows that \Bob signs auth(shaketable, Alice)" is also true
at Bob. Further, Bob's original release policy shows that the authorization \Bob signs
auth(shaketable, Alice)" can be released to Alice. Bob can also send Alice his conditional
release rule, which lets Alice do anything she likes with the authorization that he gives
her.
Example 2b In this case, CAS has delegated its authorization tasks to CAS-DB, and
Bob wants to see a proof from CAS that Alice can access the shake table:
Bob:
Bob signs auth(shaketable, X)  CAS lsigns auth(shaketable, X)
Bob signs srelease(Bob signs auth(shaketable, X)  
CAS lsigns auth(shaketable, X), Y , Z)
CAS-DB:
CAS signs auth(shaketable, X)  CAS signs authgroup(shaketable, G)
^ CAS signs member(G, X)
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CAS signs authgroup(shaketable, earthquake)
CAS signs member(earthquake, Alice)
If we adopt the same approach to release rules as in Example 1b, then CAS-DB would have
the release policy \CAS signs srelease(CAS signs auth(R;X); Y; Z)". This is not helpful,
as CAS-DB cannot derive any facts of the form \CAS signs auth(R, X)"; CAS-DB can
only derive logically signed authorizations. CAS needs to authorize CAS-DB to release all
the details of the proof, so that CAS-DB can convince others that it is faithfully mirroring
CAS's reasoning:
CAS-DB:
CAS signs srelease(CAS lsigns auth(shaketable, X)  
CAS signs authgroup(shaketable, G) ^ CAS signs member(G;X); Y; Z)
CAS signs srelease(CAS signs authgroup(X;G); Z;W )
CAS signs srelease(CAS signs member(G;Y ); Z;W )
For brevity, we have set up these three release policies so that everything is publicly
releasable. In practice, CAS would probably prefer to be less trusting of CAS-DB, and only
authorize CAS-DB to release Alice's membership credential to Alice, while still allowing
Alice to release it to anyone she chooses. Similarly, CAS might choose to limit the initial
release of authgroup(shaketable, earthquake) to members of the earthquake group. CAS
could also limit the initial release of its delegation rule so that CAS-DB can only give it
to authorized shake table users, if desired. We will not write out these more restrictive
rules here, because Example 1b has already shown how to write such policies.
To convince Bob that Alice can access the shake table, it suces for Alice to send
Bob a message containing CAS-DB's base rule and base facts, from which CAS lsigns
auth(shaketable, Alice) follows. Alice does not need to send release policies for CAS-DB's
rules and facts, because Bob does not release them further. Because Bob directly signs
his own conclusions, he can send out that conclusion regardless of the sticky policies on
the information he used to reach that conclusion.
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Example 3b In this example, CAS does not maintain the lists of current group mem-
bers. CAS-DB has the three base rules dened earlier, a sprinkling of cached facts, and
release policies from CAS authorizing public dissemination of the rules:
CAS-DB:
CAS signs auth(shaketable, X)  
CAS lsigns authgroup(shaketable, G) ^ CAS lsigns member(G, X)
CAS signs member(G, X)  O lsigns member(G, X) ^ CAS lsigns owner(G, O)
CAS signs authgroup(R, G)  O lsigns authgroup(R, G) ^ CAS lsigns owner(R, O)
CAS signs owner(earthquake, earthquakeOwner)
CAS signs owner(shaketable, Bob)
earthquakeOwner signs member(earthquake, Alice)
Bob signs authgroup(shaketable, earthquake)
CAS signs srelease(CAS signs auth(shaketable, X)  
CAS lsigns authgroup(shaketable, G) ^ CAS lsigns member(G, X), Y , Z)
CAS signs srelease(CAS signs member(G, X)  
O lsigns member(G, X) ^ CAS lsigns owner(G, O), Y , Z)
CAS signs srelease(CAS signs authgroup(R, G)  
O lsigns authgroup(R, G) ^ CAS lsigns owner(R, O), Y , Z)
To convince Bob that she can access the shake table, Alice will need to convince
him that CAS lsigns auth(shaketable, Alice). From CAS-DB's facts and rules, it follows
that \CAS lsigns auth(shaketable, Alice)" is true at CAS-DB. However, CAS-DB can
only send directly signed atoms and rules in messages, and \CAS signs auth(shaketable,
Alice)" is not true at CAS-DB. Thus, if CAS-DB wants to be helpful, it must give
Alice a set of atoms and rules from which it follows that CAS lsigns auth(shaketable,
Alice). The release policies given above authorize CAS-DB to release all relevant in-
formation except \earthquakeOwner signs member(earthquake, Alice)" and \Bob signs
authgroup(shaketable, earthquake)". To release these atoms, \earthquakeOwner lsigns
srelease(earthquakeOwner signs member(earthquake, Alice), CAS-DB, Alice)" and \Bob
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lsigns srelease(Bob signs authgroup(shaketable, earthquake), CAS-DB, Alice)" must be
true at CAS-DB. Further, for Alice to make use of the information CAS-DB gives her,
she must be able to release it as well. This need implies that CAS-DB should have cached
release policies from earthquakeOwner and Bob, because it will need these policies every
time it receives a query about access, and it will receive such queries constantly.
The PeerAccess framework can be instantiated with a release predicate dierent from
srelease if CAS should have the authority to override the wishes of the group and resource
owner in releasing group membership lists and lists of authorized groups, or if CAS-DB's
release of \O signs authgroup(R, G)" should require the permission of R's owner as well
as O. We will discuss this in Chapter5.
3.5 PeerAccess Semantics
Denition 3.2 (Possible world) A possible world W is a set of logically signed ground
facts that satises the Herbrand domain assumption, i.e., \X = X" 2W for every ground
choice of X, and \X 6= Y " 2W for every pair of distinct choices of X and Y .
The fact \CAS lsigns srelease(CAS signs auth(X, Y ), Alice, Bob)" is not ground:
variables and metavariables cannot occur anywhere in a ground formula or in a possible
world.
Denition 3.3 (Interpretation) A PeerAccess interpretation I is a set containing one
local interpretation for each peer, i.e., I = f(j; Ij) j j 2 Ng. Peer j's interpretation is
Ij = (Wj ; Sj), where Wj is a set of possible worlds and Sj is a set of rules directly signed
by other peers.
Wj is a set of possible worlds because correct local reasoning about authorization in
an open system requires an open world assumption.3
3With a closed world assumption, we could have the following scenario: A university U delegates
all responsibility to its registrar R for determining who is a student: \U lsigns student(X)  R lsigns
student(X)". U does not maintain any lists of students itself. Under a closed world assumption, \U lsigns
student(Alice)  U lsigns student(Bob)" is true at U, because U does not know that Bob is a student. If
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We dene the truth of a formula in I as follows, where A is the name of an arbitrary
peer:
Denition 3.4 (j=, Model)
1. I j=A , for a logically signed ground rule  of the form f  f1 ^    ^ fm, i for
each world W in WA, either f 2W or there exists some 1  j  m, such that
 fj (or, if fj is directly signed, fj's logically signed counterpart)is not in W , or
 fj is directly signed by someone other than A, and there does not exist g 2 SA
that can be instantiated to fj.
2. I j=A , for a logically signed non-ground rule , i for every ground instance 0 of
, I j=A 0.
3. I j=A , for a directly signed rule , i both of the following hold:
  2 SA, if  is not directly signed by A;
 I j=A 0, where 0 is the logically signed counterpart of .
4. I j=A , for a set  of rules, i for all  2 , I j=A . In this case, we say that I
is a model of  at A and  is true in IA.
5. I j= P, for a global KB P, i for all peers A 2 N , I j=A PA. In this case, we say
that I is a model of P and P is true in I.
The preceding denition of an interpretation holds for any instantiation of the Peer-
Access framework.
One can view the evolution of a global KB over time as being represented by a sequence
I1; I2; : : :, where each evolution step corresponds to a set of messages being sent in parallel
between peers. Each such message can add formulas to the local KBs, but the contents of
U signs and sends this true rule to Alice, and Alice obtains proof that Bob is a student, then Alice will
have a proof of U lsigns student(Alice), which U never intended. An open world assumption prevents this
rule from ever being true at U (because U has possible worlds where Bob is a student), thereby preventing
its dissemination in messages.
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the local KBs are bounded above: there are only so many new messages that can be sent.
As a result, for each legal initial global KB there is exactly one canonical model, written
P, which is the interpretation representing the maximal attainable state of knowledge
across all peers. In this study, we do not allow peers to delete formulas from their KBs,
or to insert formulas other than those that arrive in messages. Each KB also has one
unique isolated model, written P, which represents each peers' maximal local knowledge
before receiving any message from others. The following denitions present fundamental
operations on interpretations, along with theorems and proofs regarding their properties.
Denition 3.5 (Union Operator ) For two interpretations I and I 0 and peer A, we
dene
IA  I 0A = ((WA [W 0A) ; (SA \ S0A))
I  I 0 = f(B; IB  I 0B) j B 2 Ng:
Proposition 3.1 (Model Closure Under Union) The union II 0 of any two models
of P is still a model of P.
Proof. Let I and I 0 be two of P's models, and  be any rule in PA. It immediately
follows that  is true in both I and I 0. Consider the following cases.
1. If  is a ground logically signed rule, then  is satised in every possible world in
WA and in W 0A; thus  is satised in every possible world in WA [W 0A; therefore 
is true in I  I 0 at A.
2. Consequently, if  is a logically signed rule, all its ground instances will be true in
I  I 0 at A; thus  is true in I  I 0 at A.
3. If  is a directly signed rule, its logically signed version is true in I  I 0 at A; if
 is not self-signed, then it is also in both SA and S0A, which means  2 SA \ S0A;
therefore  is true in I  I 0 at A.
We conclude that I  I 0 is a model for P.
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Denition 3.6 (Intersection Operator ) For two interpretations I and I 0 and peer
A, we dene
IA  I 0A = ((WA \W 0A) ; (SA [ S0A))
and further dene
I  I 0 = f(B; IB  I 0B) j B 2 Ng:
Proposition 3.2 (Model Closure Under Intersection) The intersection II 0 of any
two models of P is still a model of P.
This proposition can be proved using the arguments in the proof of the previous
proposition.
Denition 3.7 ( Relation) For two interpretations I and I 0 and an arbitrary peer A,
we dene
IA  I 0A i (WA  W 0A) and(SA  S0A):
Then we dene I  I 0 i for all B 2 N ; IB  I 0B: We call I 0 an upper bound for I.
The relation  is reexive, transitive, and anti-symmetric, hence it is a partial order
on interpretations. As examples, we have (I I 0)  I, and I  (I I 0). The partial order
has a maximal element I1, in which each peer has no possible worlds and a set containing
all directly signed non-self-signed rules. We further dene I  I 0 i I  I 0 and I 6= I 0.
Denition 3.8 (Isolated Model) The union of all models of KB P is its isolated model,
written P.
We observe that P's set of directly signed rules for a peer A is the set of all the rules in
Pi that are directly signed by others.
The isolated model reects the viewpoint of each peer, considering only that peer's
local knowledge. A peer's local reasoning is performed with respect to its portion of an
isolated model.
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Denition 3.9 (Releasability) A rule  directly signed by peer B is releasable from
peer A to C in interpretation I i  is true at IA and I j=A B lsigns srelease(;A;C).
Denition 3.10 (Stabilized Interpretation) An interpretation I is stabilized i for
all peers A, B, and C and all rules  that are directly signed by B, if  is releasable from
A to C, then  is true in I at C.
Intuitively speaking, every interesting message has already been sent in a stabilized
interpretation.
Denition 3.11 (Messages) We dene global, local, (maximum) legal, and new mes-
sages as follows:
1. A global message M = f(A;MA) j A 2 Ng, where MA is a nite set of directly
signed rules. A rule m in MA is a local message for peer A. We omit the terms
\global" and \local" when the intent is clear from the context.
2. M is a new message for interpretation I i there exists a peer A and rule  2MA,
such that I 6j=A .
3. M is a legal message for interpretation I i for all peers A and all rules  2 MA,
there exists a peer B such that  is releasable in I from B to A.
4. M is the maximum legal message for I i for every legal message M 0 for I and for
all peers A, M 0A MA.
A global message is also a PeerAccess KB.
Denition 3.12 (Transition and Successors) We dene an immediate successor re-
lation ) (leads to), transition sequence, and fairness as follows.
1. Interpretation I 0 is an immediate successor of I, denoted I ) I 0, i there exists a
legal message M for I such that (I M) = I 0. In this case, we say I leads to I 0 by
message M , and M sends m to I 0 at A when m 2 MA. I 0 is a non-trivial successor
of I if M is a new message for I.
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2. A sequence I1; I2; : : : of interpretations is a transition sequence i I1 ) I2 )   .
3. A transition sequence is fair i for each choice of j > 0, each legal message M j
for Ij, every peer A, and every rule m 2 M jA, there exists an interpretation I l in
the sequence that leads to I l+1 by sending legal message M l, and m 2 M lA. The
intuition is that every possible local message gets sent during the sequence, within a
nite number of transitions.
An interpretation can have more than one immediate successor. Note that if I ) I 0, then
I  I 0.
Denition 3.13 (Upper Bound) Let Seq be an innite sequence of interpretations I1; I2; : : :
such that I1  I2  : : :. I is an upper bound of Seq i for all j, Ij  I.
Proposition 3.3 (Upper Bound Union Closure with ) 1. If I  Ia and I 
Ib, then I  (Ia  Ib).
2. The union L  L0 of two upper bounds for an interpretation sequence Seq is still an
upper bound for Seq.
Proof. (Part 1) Let W, Wa, and Wb be the corresponding sets of possible worlds and
let S, Sa, and Sb be the corresponding sets of directly signed formulas. For all choices of
peers A, I  Ia and I  Ib imply that W  W a and W  W b; thus W  (W a [W b).
We obtain S  (Sa \ Sb) similarly, and conclude that I  (Ia  Ib). (Part 2) The desired
result follows by applying Part 1 to all interpretations in the sequence.
Denition 3.14 (Fixpoint) Let Seq be an innite sequence of interpretations I1; I2; : : :
such that I1  I2  : : :. The union I of all upper bounds for Seq is Seq's xpoint.
For every upper bound I for Seq, I  I. Note that Seq does not necessarily include the
xpoint.
Let Seq be an innite transition sequence P; I1; I2; : : :. We say that Seq is a transition
sequence for P.
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Denition 3.15 (Canonical Model) P's canonical model, written P, is the intersec-
tion of the xpoints of all the transition sequences for P.
Theorem 3.1 (PeerAccess Conuence Theorem) For each innite transition sequence
Seq for P and its xpoint I, we have:
1. I  P.
2. I = P i Seq is a fair transition sequence.
Proof. (Part 1.) By denition, P is the intersection of I and others, thus I  P.
(Part 2.) Represent any two of these fair sequences E and F as E1 = P, E2, ..., and
F 1 = P, F 2, ....
Let m be a member of the set of directly signed formulas in sequence E's xpoint E
at peer A. Then m has to be in some Ei's set of directly signed formulas at A. Otherwise,
we can have an upper bound E+ that has the same possible worlds and set of directly
signed formulas as E, except that m is not in E+'s set of directly signed formulas at
A. In that case E+  E, which contradicts the fact that E is the xpoint. So we can
assume m rst appears in E at Ei and is sent from B at Ei 1.
Let the tuple (x, P , A), called a message delivery, represent the fact that that peer P
sent a local message x to A at transition Ei 1. Let S be an empty stack, and push (m, B,
A) onto S. Then for each peer P that sent B a message during stage Ei 2, push a tuple
(x, P , B) onto the stack. Repeat the process for each message that a peer P 0 sent to P
or B at stage Ei 3. Continue the process back through each stage, pushing messages sent
by (potentially more and more) peers, until all relevant messages from the rst stage have
been pushed.
The resulting stack shows how m came to be delivered to A. Each message in the stack
is legal (releasable) if all messages above it in the stack have already been sent. If we pop
messages o the stack one by one, we get a nite sequence of legal message deliveries, (m1,
B1, A1), (m2, B2, A2), : : :, (m, B, A.) Because F1 equals E1, m1 must be releasable
at F 1 from A1 to B1. Under the fairness assumption, this legal message must be sent at
63
some point in F ; say it happens at F r. After that point, m2 is releasable from A2 to B2,
and the same argument as used for m1 implies that m2 is eventually sent in F . Repeating
this argument, we nd that eventually m is sent in F ; say this happens in F k at A. Then
m is also in F  at A, as otherwise we would have a xpoint F+  F . We conclude that
E and F  have the same sets of directly signed formulas.
E and F start with the same set of possible worlds at A, and every time a message is
received at A, the elimination of possible worlds (by intersecting with all possible worlds
implied by the received messages at A) is determined by the set of messages in A. If a
possible world w is in E1 at A, but not in E at A, then it must be eliminated from some
Ei at A because of a message m received by Ei at A. As we have proved, m also gets
delivered to some F j , which eliminates w from F j at A and all F j 's successors. Thus w
is not in F  at A either. We conclude that E = F , which means that all of P's fair
transition sequences have the same xpoint, written F .
We can use the same arguments to show that every local message sent to A in an
unfair transition sequence is also present in the set of directly signed formulas at A in
the xpoint of a fair transition sequence, but not the other way around. Thus any unfair
transition sequence's xpoint F 0  F , which means F  F 0 = F . As P is dened as the
union of all transition sequences' xpoints, we conclude that P = F .
For the other direction, we have already proved that for any unfair sequence for P and
resulting xpoint F 0, we have F 0  P. It follows that if a sequence's xpoint is P, then
this sequence must be a fair sequence.
3.6 Proof Theory
We now turn our attention from what is true in the interpretations of PeerAccess knowl-
edge bases to what is provable.
Denition 3.16 ((Local) Derivation) We have the following local derivation rules to
derive new information inside a particular peer A's KB, PA:
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 Instantiation. From a logically signed rule  in PA, derive an instance of .
 Signing. From a rule logically signed by A, derive its directly signed counterpart.
 Signature. From a directly signed rule, derive its logically signed counterpart.
 Extended modus ponens. From the logically signed rule f  f1 ^    ^ fm and
facts f 01 through f 0m, where for all 1  i  m, fi is an instance of f 0i , derive f .
 Self-release. From a rule  directly signed by B, derive \B lsigns srelease(;A;B)"
and \B lsigns srelease(;A;A)".
 srelease-1. From a rule  of the form \B lsigns srelease( ;C;D) f1 ^    ^ fn",
derive \B lsigns srelease(;A;C)", where B, C, and D are arbitrary peers.
 srelease-2. From a rule of the form \B lsigns srelease(;C;D)  f1 ^    ^ fn"
and a rule  of the form \B lsigns srelease(;D;E) f1 ^    ^ fn", derive
\B lsigns srelease( ;A;C)", where B, C, D, and E are arbitrary peers.
A sequence P1A; : : : ;PnA of peer A's KBs is a (local) derivation sequence for peer A if P i+1A
can be obtained from P iA by applying at most one derivation rule, for all 1  i < n.
Denition 3.17 ((Global) Derivation) For peers A and B with KBs PA and PB re-
spectively, we have the following global derivation rule.
 Message. From a set   PA of rules such that for each  2 ,  is directly signed
by some peer C and \C lsigns srelease(, A, B)" 2 PA, derive  in PB.
A sequence P1; : : : ;Pn of global KBs is a (global) derivation sequence if for all peers A
and all 1  i < n, either (1) the sequence P iA;P i+1A is a local derivation sequence for A, or
(2) P i+1A can be obtained from P iB, for some peer B, through an application of the message
derivation rule.
Denition 3.18 A KB P derives a rule  at peer A, written P `A , i there exists a
derivation sequence P1; : : : ;Pn such that  2 PnA. Then P1; : : : ;Pn is a proof for  at A.
When only local derivation rules are used in this proof, we write PA `A .
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Proofs that use only local derivations describe the access control process from a partic-
ular peer's point of view. Proofs that use global derivations describe what could happen
in the system, so are useful for analyzing safety and liveness. We next argue that each
KB's local proofs are sound and complete for the isolated model P; and accordingly, so
are the global proofs for the canonical model P.
We next present theorems regarding the soundness and completeness of a peer's local
reasoning (between the receipt of messages). The reasoning behind these theorems is
essentially the same as for ordinary logic programs.
Theorem 3.2 (Local Soundness) For any KB P, rule , and peer A, if PA `A , then
P j=A .
Proof. When only the local derivation rules are used, derivation in PeerAccess becomes
similar to derivation in an ordinary logic program. We prove its local soundness by arguing
for the soundness of each derivation rule.
 Instantiation. If a logically signed rule  is true in P at A, then every instance of
it is present in every possible world of P at A, so every instance of it is also true in
P at A.
 Modus ponens. For every logically signed rule  of the form f  f1 ^    ^ fm
and facts f1 through fm, let f 01 through f 0m be corresponding ground instances. For
every world w of P at A, as all f 01 through f 0m are present in w, if f 0 is not in w,
then the rule  is not true in w, which is a contradiction. We conclude that f 0 is in
w and f is true in P at A.
 Signature. If a ground rule  logically signed by A is true in P at A, the model the-
oretic denition of directly signed rules tells us that 's directly signed counterpart
is also true at A.
 Release. The remaining local derivation rules are for the srelease predicate, and
their soundness follows immediately from the model theoretic constraints on srelease.
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Thus  is also true in P at A, and we conclude that P j=A .
Theorem 3.3 (Local Completeness) For any KB P and ground rule , if P j=A ,
then PA `A .
Proof. Since peer A has a nite set of local rules at each point, this completeness result
can be shown in the same way as the completeness results for general logic programs, with
the exception of proofs regarding the srelease predicate. For that predicate, each point
of its model-theoretic denitions corresponds directly to a proof-theoretic counterpart, so
the completeness of reasoning about srelease follows immediately from the denition of `.
Theorem 3.4 (Global Soundness) For any KB P, peer A, and rule , if P `A ,
then P j=A .
Proof. We prove this theorem by induction on the number of steps of the proof. If the
proof has one step, then  2 P, and the theorem holds. Otherwise, assume that it holds
for all proofs of length less than n, and now consider the nth and nal step in deriving 
at peer A.
1. When a local derivation rule is used to derive , the Local Soundness Theorem tells
us that  is true in P at A. As P  P, we know  is true in P at A.
2. When a global derivation rule is used to derive , peer A gets a messagem containing
. In this case, P becomes P 0 after the message is received. Let M be a global
message with MA = fmg, and with the empty set for all other local messages. Then
P 0 becomes P M after M is received, and m is true in P 0 at A. By the Fixpoint
Theorem, we know that P 0  P, so m is also true in P at A.
By the induction hypothesis, we conclude that the theorem holds for proofs of all lengths.
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Theorem 3.5 (Global Completeness) For any KB P and ground rule , if P j=A ,
then P ` .
Proof. Suppose that  is true in the canonical model P. Consider a fair transition
sequence Seq = I1; I2; : : : with xpoint P; such a sequence must exist, because  is
ground and P is nite. Let j be the rst point in Seq in which  is true in IjA. If j = 1,
then we have  in the initial local interpretation of PA, and by the Local Completeness
Theorem, the current theorem follows. Otherwise, by the induction hypothesis, let us
assume that for every rule  that is true at some peer B in Ik, for 1  k < j, the theorem
holds; in other words, we have a proof of  at B in the canonical model. By the denition
of a transition sequence, a nite set of rules must have been sent to peer A in a new
legal message, causing the transition from Ij 1 to Ij . Consider any member r of this set
that was not already in the set of directly signed non-self-signed rules in Ij 1. Recall
that B can only send r to A if r is directly signed and releasable, i.e., r is true at B and
either A signed r, A = B, or \C lsigns srelease(r;B;A)" is true at B. In the current
situation, A 6= B, because r is not in the set of directly signed non-self-signed rules in
Ij 1. Similarly, A cannot be the signer of r. Thus it must be the case that \C lsigns
srelease(r;B;A)" is true at B in Ij 1. By the induction hypothesis, we have a proof for
r at B in the canonical model of P. By the induction hypothesis, we also have a proof in
the canonical model for every rule r that was true at A in Ij 1.
Consider the set m of all new directly signed non-self-signed rules that arrived at A
during the transition between Ij 1 and Ij . Given that  is true in Ij but not in Ij 1, one
possibility is that  is in m. In that case, by the induction hypothesis, we have a proof of
 at B in the canonical model. By the message derivation rule, we also have a proof of 
at A in the canonical model.
Otherwise, we have  62 m, so  must not be directly signed by another peer. Consider
the KB K that consists of the initial KB P, plus every legal new message sent in the
transitions up to and including the transition to Ij . The Local Completeness Theorem
tells us that if  is true at A in the isolated model of K, then there is a proof of  at A for
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K.  must be true in the isolated model of K, because K captures all the messages sent
to any peer since the rst transition of the system. Further, by the induction hypothesis,
we have a proof of every formula that is in K but is not in P. We can take the proof of 
in K, and extend it by prefacing it with the proofs of all the formulas in K that are used
in the proof of  in the isolated model of  but are not present in P (by the denition of
a proof, this set of formulas must be nite), to create a proof of  in the canonical model
of P.
3.7 Proof Hints and Queries
The preceding sections have talked about what is true and provable at peers, without
considering whether the peers are willing to construct the proofs or determine the truths.
If Alice needs to determine whether  is true and is unable to do so on her own, in some
applications Alice could ask every other peer in the system for help. However, in the real
world there are typically so many peers that Alice would not want to take the time to ask
all of them for help, and most peers would be unwilling to help her anyway. Alice uses
her proof hints to restrict her search to peers where she has a reasonable chance of getting
help. For this purpose, each PeerAccess peer's knowledge base contains a section devoted
to proof hints, which are metalevel facts and rules that suggest which peers Alice should
ask for help as she tries to determine whether certain facts and rules are true.
Each proof hint takes the form \A signs nd(;B;C) f1 ^    ^ fn;" or its logically
signed counterpart, where A is a peer name, B and C are peer names or variables, \nd"
is a metalevel proof hint predicate,  is a rule, and f1 through fn are base or proof hint
facts. Intuitively, if a peer Alice is trying to prove , the hint \Bob signs nd(, Alice,
Carla)  f1 ^    ^ fn" means that Bob suggests that Alice ask Carla about , under
conditions f1 through fn. Much as we disallowed srelease policies for srelease policies,
we disallow proof hints for nding proof hints, because the additional layer of indirection
adds no interesting expressive capability and complicates execution at runtime.
Alice can dene broker predicates and use them to describe how to use them to nd
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proof hints:
Alice:
Alice lsigns NeesGridBroker(David)
Alice lsigns NeesGridBroker(Edith)
Alice lsigns nd(O lsigns auth(R, X), Alice, B)  
Alice lsigns NeesGridResource(R) ^ Alice lsigns NeesGridBroker(B)
These formulas say that when Alice is trying to prove that she or her proxy is authorized
to access a NeesGrid resource, she should ask one of the NeesGrid brokers for help, by
sending the broker her query. If Alice asks David whether Alice can access the shake table
(using the query ?O lsigns auth(shaketable, Alice), as dened in the next section), David
could in theory respond with a yes or no answer. However, if David really is a broker, he
will not answer the query directly. Instead David will give Alice a new proof hint, e.g.,
\David signs nd(Bob signs auth(shaketable, Alice), Alice, Bob)". An unscrupulous or
out-of-date broker could direct Alice to someone who is not the authorization authority
for the shake table.
As another example, for CAS-DB to ask resource owners for permission to release facts
about their authorized groups, CAS-DB could use the following proof hint:
CAS-DB signs nd( O signs srelease(O signs authgroup(R, G), CAS-DB, X), CAS-DB, O)
 CAS lsigns owner(R, O)
If David sends Alice a proof hint, then the proof hint must have been releasable. The
releasability of proof hints is determined exactly as for base predicates, and the semantics
and derivation rules presented in the previous sections remain unchanged; the truth of a
proof hint formula does not depend on whether the formula to be proved is true or false.
The impact of proof hints lies in their eect on a peer's run-time behavior, which is a
tunable feature of the PeerAccess framework. For example, proof hints can be used to
encode a more modular version of the credential discovery type system of [53], as rules
70
that say that if a credential is of type issuer-traces-all, we should start by asking the
prospective signer for the credential; if it is of type subject-traces-all, we should start by
asking the prospective owner for it; and so on. Whether and how a peer makes use of
proof hints is governed by the event-condition-action rules for that peer in the PeerAccess
framework. Peers do not have to act on all proof hints in their possession. For example,
if Alice only acts on proof hints that she herself has signed, and she trusts the NeesGrid
brokers to give her good hints about authorization, then she could encode this trust in
the following rule in her KB:
Alice lsigns nd(O lsigns auth(R, X), Alice, Y )  
B lsigns nd(O lsigns auth(R, X), Alice, Y ) ^
Alice lsigns NeesGridResource(R) ^ Alice lsigns NeesGridBroker(B)
To simplify our discussion, we use a single such rule for all peers for the rest of the
chapter: when Alice is unable to make headway on determining the truth of a fact, she
does not give up until she has asked for help by querying each peer recommended by any
proof hint in her local knowledge base. More precisely, if Alice is trying to determine
whether  is true and is unable to do so using her local knowledge base, she will send the
query ? to each peer P such that P 0 lsigns nd(, Alice, P ) is true at Alice, for any peer
P 0.
In even the smallest examples, proof hints of the form \Alice lsigns nd(P lsigns ,
Alice, P )", where  is a metavariable, would cause Alice to issue a huge number of queries
whenever she got stuck during proof construction|queries not only about each leaf of the
proof tree under construction, but also about each interior node. To protect Alice from
a denial of service attack by purveyors of proof hints that instruct Alice to ask all peers,
Alice can use some exposure policies to limit the set of proof hints she allows into her KB,
and she should use ECA rules that require the signer of a proof hint that she acts upon
to have a good rating from a reputation service that she trusts (modeled as an additional
peer or peers who sign ratings). Even in the small examples we present, if Bob has a proof
hint that directs him to always ask the signer of a fact for help when trying to prove the
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fact, it would cause him to contact CAS or CAS-DB himself, rather than having Alice do
the work for him. We will show how to use proof hints in the CAS examples once we have
discussed the format and handling of queries.
In PeerAccess, a query takes the form ?f1 ^    ^ fn, where each fi is a fact or a rule
delimited by parentheses, for 1  i  n. The meaning of a ground conjunctive formula is
dened in the traditional manner: the formula is true at a peer if all conjuncts are true
at that peer.
The conjunctive form of a query allows Alice to ask CAS-DB whether CAS signs a
particular fact, and include a statement about the purpose that she intends to use that
signed fact for (in the form of a proposed release policy for the fact). For example, Alice
may query CAS-DB with ?(CAS lsigns auth(shaketable, Alice) ^ (CAS lsigns srelease(CAS
lsigns auth(shaketable, Alice), Alice, shaketable))). A more voluminous set of rules in the
query would allow Alice to explain that she will only give CAS's authorization statement
to her proxies and to the shaketable. Because PeerAccess peers can choose to ignore
queries, a peer may choose not to respond to a query that lacks an acceptable purpose.
Performance and feasibility considerations also motivate the use of conjunctive queries.
For example, an authorization server might not be willing to answer the query ?CAS
lsigns auth(shaketable, X), which would require listing every person who is authorized
to access the shake table; but the same server might be willing to answer ?CAS lsigns
auth(shaketable, X) ^ member(quake, X), which asks for all the members of the quake
group who are authorized to access the shake table. Even if the authorization server
is willing to answer both queries, it is much more ecient to use the latter form if the
requester only needs to know the authorized members of the quake group.
The run-time behavior of a set of peers, as encoded in their proof hints and other
ECA rules, depends on the peers' designers' choice of run-time strategies, such as the
proposals put forth by [7, 11, 38, 93]. Dierent strategies have dierent conventions for
what the acceptable responses are to a query. For example, SD3 adopts the convention
that Bob's response must be such that Alice never has to ask Bob the same query again
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as she continues to work on getting all the answers to her query [38]. The proposal of [7]
guarantees complete query answers, under an assumption that peers are fully cooperative.
We intend PeerAccess to be customizable to support all of these proposed strategies and
the many others that will be proposed in the future; each such proposal can guarantee (or
not) properties such as termination, safety, and liveness in its own way. Thus the only
query answer requirement PeerAccess imposes is that every answer must be an ordinary
message (directly signed, releasable, and true at the sender). This allows Bob's query-
answering behavior to range from non-response to sending back all releasable information
already in his KB plus everything he can glean from other peers, whether or not it is
relevant to the query. Here we revisit example 1 to see the eect of proof hints and
queries on an SD3-like run-time strategy. We will investigate other proof strategies in
chapter 4.
Example 1c (Bob makes and signs his own authorization decisions, relying on directly
signed CAS statements in his internal reasoning.) Alice starts the interaction by sending
Bob the query ?Bob lsigns auth(shaketable, Alice). Bob's KB contains the following, plus
three additional release rules for the auth predicate:
Bob:
Bob signs auth(shaketable, X)  CAS signs auth(shaketable, X)
Bob signs nd(CAS signs auth(shaketable, X), X, CAS)  X 6= Bob
Bob lsigns srelease(
Bob signs nd(CAS signs auth(shaketable, X), X, CAS)  X 6= Bob, Y , Z)
Bob's receives queries about shake table authorizations from individual parties who would
like to be authorized. Bob is congured so that he tries to prove \Bob signs auth(shaketable,
Alice)" when he receives Alice's query.
Bob checks to see if \Bob lsigns auth(shaketable, Alice)" is already in his KB (signature
derivation rule), and nds that it is not. Next he looks for rules that will allow him to
expand the lsigned version of his goal (modus ponens derivation rule), and nds his CAS
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delegation rule. Then his eort shifts to proving \CAS signs auth(shaketable, Alice)",
which is not in his KB. It is not a self-signed formula, so an lsigned version of the formula
would not help. He has no rules that allow him to expand this proof goal. Bob is stuck,
and there are no other rules that allow him to expand his original proof goal.
Since his local proof attempts have failed, Bob looks for proof hints in his KB that
will tell him how to prove any of his proof goals, or that suggest sources for new rules
to use in expanding his current set of proof goals. He has only one proof hint, and its
preconditions are not satised. Bob is not congured to look for additional proof hints at
runtime, so his proof attempts have ended in failure. This is exactly the desired outcome:
Bob wants Alice to do the work of querying CAS. In accordance with SD3's principles,
Bob sends Alice sucient information that she will not have to ask him the same query
again (except to get his direct signature on his authorization); he sends her \Bob signs
auth(shaketable, X)  CAS signs auth(shaketable, X)", after proving that this formula
is releasable (via the signature rule). Bob is congured to send along all releasable proof
hints that are possibly relevant to his answers, so he also sends his proof hint. (It would
not be unreasonable in this case for Bob to be congured to send Alice every releasable
formula in his KB. Or Bob might respond with the counterquery ?CAS signs auth(Alice,
shaketable).)
Alice is congured to accept Bob's query as well as his associated proof hint, which she
adds to her KB. In attempting to answer Bob's query, her local knowledge immediately
fails her and she makes use of Bob's proof hint, which tells her to query CAS. CAS ac-
cepts queries from parties who are asking whether they are authorized to access resources
that CAS knows about. Thus CAS accepts Alice's query, and tries to prove \CAS signs
auth(shaketable, Alice)" using local inference. If CAS answers the query by sending Alice
\CAS signs auth(shaketable, Alice)", then Alice can push that fact to Bob and repeat her
earlier query. (If CAS does not give Alice a suitable release policy for her to push that
fact to Bob, she can query CAS for the policy she needs: ?CAS signs srelease(CAS signs
auth(shaketable, Alice), Alice, Bob).) This time, Bob can use the instantiation, modus
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ponens, and signature derivation rules to prove \Bob signs auth(shaketable, Alice)". Bob
is congured to send this signed fact to Alice, after proving that it is releasable (instantia-
tion and modus ponens derivation rules). If he is also congured to send her all associated
release policies, then she will be able to send the authorization fact to anyone. If he does
not automatically send her the release policy, she and her proxies will have to query him
for release permission each time they send the authorization fact to a new party.
3.8 Summary
We have presented an overview of the PeerAccess framework, including its handling of
base and release policies and proof hints, and shown how it can be used in reasoning
about the behavior of resource owners and their clients in open distributed systems. We
have also presented a formal semantics and proof theory for PeerAccess, and shown the
soundness and completeness of the PeerAccess proof theory.
PeerAccess oers an extensible set of features to meet the multiple party authorization
needs of a diverse set of peers. It provides sticky release policies to support original
owner controlled information dissemination and re-dissemination. PeerAccess allows one
to model the local reasoning of individual peers who are unaware of the internal state of
other peers. PeerAccess also allows one to reason about possible future global evolution
of the system (e.g., for safety or liveness analysis). PeerAccess supports peer autonomy
in choice of run-time behavior; this behavior is encoded in individual peers' proof hints,
which describe a peer's choice of pulling information, and how hard it will work to answer
the queries it accepts (i.e., what other peers it is willing to contact for help). Peers can
easily describe their purpose in asking a query, and the answering peer can easily limit
the purposes for which the answers will be used (subject to voluntary compliance).
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Chapter 4
Customizing Distributed Proofs of
Authorization
4.1 Introduction
The interacting parties in open distributed systems are often strangers to each other; yet
they have the need to share services or other resources, and such sharing has to be carried
out in a secure and timely fashion. In this situation, authorization to access a resource
often cannot be decided by a requester's identity alone: the requester's attributes, as
attested to by digital credentials, matter more. Authorization policies can be encoded
as predicates in a formal language over those attributes, just like PeerAccess, or other
attribute-based authorization systems [43, 3, 47]. Before a service request can be autho-
rized in such systems, a certain credentials have to be collected to prove that the according
access control policies are satised. Since a proof is encoded as logic formulas, following
a predened set of inference rules, it is usually straightforward to verify its correctness.
The process to construct such a proof, however, is often interactive, involving multiple
parties requesting credentials from one another before presenting all their own relevant
credentials; we call this process distributed proof of authorization.1
The multilateral and distributed nature makes proofs of authorization hard to con-
struct in open systems. When a peer requests a resource from a provider, the provider
requires certain credentials to prove that the requester is authorized to access the resource.
Very often, neither the resource provider nor the requester have these credentials at the
moment, but they can obtain them from third parties (e.g., an online certier or a cre-
dential repository). The question is who should provide these credentials. One possibility
1This chapter is based on the material originally published in [95].
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is for the resource requester to request the credential from an appropriate peer, and then
forward the credential to the resource provider. Another option is to have the resource
provider directly request the credential from the appropriate peer. For example, the QCM
[32] credential retrieval system takes the latter approach, TrustBuilder [72] assumes the
former, and Bonatti and Samarati [16] allow the provider and requester to work on fulll-
ing separate parts of the same policy. Not only the duration but also the eventual outcome
of the credential may depend on who looks for a missing credential. For example, resource
provider Alice may require a reliability rating of her potential clients before she will grant
them access. If Bob supplies these ratings, he may be willing to give them to Alice but
not to Alice's potential clients|or vice versa. In this case, trust can only be established
if the right kind of peer asks Bob for the rating credential.
Another question is where to look for a needed credential. For example, Bob may
only give out ratings through his agent, Barbara. The RT0 framework addressed this
problem via a typing system for credentials: the type of a credential indicates whether
to start the search by contacting its issuer or its owner [49]. From the starting point of
the search, a chain of referrals (delegations) leads the searcher to the desired credential.
In this framework, credentials and referrals are freely available to any searcher, and all
parties abide by the typing rules.
In the previous chapter, we show that the PeerAccess language can be used to specify
authorization policies and to encode proofs of authorization. Its proof hints allow us to
customize how a proof can be constructed. Yet we have not given any specic runtime
algorithm for controlling credential search and performing proof construction. In this
chapter, we enhance PeerAccess by providing a more versatile version of proof hints,
called Query Routing Rules (QRRs), as a practical approach to constructing proofs in
open distributed systems. To avoid confusion with the basic PeerAccess framework, we
call the enhanced authorization framework MultiTrust. Like PeerAccess's proof hints,
QRRs are used to guide a peer's construction of authorization proofs by specifying where
to look for a particular fact. We make the following contributions in MultiTrust.
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 MultiTrust's QRRs are very exible and can be used to model the proof construction
behaviors of other trust management systems, such as QCM and RT0. To our
knowledge, MultiTrust is the rst framework that can be used to reason about the
runtime behavior of these other systems, and to reason about the runtime behavior
when dierent peers use dierent proof construction algorithms.
 While credentials are the ultimate assertions on which proofs rest, it can be very con-
venient for a resource provider to have a complete proof handed to it for verication
[3, 9], rather than only a set of credentials from which a proof can be constructed.
We will show that MultiTrust supports both scenarios.
 The distributed algorithm that we propose to construct proofs of authorization based
on QRRs limits the search space to that covered by the QRRs and guarantees the
search's completeness within that space, providing a signicant performance gain
over brute-force search in an open environment.
The rest of the chapter organizes as follows. We introduce the problem of distributed
proof of authorization in Section 4.2, and propose QRR in Section 4.3 as our solution for
runtime behavior customization when handling queries for credentials. We then present
our QRR based proof construction algorithm in Section 4.4, and discusses its soundness
and completeness. In Section 4.5, we show how QRRs can be used to handle credential
requests in dierent ways, including those used in QCM and RT0. We discuss possible
optimizations for MultiTrust in Section 4.6, and give a summary in Section 4.7.
4.2 Distributed Proofs of Authorization
We start by using an example to show how MultiTrust encodes authorization policies, and
how multiple parties can interactively construct a proof.
Example 1 (Fig. 4.1) Alice wants to buy a car at Best Motorvehicle World (BMW),
and see whether she qualies for BMW's premier discount (her target resource). BMW's
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Figure 4.1: Ways to handle Alice's query
premier discount policy says she must have a driver's license from the Department of
Motor Vehicles (DMV) and have a good credit rating from the Credit Report Depot
(CRD). CRD will disclose a good credit rating for Alice if she satises CRD's credit score
requirement and CRD has an information release authorization certicate issued by Alice.
This is formalized as rules R1 and R2 in BMW's and CRD's KBs respectively.
R1: BMW signs PremierDiscount(X)  
DMV signs DriversLicense(X), CRD signs GoodCredit(X)
R2: CRD signs GoodCredit(X)  
X signs PermitRelease(CRD), CRD signs GoodCreditScore(X)
MultiTrust abstracts authorization to access a resource as a signed permission from
the resource owner, or a lsigned permission that comes with a proof of authenticity. The
request for authorization begins when Alice queries for credential/resource \BMW signs
PremierDiscount(Alice)", which we encode as the query \Alice ? (BMW signs PremierDis-
count(Alice))" that Alice sends to BMW. The prex \P ?" shows who sends the query.
For brevity, the following short names for factual credentials are used in the rest of the
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chapter.
C1: BMW signs PremierDiscount(Alice)
C2: DMV signs DriversLicense(Alice)
C3: CRD signs GoodCredit(Alice)
C4: Alice signs PermitRelease(CRD)
C5: CRD signs GoodCreditScore(Alice)
Figure 4.1 shows two ways to resolve Alice's request for C1. Figure 4.1-A presents the
passive-resource-owner approach, used in many of the ATN proposals in the literature.
After Alice requests C1 from BMW, BMW asks Alice for C2. If Alice does not have a
digital version of her license, she asks the DMV for C2, then sends C2 to BMW. Next,
BMW asks Alice for C3. Alice asks CRD for C3, supplies her release permission, then
sends C3 back to BMW. (Alternatively, BMW could ask Alice for both C2 and C3 at
once.) Finally, BMW sends C1 to Alice.
Figure 4.1-B shows the proactive-resource-owner approach used in QCM and SD3 [37].
After Alice requests C1 from BMW, BMW asks the DMV for C2 and asks CRD for C3,
sequentially or in parallel. CRD obtains Alice's permission to release information, and
sends her credit rating to BMW. Once C2 and C3 are received, BMW sends C1 back to
Alice.
The passive-resource-owner approach depends on Alice to provide all required creden-
tials to BMW. In the real world, it may be preferable for BMW, rather than Alice, to
retrieve C3 from CRD: Alice may not know how to interact with CRD, or CRD may charge
Alice a high price but give BMW a bulk discount. Another possibility, not modeled in
this version of MultiTrust, is that CRD may be willing to talk to BMW but not to Alice.
From the viewpoint of communication eciency, having BMW retrieve C3 directly will
avoid the extra cost of routing C3 through Alice. On the other hand, if the interaction
with CRD requires signicant eort, then BMW may prefer to ooad the eort onto its
clients, to improve BMW's server's scalability.
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The advantages and disadvantages of the proactive-resource-owner approach are the
reverse of those of the passive-resource-owner approach. For example, if Alice already has
her digital driver's license, it is more ecient for BMW to retrieve it from her than from
the DMV. At the same time, the DMV may be unwilling to disclose C1 to BMW anyway,
for privacy reasons. Thus the proactive-resource-owner approach does not necessarily
provide the best credential retrieval eciency, and it may not even work, as the resource
owner is not always entitled to directly retrieve a credential from the issuer on behalf of
the resource requester.
4.3 Query Routing Rules
The previous section shows that in an authorization process involving multiple parties,
we need a more exible approach than either passive-resource-owner or passive-resource-
requester alone to determine who will look for each needed credential:
 Peers should have autonomy in deciding whether and how they respond to each
request, and what requests they send to others. This mirrors real-world autonomy
of peers in open systems.
 The decision on how to handle a particular request should not be embedded in the
authorization policies themselves. The decision should be made at the meta level,
orthogonal to the policies. This aspect of MultiTrust will help it work with a variety
of underlying policy languages.
 The approach should be suciently expressive to encode the approaches previously
proposed in the literature (e.g., QCM [32], SD3 [37], Cassandra [10], RT [49], BGR05
[7], TrustX [13]) as special cases.
 If a query fails to produce the desired credential(s) in response, then the requester
should be able to ask other peers the same query, if desired. In other words, a neg-
ative response to a request should be interpreted under the open world assumption:
another peer may respond more helpfully.
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Our proposed approach is called Query Routing Rules (QRRs). In this chapter,
the condition in a QRR will be over a single fact (goal) in a query, although one can
imagine more complex conditions; a QRR rule is an entry in a peer's KB of the form
if condition then
action
where condition is a Boolean combination of predicates over the attributes of a query P 0 ?
P signs f , or P 0 ? P lsigns f , in the base language. In this chapter, we use a minimal set
of such predicates: equality and set membership tests over peer names, other constants
and variables from the base language, and the following query attributes:
 requester, which is P 0;
 issuer, the peer who signed or lsigned f ;
 predicate, the name of the predicate in f ;
 self, the peer who is currently executing the QRR;
 subjects, the set of all arguments in f ;
 subject, which is the sole member of subjects if the latter has cardinality 1, and is
undened otherwise.
For example, when Alice requests \BMW signs PremierDiscount(Alice)" from BMW, then
the following conditions are true: requester == Alice, issuer==BMW, subject==Alice,
predicate==PremierDiscount, subjects==fAliceg. One could dene additional attributes
that, for example, check whether the ith argument of the query is bound or free, and
whether the queried fact is signed or lsigned. A complex condition language requires a
formal syntax, semantics, and evaluation rules. For the purpose of this research, we choose
an extremely simple condition language whose semantics will be obvious to readers.
An action takes the form \ask X [for target ]", where X is requester, issuer, subject,
or any specic peer name. To take an action, the local peer sends a message to the peer X
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(unless X is the local peer, in which case no action is taken). The message body contains
the original query with the requester stripped o, unless target was present in the rule; in
that case, the message body contains target, which is a base-level rule or fact.
When processing a query, a peer's policy engine rst tries to answer the query locally,
by looking for the requested credential (fact) in the local KB and trying to infer it from the
local KB. If this process fails due to the need for a fact that is not available locally, then
the policy engine will consult the QRR portion of the KB to decide whether and where to
send a message querying for the missing fact(s). If no QRR matches the missing fact, the
policy engine gives up and sends a negative answer to the querying peer. As MultiTrust
adopts an open world assumption, and we do not model negative authorizations in this
chapter, a negative answer means \I do not know and cannot help you further". For
example, the QRR
if issuer == Alice then
ask Alice
says that if any locally-unavailable fact/credential was signed or lsigned by Alice, then the
query for that fact should be forwarded to Alice. The QRR
if subject == Carl then
ask Carl
says that we should ask Carl for any locally-unavailable credential with Carl as the only
subject.
Because a request can match more than one QRR, MultiTrust uses a multiple match
semantics on QRRs. More precisely, we store a set of QRRs, and try them one by one
until the needed fact is obtained or no more matching QRRs remain. Other possibilities
include a set of QRRs in which all matching rules are used in parallel, an ordered list
for which only the rst matching QRR is used, or an unordered list in which a randomly
picked matching rule is used.
MultiTrust uses the same set of inference rules as PeerAccess. For convenience, we call
the instantiation, signing and signature inference rules uni-inference rules: r uni-infers r0
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i r0 can be derived from r by applying zero or more uni-inference rules.
4.4 Proof Construction
Figure 4.2 gives an algorithm that a peer can use to process incoming queries and construct
proofs for their answers. In the algorithm, every peer has a local set of base policies
KB and a local routing rules knowledge base QRRKB . A call to a peer's QueryFacts
routine takes ve parameters: requester, goals, , exclusions, and d, which respectively
represent the original caller, a set of facts (credentials) being queried (requested), the
current substitution for the free variables in goals, a set of unwanted substitutions, and
a limit on the depth of recursive invocations of QueryFacts (to guarantee termination).
QueryFacts returns a substitution and a proof. Before explaining the algorithm, we
discuss substitutions in more detail.
Parameter  species one value assignment for each free variable in goals; an assign-
ment X =  means X is still free. The result of applying  to each formula in goals
is written goals/. The querier would like to receive a substitution 0 and a proof of
each member of (goals/)/0, where 0 is some (possibly empty) substitution. For ex-
ample, if Alice would like to nd a friend of Bob's, she can send Bob the query \Bob
signs friend(X)", which translates to the call QueryFacts(Alice, fBob signs friend(X)g,
fX = g, fg, d). The credential \Bob signs friend(Carl)", expressed by the substitution
fX=Carlg, is a possible answer. The exclusions parameter is used to prevent the query
answer from including any substitution that is covered by any single element of the exclu-
sions parameter. For example, if Alice would like to nd out any of Bob's friends other
than Carl and Eve, she can make the same call as before, but with an exclusion set of
ffX=Carlg, fX=Evegg. A substitution  covers substitution  if for all formulas g, there
exists a substitution  such that (g/)/ is g/. For example, fY=Carl, Z=g covers
fY=Carl, Z=Bobg. If fY=Carl, Z=g 2 exclusions, fY=Carl, Z=Bobg will not be
returned as an answer.
We use a projection operation project(; ) that returns the subset of  whose variables
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also receive assignments in . For example, project(fX = 5; Y = ; Z = g; fX = ; Z =
g) returns fX = 5; Z = g. Particularly, whenever a projection is used in this chapter,
we guarantee that 's substitution for any of its variable X always covers 's.
At the beginning of QueryFacts, the peer checks whether all goals have been proved
with the given substitution . If any substitution in the exclusion list covers ,  is not
an acceptable answer. If goals is not empty, but the invocation depth limit d has been
reached, failure is returned. The ( is a binary operator for pair values. For expression
hx; yi ( p, if v is a pair hv1; v2i, then the whole expression evaluates to true, with v1 and
v2 assigned to variables x and y respectively; if v is not a pair, then the whole expression
evaluates to false, with v1 and v2's value unchanged.
Starting from line 10, the peer picks one of the target goals and attempts to prove it.
Here we do not stipulate which goal should be picked, leaving it as the peer's strategic
choice; in a specic domain, certain predicates will be more likely to be true than others.
The peer then tries to answer the query, rst using local rules (lines 13-31).
Subroutine findSubstitutionAndSubgoals (gure 4.3) checks whether r is a matching
rule for goal/, and if so returns the substitution for goal. Let h be the head of r; r is
a matching rule if h can be used to uni-infer goal/. Any substitution this subroutine
returns is covered by . If such a substitution 0 is found for r, QueryFacts recursively
calls itself (line 20) to answer the subgoals in r=0 body that are not in the KB yet and
that prove goal=01. The algorithm enumerates such solutions until it has proved all goals
with substitution 2 (line 28). At that point the algorithm can compose and return a
proof sequence for goals=02.
If the peer fails to answer the query after trying all existing local rules, it goes through
all its QRRs and forwards the query to other peers for help (loop starting from line 33)
until the query is answered or all QRRs have been tried. The choice of which QRRs to try
rst (eectively, of which matching QRRs to try rst) is not specied; domain knowledge
will determine which peers are most likely to prove helpful for which goals. The subroutine
findRoute decides whether the current qrr can be used to help prove goal by sending a
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local KB /* the local peer's set of base policies */
local QRRKB /* the local peer's set of QRRs */
QueryFacts(requester; goals; ; exclusions; d) f
if goals is empty then
if exclusions does not cover  then
return h; nulli /* return  and an empty proof sequence */
return failure /* unable to answer this query */
if d  0 then
return failure /* ran out of time to answer this query */
goal := pick one element from goals
goals0 := goals  fgoalg
/* try local rules rst */
for all r 2 KB do
/* check if r can possibly infer goal= */
if h0; subgoalsi ( ndSubstitutionAndSubgoals(r; goal; ) then
/* those that can already be uni-inferred */
sub := fx x 2 subgoals and (9y 2 KB ; y uni-infers x=0)g
sub :=concatenation of all retrieveProof(y), where y 2 KB and (9x 2 sub; y uni-infers x=0)
exclusions0 := exclusions
while h1; 1i ( QueryFacts(requester; subgoals  sub; 0; exclusions0; d  1) do
exclusions0 := exclusions0 [ 1
/* compose a proof sequence */
01 := sub k 1 k retrieveProof(r) k hself; goal=1i
01 := project(1; )
KB := KB [ goal=01
/* save the proof for future use */
saveProof(goal=01; 
0
1)
if h2; 2i ( QueryFacts(requester; goals0; 01; exclusions; d  1) then
02 := 
0
1 k hself; goal=2i k 2
02 := project(2; )
return h02; 02i
/* Local resolution failed. Use QRR to decide where to forward. */
for all qrr 2 QRRKB do
if hr; P i ( findRoute(qrr; requester; goal; ) then
h0; subgoalsi ( ndSubstitutionAndSubgoals(r; goal; )
exclusions0 := exclusions
/* ask another peer P for help */
while h3; 3i ( P:QueryFacts(self; frg; 0; exclusions0; d  1) do
exclusions0 := exclusions0 [ 3
/* disclosure of r=3 from P to self */
03 := 3 k hself; r=3i
KB := KB [ r=3
saveProof(r=3; 03)
sub := fx x 2 subgoals and (9y 2 KB ; y uni-infers x=3)g
sub := concatenation of all retrieveProof(y), where y 2 KB and (9x 2 sub; y uni-infers x=3)
exclusions1 := exclusions
while h4; 4i ( QueryFacts(requester; subgoals  sub; 3; exclusions1; d  1) do
exclusions1 := exclusions1 [ 4
04 := sub k 4 k 03 k hself; goal=4i
04 := project(4; )
KB := KB [ goal=04
saveProof(goal=04; 
0
4)
if h5; 5i ( QueryFacts(requester; goals0; 04; exclusions; d  1) then
05 := 
0
4 k hself; goal=5i k 5
05 := project(5; )
return h05; 05i
/* unable to answer this query */
return failure
g
Figure 4.2: MultiTrust query answering algorithm
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ndSubstitutionAndSubgoals(r; goal; ) f
Input:
r: the rule to infer from
goal: the target rule to infer
: the current substitution
Output:
failure or hnew; subgoalsi: 0 is a substitution and subgoals is a set of facts
/* r unies with goal=, ignoring the signs and lsigns operators */
if 90; r=0 uni-infers goal= then
new := such a 0 that leaves the biggest number of free variables in r=0
return hnew; nulli
/* The head of r unies with goal=, ignoring the signs and lsigns operators */
if 90; the head of r=0 uni-infers goal= then
new := such a 0 that leaves the biggest number of free variables in r=0
return hnew; fthe facts in r's bodygi
return failure
g
Figure 4.3: MultiTrust algorithm to nd a substitution and subgoals
query for r to another peer P . r can either uni-infer goal= (e.g., r instantiates to goal=),
or has non-empty body and can possibly be used to derive goal=0. Line 38 sends the query
for r to the current selected helper P , who either runs the same algorithm or, as discussed
later, supports the same interface. P may return failure, indicating that it is unable to
or unwilling to answer r; or a substitution 3 and a sequence 3 that proves r=3. In the
latter case, the peer further checks whether the body facts of r=3 and the remaining goals
goal0 can be recursively solved. If yes, it composes a proof for all the original goals under
the found substitution and returns the results. If its attempt is unsuccessful, it asks the
same query of P again, except that the substitution in the previous answer is included
in the exclusion list. If all the attempts fail, the peer returns failure, indicating that it
cannot answer the query.
The function saveProof(r; ) saves the proof  for r so that it can be used in the
future. Accordingly, retrieveProof(r) returns the saved proof for r, or an empty sequence
if no proof has been saved. Before we examine the soundness and completeness of this
algorithm, we need a few denitions.
Denition 4.1 (Conguration) The conguration Q of a MultiTrust system is a set
of tuples hP; ri such that hP; ri 2 Q i peer P has rule r in its knowledge base. When we
are only interested in what happens after the moment where Q exists, we call Q an initial
87
conguration.
Denition 4.2 (Proof) Let  be a nite sequence of hpeer; rulei pairs in a system with
initial conguration Q:
hP0; r0i; : : : ; hPn; rni:
Suppose every hPi; rii, 0  i  n, satises one of these conditions:
1. There exists ri0 such that hPi; ri0i either is in Q or appears earlier in  than hPi; rii,
and ri0 uni-infers ri.
2. There exist ri0 ; : : : ; rim, m  1, where ri0 is a rule with m facts in its body, and
ri1 ; : : : ; rim are facts, such that for all 0  j  m, hPi; rij i either is in Q or appears
earlier in  than hPi; rii, and all rij together derive ri through one application of
modus ponens plus zero or more uni-inferences.
3. There exists hPj ; rii; Pj 6= Pi, such that either hPj ; rii 2 Q or hPj ; rii appears earlier
in  than hPi; rii. This means that rule ri is disclosed (sent) from Pj to Pi.
Then we say that  is a proof sequence in Q,  proves every pair hPi; rii; 0  i  n, and
ri has a proof at Pi.
When  is a proof sequence, we can start from Q, follow the sequence step by step, and
eventually derive ri at peer Pi. For a set G of facts, if  proves hP; gi for every g 2 G,
then we say that  proves G at P . An empty sequence proves an empty goal set.
Theorem 4.1 (Soundness) In a MultiTrust system with initial state Q, suppose peer A
runs QueryFacts(B, G0, 0, E0, d0) and receives answer (^; ^). Then (1) 0 covers ^,
(2) ^ is not covered by any element in E0, and (3) ^ is a proof for G0=^ at A in Q.
Proof. To prove part (1) of the theorem, we induct on the invocation depth d0. When d0
is 1, the invocation returns in line 6, which means ^ equals 0. Now consider the case where
d0 is n+1. The initial invocation must have returned at line 6, 31 or 56. In case of line 6,
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^ equals 0. If the return is at line 31, the 0 returned by findSubstitutionAndSubgoals
(line 15) is always covered by the current . By the induction hypothesis, the substitution
1 returned by QueryFacts in line 20 is covered by 0, which means 1 is also covered by
. In line 24, a projection is done on 1 and ; then the outcome 01 is still covered by
, which equals 0 in this invocation. Similarly, we get that 02 is covered by 01. So the
substitution eventually returned by QueryFacts in line 31 is covered by 0. Similarly we
have that the substitution returned in line 56 is covered by 0 as well. By induction, we
know that every ^ is covered by 0.
To prove part (2) of the theorem, we induct on d0. When d0 is 0, 0 is returned in
line 6, and 0 is not covered by any element in exclusions0 (line 5). Now consider the
case when d0 is n+ 1. The initial invocation must have returned in line 6, line 31 or 56.
The case for line 6 is obvious, as ^ equals 0. Suppose the return is from line 31. By
the induction hypothesis, the substitution 1 returned by QueryFacts in line 20 is not
covered by any element in exclusions. The projection in line 24 \relaxes" 1 by removing
some value assignments and therefore makes the according variables free, which means 01
covers 1. So 01 is also not covered by any element of exclusions, which equals E0 in this
invocation. Continuing on, we nd that 02 at line 30 is not covered by E0. Similarly, we
nd that 05 at line 56 is not covered by E0 either. By induction, ^ is not covered by E0.
We also prove part (3) by an induction on d0. When d0 is 1, ^ must have been returned
in line 6, which means both goals and ^ are empty; then ^ is a valid proof for the empty
set G0=0. Now consider the case when d0 is n + 1. The initial invocation must have
returned in line 6, 31 or 56. The case for 6 is similar to that of d0 = 0. Let us examine
the latter two cases.
In the case of a return from line 31, the sequence 01 (line 23) is composed as
1 k retrieveProof(r) k hself; r=1i k hself; goal=1i
By the induction hypothesis, we know that the 1 returned at line 20 is a proof sequence for
(subgoals  sub)=1 at self . As r is already in the current peer's KB , either (1) hself ; ri
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is in Q and retrieveProof(r) returns an empty sequence that generates no pairs, or (2)
r gets added to KB in line 25, 42, or 51, so retrieveProof(r) returns the corresponding
sequence saved by saveProof . Examining how the saved sequence is composed and using
the induction hypothesis, we see that the saved sequence is a proof for r at self in Q,
which means we can apply instantiation to derive hA; r=1i, and further apply modus
ponens to derive hP; goal=1i. So the 01 here is a proof sequence for goal=1, which equals
goal=01 due to the projection on  in line 24. Continuing on, we nd that when we reach
line 29, 02 is a proof sequence, and it contains every element of A  goals=02. This means
02 is a proof for goals=02 at self in Q, where 02 equals ^, 02 equals ^, and self equals A
when QueryFacts returns at line 31.
In the case of a return from line 56, the argument proceeds as for the previous case.
The proof composition at line 41 appends hself ; r=3i to 3, because by induction 3 is a
proof for r=3 at the other peer P , and r=3 then gets disclosed to A.
Now we consider the completeness of this algorithm. For a query-answering system
to be truly complete in a distributed P2P system, a peer potentially needs to directly or
indirectly ask every peer its query, which is undesirable in practice because of its high
costs. In MultiTrust, a peer directly asks only the set of peers that it believes may be
helpful, as specied by its QRRs. While this provides a more practical approach than
blindly asking every peer in the system, the reduced search space means that some query
answers may be missed. Further, even with the use of QRRs to limit the search space,
QueryFacts could still run forever if we did not take measures to limit its execution. We
chose to use a depth limit for recursive invocations; many other approaches are possible.
In practice, peers can run their own private implementations of QueryFacts, as long
as they agree to terminate, honor the exclusions list, and return proof sequences and
substitutions that cover . Because we want to provide completeness guarantees, which
require an understanding of the measures each peer takes to limit its search (QRRs and
variable instantiation in our case), the proofs that follow assume that every peer runs
QueryFacts.
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Theorem 4.2 (Finite Substitution) Given values for parameters requester, goals, ,
exclusions, and d, there are only a nite number of possible substitutions that QueryFacts
can return.
Proof. QueryFacts does not instantiate a free variable to an arbitrary constant. If a
constant or variable occurs in the returned substitution, this constant or variable must
occur in goals, , the local peer's base rules and QRRs, or in those of a peer that was called
to help answer the query. Each peer has a nite number of rules, and its QRRs point to a
nite number of other peers. Within a nite invocation depth, the set of reachable peers
is nite, so there are only nitely many constants and free variables that can appear in
the returned substitution.
Theorem 4.3 (Invocation Termination) QueryFacts always terminates.
Suppose that a peer calls QueryFacts repeatedly, with the same set of goals, but with a
monotonically growing set of exclusions containing all substitutions returned by previous
invocations. Then QueryFacts returns failure after a nite number of invocations.
Theorem 4.4 (Enumeration Termination) The following while loop always termi-
nates:
while h; i ( QueryFacts(A;G0; 0; E; d)) do
E := E [ 
Proof. The above two termination theorems are related. We do an induction on the
invocation depth parameter d. When d is 0, both theorems hold. Now consider the case
where d equals n+ 1.
 If the rst invocation returns in line 6, the invocation terminates here.
 By the induction hypothesis, we know the three while loops (line 20, 38, and 47)
always terminate because they each have invocation depth limit d   1 equal to n.
So QueryFacts always terminates on invocation depth n+ 1.
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 Every time QueryFacts returns, it contains a substitution dierent from all pre-
viously returned substitutions, as specied in the exclusion set E. Because there
are only a nite number of substitutions, after a nite number of loop iterations,
QueryFacts returns a failure answer, which terminates the while loop.
Denition 4.3 (QRR-covered) In MultiTrust, a proof sequence  is covered by the
system's QRRs i for every rule r that is disclosed from peer P to A in , and every
g that can be uni-inferred from r or from r's head, there is a QRR in A's KB such
that (1) its condition is satised when g is requested from A, and (2) this QRR's action
is
ask P for r0
where r0 instantiates to r.
Denition 4.4 (First uni-originator and rst originator) Consider a proof sequence
 with initial conguration Q = hP0; r0i; : : : ; hPn; rni.
 First uni-originator. The rst uni-originator for hPi; rii, 0  i  n, is a pair
hPi; rji in Q or occurring no later than hPi; rii in , such that hPi; rji uni-infers
hPi; rii within a nite number of uni-inferences, and that if hPi; rji appears in ,
then there does not exist hPi; rki that infers hPi; rji and hPi; rki is in Q or precedes
hPi; rji in .
 First originator. Let hPi; rji be a rst uni-originator for hPi; rii in .
{ If hPi; rji 2 Q, then hPi; rji is also a rst originator for hPi; rii.
{ Suppose there exists hPi; rj0i, hPi; rj1i, ..., hPi; rjmi, m  1, such that (1) for
each 0  k  n, hPi; rjki is in Q or precedes hPi; rji in , and (2) rj0 is a rule
with m facts i its body, rj1 ; :::; rjm are facts, and they together derive rj with
one application of modus ponens and zero or more uni-inferences. Then a rst
uni-originator of hPi; rj0i is also a rst originator of hPi; rii.
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If hPi; rji is a rst originator (or uni-orginator) of hPi; rii, we also say rj is a rst originator
(or uni-originator) of ri at Pi in . If hPi; rji =2 Q, we know from the denition of a proof
sequence that rj is disclosed from some other peer.
Theorem 4.5 (Finite Completeness) In a MultiTrust system with initial congura-
tion Q, suppose that peer B invokes QueryFacts(B, G0, 0, E0, d0) on peer A, where 0
is not covered by E0. If there exists a sequence 0 such that (1) 0 is a proof for G0=0 at
A in Q, (2) d0 > L, where L is the length (number of pairs) of , and (3)  is covered
by the system's QRRs, then:
1. QueryFacts returns h^; ^i, where ^ is a proof for G0=^ at A in Q.
2. If one calls QueryFacts repeatedly as specied below, then QueryFacts will eventu-
ally return a pair with ^ that covers 0.
E := E0
while h^; ^i ( QueryFacts(A;G0; 0; E; d0) do
E := E [ ^
Proof. Suppose QueryFacts(B, G0, 0, E0, d0) returns h^; ^i instead of failure. Then
by the completeness theorem, we know that ^ is a proof for G0=^ at A in Q, which proves
point 1 of the nite completeness theorem. From point 1, we know that the invocation
in the enumeration loop of point 2 will return a pair if a proof sequence exists. Further
applying the enumeration termination theorem and the rst two points of the soundness
theorem, we know that the enumeration loop eventually returns a pair containing 0. So
if we prove that QueryFacts(B, G0, 0, E0, d0) always returns a pair, we have proved the
whole nite completeness theorem.
We conduct an induction on L, the length of 0. When L is 0, since 0 proves G0=00,
G0 is also empty, the invocation returns a pair in line 6. Assume the theorem is true for
0 with length L  n  1. Consider the case when L is n. If G0 is empty, the invocation
returns at line 6. So we only need to examine the case where G0 is nonempty. Then the
rst invocation of QueryFacts reaches line 10 with variable goals equal to G0. Now it
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picks one element from goals and assigns it to goal. Since 0 proves goal= at A ( equals
0 as this is the initial invocation), we know that hA; goal=i is in 0. Let  be a rst
originator for goal= in A (self equals A at this point). We have the following dierent
cases:
Case 1a. hA; i is in Q and  is not a rst uni-originator for goal=. Then  must
be a rule whose head uni-infers goal=. If the algorithm returns before the loop that goes
through all rules in KB (line 13), it has returned a pair. Or, the loop eventually reaches
the iteration where r equals , since  is in KB and can be used to infer goal=. The
set sub contains those subgoals that, after applying substitution 0, can be uni-inferred
by rules in KB , and (subgoals   sub) contains those that cannot be uni-inferred yet.
Then for every s 2 (subgoals   sub), there exists s0, such that hA; s0i occurs in 0
to the left of hA; goal=i and s0 uni-infers s=0. If we replace every such hA; s0i in 0
by hA; si, then the resulting new sequence contains a subsequence that is a valid proof
sequence for (subgoals   sub)=0. Further, the length of the new sequence is less than n
because at least hA; goal=i is not in it. By the induction hypothesis, we know that the
recursive invocation to answer (subgoals   sub)=0 at line 20 successfully returns a pair;
and unless the whole invocation returns a pair already, the while loop on the same line
will reach the point where the returned 1 equals 0. If so, since all goals in subgoals=0
have been answered, the algorithm is able to compose a proof for goal= and save it in
KB before the algorithm reaches line 28 to answer goals0=. Now with regard to the new
conguration that contains hA; goal=i, the new sequence 0 less hA; goal=i is still a valid
proof sequence for (goals  goal)=0 and its size is n  1. By the induction hypothesis, we
know that the invocation in line 28 returns a pair, which means that the whole invocation
ends by returning a pair in line 31.
Case 1b. hA; i is inQ and  is a rst uni-originator for goal=. The proof proceeds as
a special case for 1a: the peculiarity is that because  uni-infers goal=0, the set subgoals
returned by findSubstitutionAndSubgoals at line 15 is empty, which does not aect the
above proof.
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Case 2a. hA; i is not in Q and  is not a rst uni-originator for goal=. Then  must
be a rule whose head uni-infers goal=. Since  is goal's rst originator and hA; i is not
in Q, hA; i must have been disclosed from another peer C, and hC; i is either in Q or to
the left of hA; i in 0. Because pi0 is covered by the system's QRRs, we know that there
exists q 2 QRRKB , such that findRoute(q;B; goal; ) returns h0; Ci, and 0 can be
used to uni-infer . Unless the algorithm returns already, the loop that goes through all
QRRs in KB ( line 33) will encounter q, and the subsequent findRoute returns h0; Ci.
Then r equals 0 and P equals C. Now consider the two situations:
1. If hC; i is in 0, then there is a subsequence of 0 that proves hC; i with length less
than n. Further, it will still be a proof sequence if we replace hC; i with hC; =0i.
By the induction hypothesis, the remote recursive invocation at line 38 returns a
pair. And either the current invocation returns a pair already, or the current loop
will reach a point where the returned 3 equals 0. Since r can be used to derive
goal=, given the maximal nature of findSubstitutionAndSubgoals, we know that
r=3 can still be used to infer goal=. Now we have r=3 in KB , which means the
rest of the proof proceeds as for case 1a.
2. If hC; i is not in 0, then it must be in KB . Since L is at least 1, currently d is
at least 2. Then the remote call at line 38 has depth limit 1, which can still return
hC; =0i. The rest of the proof for this subcase proceeds as for subcase 1.
Case 2b. hA; i is not in Q and  is a rst uni-originator for goal=. With the same
argument made in 1b, the proof proceeds as a special case for 2a. This completes the
proof.
4.5 Customizing MultiTrust
MultiTrust's QRRs support a variety of ways to retrieve credentials, allowing it to emulate
the message-passing and proof-construction behavior of other trust management systems.
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Passive-Resource-Owner. In this approach, the service provider requires that the
requester provide any credential that the service provider does not have available locally.
This is easily encoded with QRRs. If we use the following QRRs in Example 1, then the
proof is constructed as in Figure 4.1-A.
Alice :
if true then
ask issuer
BMW :
if true then
ask requester
CRD :
if true then
ask issuer
DMV :
if true then
ask issuer
QCM Approach. In QCM, the service provider proactively requests credentials
from their issuers. This is achieved by the QRR conguration where every peer has one
QRR,
if true then
ask issuer.
This results in the authorization process as show in Example 1 in Figure 4.1-B.
Optimized Approach. When CRD does not accept requests from individuals, the
following QRRs have BMW initiate communications with CRD, saving Alice time, as
shown in Figure 4.4-A.
Alice :
if true then
ask issuer
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BMW :
if issuer == DMV then
ask subject
else if issuer == CRD then
ask CRD
CRD :
if true then
ask issuer
DMV :
if true then
ask issuer
First Alice requests C1 from BMW. BMW nds a local rule R1 that matches C1, so
it recursively calls QueryFacts on itself for fact C2. There is no local rule to derive C2,
so BMW checks its QRRs, and nds a match that tells it to ask the subject of S2, Alice.
When Alice calls QueryFacts on C2, she does not nd a match in her base policies, and
her QRRs direct her to ask DMV for C2. The proof continues as described in the gure.
Request C1
Request C2
Send C2
Send C1
Alice BMW
DMV CRD
Request 
C2
Send 
C2
Request 
C3
Send 
C3
1
2
3
4
5
6
9
10
A: Mixed PeerAccess
Request C1
Predisclose C2 C4
Alice BMW
DMV CRD
Request 
C2
Send 
C2
Request C3
Predisclose
C4
Send 
C3
3
1
2
6
4
5
B: Eager PeerAccess
with pre-disclosure
Send C1
Request C4
Send 
C4
7
8
Figure 4.4: MultiTrust handling of a query for a credential.
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RT0 Approach. Credentials are typed in the RT0 framework, and the type determines
where a credential is stored: at a party reachable in a chain starting from the issuer, from
the subject, or both. If both, a preference among the two is given. MultiTrust can
implement this searching strategy with the pseudocode below for creating QRRs based on
credential types. These QRRs are used if the credential cannot already be inferred from
the current peer's knowledge base, and should be placed after any domain-specic QRRs.
For example, suppose that Alice is trying to obtain her student ID, a credential traceable
from the issuer. When she asks the university for her ID, the university should have a
domain-specic rule that directs it to ask its registrar for the ID (the rst rule below).
if predicate == studentID then
ask registrar
if issuer-tracing-preferred then
if issuer-traceable then
ask issuer
if subject-traceable then
ask subject
if subject-tracing-preferred then
if subject-traceable then
ask subject
if issuer-traceable then
ask issuer
Support for Credential Repositories Instead of being stored at a location that is
guaranteed to be traceable from its issuer or owner, a credential might be kept at a third
party repository. We can generalize type-based credential retrievers [51], whose search
focuses on credential issuers and owners, by conguring QRRs to retrieve credentials from
repository peers and from peers who know how to get various kinds of credentials and are
willing to do the legwork, as shown below.
if self 2 subjects then
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ask myProxy.org
if predicate == discount then
ask eCoupons.com
4.6 Discussion
In an open distributed system like the Web, sending a query to all servers is impractical.
Just as people go to Ebay for auctions and Amazon for book listings, QRRs specify where
a peer should look for a certain credential, and signicantly reduce the search space. In a
properly congured system, the number of applicable QRRs at a peer's KB will be small,
the resulting search space among multiple peers will be modest, and the proof construction
algorithm can quickly succeed or fail.
When MultiTrust is used to emulate other trust management systems, the set of QRRs
at a peer is predetermined by the emulated system. But we can take advantage of Mul-
tiTrust's exibility and go far beyond this, to support peers who dynamically share and
self-congure their QRRs, much as one learns about useful new sites on the Web. For ex-
ample, peers can observe, record, and rate the eectiveness of their own QRRs in producing
proofs. Using machine learning techniques, these observations can lead to improvements
such as changing the order in which QRRs are tried (the equivalent of humans learning
to only ask Expedia after trying Travelocity, and to try Google before Yahoo) and adding
restrictions to a QRR condition. Peers can gossip and exchange QRRs and QRR eec-
tiveness ratings. Brokers can give their clients new QRRs to help them nd credentials,
and clients can consult their favorite brokers using QRRs such as
if true then
ask credential-google.com
Peers can even rely on reputation ratings to determine who they will accept new QRRs
from. Thus each peer can adjust its query-answering strategies as the world evolves, and
also answer queries faster by retiring poorly-performing QRRs (at the cost of possibly
failing to construct a proof), much as people typically only consult their favorite Internet
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search engine even though no search engine covers all of the web. We hope that this vision
will inspire future work in this area.
Although MultiTrust assumes that all involving peers cooperate and respect the inter-
action protocols as specied by the parameters of QueryFacts so that the completeness
theorem applies, this assumption is not required for correctness. Since QueryFacts can
verify the proofs it receives, peers cannot cheat by returning bogus messages.
MultiTrust peers can disclose credentials before they are requested, to accelerate the
proof construction process. If Alice knows from previous experience that BMW always
wants a DMV-signed driver license when she asks for a discount, and that CRD always
needs her signed authorization before releasing her credit rating to BMW, then Alice
can predisclose those credentials to BMW when she submits her request for a discount.
We can use a QRR-style language to specify the predisclosure of credentials so that the
authorization proceeds as in Figure 4.4-B.
4.7 Summary
We were motivated in this chapter by a desire to be able to describe today's real-world
heterogeneous authorization scenarios, those that sport a variety of authorization-related
repositories, services, resource owners, access policies, credential types, authorization
paradigms, and clients. Even though the interacting parties in an open distributed sys-
tem are often strangers to each other, they have the need to share resources in a secure
and timely fashion. A resource owner usually cannot base its authorization decisions on
a requesters identity alone, if the owner has no prior acquaintance with the requester.
Instead, the requester's attributes, as attested to by digital credentials, matter more for
the resource owner's decision making. Formal languages like PeerAccess can be used to
specify authorization policies based on these digital credentials and encode proofs of au-
thorizations. While verifying the correctness of a proof is straightforward, constructing a
proof of authorization that involves multiple parties is dicult, due to its multilateral and
distributed nature. To alleviate this problem, we have presented the MultiTrust query
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routing rules and algorithm for distributed non-repudiable proof construction, which sup-
port a signicant degree of local autonomy and local customization in proof construction
and in the degree and manner in which each peer is willing to search for needed cre-
dentials. We have proved that this algorithm is sound and complete with respect to the
credential search procedures that each peer chooses to adopt. Further, we have shown
that MultiTrust's credential search procedures can model the message-passing behavior
of other well-known trust management systems; thus MultiTrust can be used to reason
about the runtime behavior of these systems as they interact with one another in a large
open system.
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Chapter 5
Declassication and
Reclassication
5.1 Introduction
In PeerAccess, parties can derive and sign statements, which can then be sent as messages
to one another. As shown in Chapter 3, the signer of a statement A species the release
policy for A, which governs the conditions under which A can be included in a message
sent between peers. The original release policy for A remains in force even after the
signer of A has sent it to another party. PeerAccess, however, does not allow the owner of
information A to retain control over the dissemination of information derived from A. 1
Given the diversity of the participating parties and the dierent sensitivity levels of
resources to be shared in open distributed systems, information ow between them can
be quite complex. We divide it into the following categories:
1. Non-sensitive information ows that no organization or individual monitors or con-
trols, such as promotional literature and information posted on public web sites.
This information can be freely disseminated and in some cases can be freely reused
(e.g., classic literature).
2. Aggregated information derived from publicly available information source, e.g.,
national wide statistics of regional weather conditions. Although the information
source is public, the aggregation may become copyrighted or sensitive.
3. Sensitive or copyrighted information that cannot be freely reused or disseminated.
The Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) [78] policies are intended to describe
1This chapter is based on the material originally published in [5].
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restrictions on the ow of such information. Much copyrighted material also falls
under this category, including books, music, videos, and software. One example
restriction is that the permission of the owner of the information must be obtained
before the information can be further disseminated or reused.
4. Extremely sensitive information that should only be disseminated under certain
carefully limited circumstances. For example, patient medical records should not
be publicly disclosed if they contain individually identiable information. Even if
no individually identiable information is included in the disclosure, the individual
may retain certain rights to control who can see the disclosed information.
In response to the need to control these information ows, many countries have adopted
regulations that require careful monitoring and control of access to and dissemination of
personal information, so that the privacy of individuals is not compromised. For example,
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) says that \Protected
Health Information (PHI) may be disclosed to facilitate treatment, payment, or health
care options or if the hospital has obtained authorization from the individual. However,
when the hospital discloses any PHI, it must make a reasonable eort to disclose only
minimum necessary information required to achieve the purpose." Researchers have also
proposed ways to allow organizations to track and monitor the use of information that they
own or that is in their possession, e.g., for acknowledging the provenance of information in
intelligence reports, for tracking all the information in their possession about a particular
person, or for digital rights management.
In this chapter, we extend the PeerAccess authorization framework to specify release
control policies described in the information ow scenarios given above. The logic can
encode and reason about who owns a particular piece of information, who controls its
dissemination and re-dissemination, who can disseminate derived information, and how
release constraints from the original owner can be declassied. Given the variety of dier-
ent release control requirements, we introduce a number of release predicates to set forth
restrictions on information dissemination and re-dissemination. In particular, we support
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sticky release (srelease in short) policies that are specied by the data owner to control
future dissemination of the data. To control the dissemination of aggregated data, we in-
troduce aggregate release (arelease in short) policies, serving as declassication rules. We
also have local release (lrelease in short) policies to specify the local release constraints of
the aggregator (the one who has produced the aggregate). The aggregated data cannot be
released until the arelease policy of every data source is satised and that the aggregator's
lrelease policy is satised.
A policy that is sticky follows the information that it is attached to, wherever it
goes. While the presence of sticky policies in existing standard policy languages such as
EPAL suggests that sticky policies are moving into the mainstream, PeerAccess is the
rst to propose using sticky policies in a general-purpose authorization policy language.
Taking one step further, we introduce the concept of super-sticky release policies, which
allow the owner of a piece of information A, or the owner's designated agent, to control
the dissemination of information that is derived using A. The super-stickiness is encoded
with the help of the arelease and lrelease policies. If the owner does not authorize the
declassication by signing his portion of the aggregate release, his original sticky release
policy will be carried over and becomes a factor of the aggregate information's sticky
release policy. In the extreme case where none of the original information owners authorize
declassication, all their super sticky policies get \glued" (and'ed, logically) together with
the aggregate's local release (lrelease) policy to form the aggregate's sticky policy. We
also introduce the concept of monotonic declassication, where under certain conditions
the original owner relinquishes control over the use and re-dissemination of information
derived from A.
The goal of this chapter is to examine the needs for dierent kinds of release policies and
enhance the PeerAccess logic framework that supports these release policies. Particularly,
our logic can be used to derive release policies for aggregated information at runtime,
and allows exible dissemination control of aggregated information by supporting full
enforcement (super-stickiness) and declassication of the original information sources'
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release policies. While our extension is directly based on PeerAccess, we design it in a
way such that the same constructs can be applied to a variety of policy languages, as a
meta-level wrapper around the base policy language, to support control of the release of
derived information.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. We present our language for
specifying release policies in Section 5.2, followed by its proof theory and semantics in
Section 5.3. We give three detailed examples of how to use the language in Section
5.4, discuss advantages and disadvantages of the proposed solution in Section 5.5, and
summarize in Section 5.6.
5.2 Language and Framework
Our focus in this chapter is on controlling the release and reuse of information, whatever
form that information may take. To describe the information and also the policies re-
garding its release, we need a framework that conceptually consists of two levels: the base
level and the meta level. The base level is used to specify the derivation of information
within a single party, and the meta level rules are used to specify release control policies.
Parties can exchange information by sending messages to one another, but a particular
piece of information can only be included in a message if its release policy is satised.
While we lift the base language wholesale from PeerAccess, it is of interest to note that
the release policies that we present, which operate at the meta level, can work with other
base languages: the exact form of the base level language does not matter, as long as it
satises the following conditions:
 Statements in the base level cannot refer to the meta level.
 The base language must include a concept of dependency. This could be a classical
logical notion of derivation, such as Datalog derivations, or the equivalent in any
formal system. Alternatively, it could record compositional relationships (e.g., photo
p is included in section s of document d).
105
 The base language must include a notion of ownership or source for each piece of
information.
The detailed description of PeerAccess's base language, semantics, and proof theory is
available in chapter 3, but we briey summarize it here.
In PeerAccess, we have a set of named peers, each with its own nite knowledge base
that includes facts and rules in the base language. The base language consists of ordinary
Datalog facts and rules, except that each fact (including those that appear in the body
and head of rules) must be signed by a peer. For example, hospital signs parent(X, Y)  
hospital signs mother(X, Y) is a PeerAccess rule. There are two types of signatures: direct
signatures (signs) and logical signatures (lsigns). Intuitively, a directly signed fact or rule
has been digitally signed by a peer. A logically signed fact or rule is one that follows from
directly signed facts and rules. More specically, if P lsigns  is true, then P would be
willing to directly sign  if presented with certain evidence.The proof theory for the base
language includes a conversion rule that allows one to convert any directly signed rule
head to a logically signed rule head, a version of the usual modus ponens inference rule
that applies to logically signed rules and directly or logically signed facts, and variable
instantiation operations. In addition, a peer can take any fact or rule head that bears its
own logical signature and convert that logical signature to a direct signature.
We use the same messaging mechanism as in PeerAccess. In brief, a peer A can send
a fact or rule r in a message to another peer B if r is true at A and the release policy for
r is true at A. Further, r must be directly signed by a peer, to provide non-repudiation.
In an implementation of PeerAccess, for example, a peer could place its digital signature
on r before sending it out in a message. Once the message is sent, its contents appear in
B. A peer that newly joins the system has only local rules: things signed by other peers
only arrive as messages.
We remarked earlier that a base language must include some notion of dependency and
ownership. A rule of the form  1 ^ : : : ^ n means that the information represented
by  depends on the information represented by 1 through n. The signer of a piece of
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information is its owner. More specically, the signer of a rule head is the owner of that
rule.
In the meta level of logic, PeerAccess uses the predicate srelease(, X,Y) to encode
sticky release policies. To add the capability of specifying release policies for derived
information, we extend PeerAccess by introducing three meta predicates: aggregate(,
 1,: : :, n), arelease(,1,X,Y), and lrelease(,X,Y). Here ,  , and  i are formulas from
the base language, which are treated as terms by the meta level. One can think of these
terms as signed objects that abstract real-world entities such as signed digital documents
or arbitrary other data. While an object may have its own internal structure, in this
chapter that internal structure is irrelevant, and we treat each object as an indivisible
entity. X and Y are variables that instantiate to peer names. We informally describe the
meaning of the meta predicates as follows.
The predicate srelease(;X; Y ) represents the conditions under which X can release
formula  in the base language and send it to Y . Dierent from PeerAccess, we treat
srelease as a reserved predicate, meaning that it cannot appear in the head of any rule
in the knowledge base of any peer, except in the monotonic declassication axiom, which
we introduce later in section 5.3.
Intuitively, the predicate aggregate(;  1; : : : ;  n) 2 abstracts the notion of depen-
dency present in the base language. For example, in a Datalog-based base language, for
each rule   1^  ^ n in a peer's knowledge base, we have aggregate(;  1; : : : ;  n).
If the underlying domain were numerical, we might have aggregate(average(x, y, z), x, y,
z), where x, y, and z are numbers (i.e., terms rather than formulas), and average gives
the average value of its three parameters. If n = 0, aggregate() means  is prime,
i.e., not dependent on any other data. For generality, the meta level treats  and  i as
structureless objects and treats aggregate as a built-in predicate.
The meaning of Ps signs arelease(a;  s; X; Y )is that Ps permits P to authorize the
release of  from X to Y . In the predicate, a is of the form P signs  and  s is of the
2Although it is an abuse of logic syntax, we are using the notation aggregate(;  1; : : : ;  n) because
it is easier for humans to understand than a conversion to a xed number of arguments would be.
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form Ps signs  . Typically, Ps would not sign arelease until Ps is assured that the release
of  does not leak undesirable information about  . Rules with arelease in the head are
called arelease policies.
P signs lrelease(P signs , X, Y ) means P personally authorizes  to be released.
In the case  is prime, P signs lrelease() is enough to allow  to be released to other
peers. If  is an aggregate, however, P signs lrelease() is not sucient for the release of
: we need authorization of the source data, denoted by arelease predicates.
Given the above framework, the release of information is controlled by a peer's ability
to generate facts that are required to prove that release predicates are satised. The
proofs can be entirely local or use facts or rules derived and signed by other peers. Recall
that any released fact or rule r must be true at the peer that releases r. In practice, at
runtime, when a peer needs to determine whether r is releasable, a proof of r generated
by the peer will be passed to the meta level, so the meta level will never have to generate
a proof of r.
5.3 Deduction System for Declassication and
Reclassication
The deduction system of our logic consists of a set of derivation rules and axioms.
5.3.1 Derivation Rules
We use the same set of inference rules as PeerAccess. More specically, they are insantia-
tion, signing, sigature, Modus Ponenes, and SRelease, which we have described in Section
3.6. All these derivation rules, except the SRelease rule, are local rules that are used to
conduct the derivation within a peer's local knowledge base. The SRelease derivation rule
can be used to derive facts across two peers' knowledge bases, which represents message
delivery as controlled by release control policies.
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5.3.2 Declassication Axioms
Monotonic Release Axiom
P2 lsigns arelease (P1 signs ; P2 signs  ; X; Y ) 
P2 lsigns srelease (P2 signs  ; X; Y )
The intuition behind this axiom is that if P2 already allows  to be released from X to
Y , P2 would not be concerned that releasing from X to Y any information  aggregated
from  can possibly leak any information about  .
Monotonic Declassication Axiom
P lsigns srelease (P signs ; X; Y )  
P lsigns lrelease (P signs ; X; Y )
^ aggregate(; 1; : : : ; n)
^ P1 lsigns arelease (P signs ; P1 signs 1; X; Y )
^ P1 signs 1
^ : : : : : :
^ Pn lsigns arelease (P signs ; Pn signs n; X; Y )
^ Pn signs n
In English, this axiom means that the aggregate  can be released if each i is authorized
by Pi's arelease policy, each i is singed by Pi,  is the aggregated from 1; : : : ; n, and
P permits its release by the lrelease policy. As a special case, if  is prime, then n is 0,
and the axiom becomes
P lsigns srelease (P signs ; X; Y )  
aggregate() ^ P lsigns lrelease (P signs ; X; Y )
The monotonic declassication axiom allows us to do both declassication and re-
classication of aggregate information. Even though the aggregagation is based sensitive
information, the aggregate information is declassied if all owners of the original infor-
mation agree to declassify by signing the according arelease policy, and the aggregator,
the party who does the aggregation, also autohorizes the declassication by signing the
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lrelease policy. On the other hand, if the aggregator would like to reclassify the aggregate
by not signing the lrelease policy, the aggregate cannot be released, even if it is completely
derived from public information.
5.3.3 Semantics
Our logic language is an extension to the PeerAccess language. The extension we introduce
includes the meta level release predicates arelease, lrelease, and aggregate. We have also
added two axioms. However, these additions do not change the basic properties of the
PeerAccess language, e.g., our language has the same set of inference rules to those of
PeerAccess. Similarly, we can reuse the semantics of PeerAccess, with the exception that
the actual meaning of the newly introduced meta predicates is conveyed by the monotonic
release and monotonic declassication axioms.
5.4 Examples
In this section, we show how the srelease, arelease, and lrelease policies can be used
to encode real world information dissemination examples with dierent levels of privacy
concerns.
Open Source Software
Nowadays important software such as Eclipse and Subversion are freely available for down-
load over the Internet. One signicant factor in this development is the use of the open
source software development model. There are a number of popular open source software
licenses, such as GPL and BSD License. Some of these licenses require an agreement that
if Alice utilizes an open source software library to develop a new application, Alice needs
to acknowledge that the new application has made use of the library and she needs to
make the application publicly available as well. We can encode this open source agreement
as:
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A lsigns lrelease (A signs content(; ); X; Y )  
A signs utilize(A signs content(; ); O signs content( ; ))
where  represents the open-source software used to generate Alice's new software .
Suppose an open source organization, OpenOrg, provides two free libraries lib1 and lib2 to
the public through the following two release rules, where X and Y can be instantiated to
any person and letting varphi1 to be OpenOrg signs content(lib1,-)) and '2 to be OpenOrg
signs content(lib2,-)):
OpenOrg signs srelease ('1; X; Y )
OpenOrg signs srelease ('2; X; Y )
If Alice used these two libraries to develop the new software App, the following formulas
will be true:
Alice signs utilize(Alice signs content(App; ); '1)
Alice signs utilize(Alice signs content(App; ); '2)
aggregate(Alice signs content(App; ); '1; '2)
Applying the open source agreement, we get
Alice lsigns lrelease (Alice signs content(App; )); X; Y )
Applying the monotonic release axiom, we get
OpenOrg lsigns arelease(Alice signs content(App; ));
OpenOrg signs content(lib1; )); X; Y )
OpenOrg lsigns arelease(Alice signs content(App; ));
OpenOrg signs content(lib2; )); X; Y )
Further applying the monotonic declassication axiom, we get
Alice lsigns srelease (Alice signs openSource(App); X; Y );
meaning Alice agrees to freely release App to everybody.
Digital Rights Management
Consider an example digital rights management (DRM) policy to control access to digital
content such as movies and music. Ideally, the owner,O, of the content would like everyone
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to easily acquire the content, i.e. have as many distributors of the content as possible.
But she also wants to get revenue from the distribution. O wants to restrict the access to
the content with the help of a release policy where the user has to pay O a fee or royalty
to get the required permissions. Let the business model be set up in such a way that every
customer can distribute the content but only when the receiver of the content is able to
prove that he is authorized to get the content from the customer.
Let A be the customer who already received the data, , from O. If B wants the data,
B has to prove to A that he paid the owner. The monotonic declassication axiom says:
A lsigns srelease (A signs content(; ); A; B) 
A lsigns lrelease(A signs content(; ); A;B)^
aggregate(A signs content(; ); O signs content(; ))^
O lsigns arelease(A signs content(; ); O signs content(; ); A;B)
A signs content(; ) is a copy of O signs content(; ), which means the above
aggregate predicate is true. If A has no local constraints for the further distribution
of , then the predicate A lsigns lrelease(A signs content(; ); A;B) is also true. The
only condition left to be satised is O's authorization of aggregate release. A then turns
to B asking for the missing condition. B further requests O to give a proof for O lsigns
arelease(A signs content(, -), O signs content(, -),A,B). O imposes a restriction that
B should be registered with O and also B should make the required payment for the
requested data with the help of the following rule:
O lsigns arelease(O signs content(; ); X; Y ) 
O lsigns registeredUser(O;X)^
O lsigns registeredUser(O; Y ) ^O lsigns madePayment(Y;O)
Now B has to register with O, if B is not already registered, and also make the
payment for the content. This will generate the proofs for O lsigns registeredUser(O,B)
and O lsigns madePayment(B,O). Since A is already a registered user, O has the proof
for O lsigns registeredUser(O;A). Using the Modus Ponens rule and the above three
rules, O can get the proof for
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O lsigns srelease (O signs content(; ); A; B).
According to the Monotonic Release Axiom we have the following rule:
O lsigns arelease (X signs ; O signs content(; ); X; Y ) 
A lsigns lrelease(A signs content(; ); X; Y )^
O lsigns srelease (O signs content(; ); X; Y )
Instantiating X with A and Y with B, we get the proof for O lsigns arelease(A signs
content(,-),O signs content(,-),A,B). Using Modus Ponens again, B can get the proof
for
A lsigns srelease (A signs content(; ); A; B). A releases the actual content repre-
sented by  to B once B shows the previous fact.
In the above example, A may also want to charge some money for releasing B. This
condition can be encoded in the form of an lrelease predicate:
A signs lrelease(A signs content(; ); X; Y ) 
A signs madePayment(Y;A)
Patient Records
Another example application for our release policies is hospital records where a patient's
medical information should be kept secret. If the hospital needs to collect information such
as the number of people who tested positive for HIV and send it to an external agency, it
would be ne to do so if the aggregate information does not leak any information about
the patients.
Let 1, 2, : : :, n be predicates representing the content of the patient records of the
n people who tested positive for HIV. The hospital requires the permission of the owners
of the records to calculate and release the aggregate information.
The hospital also requires the patients to sign a consent form for release of information
at the beginning of the treatment. The patient consents to release his statistics if his
personal details are kept anonymous. Using the consent form, the following rules can be
generated for each patient Pi:
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' :Pi signs arelease (H signs ; Pi signs i; X; Y ) 
H lsigns anonymous(H signs ; Pi signs i; X; Y )
The hospital may also have the following rules:
 1 : H lsigns anonymous(H signs ; P1 signs 1;H;A)
: : :
 n : H lsigns anonymous(H signs ; Pn signs n;H;A)
Using ',  1, . . . ,  n and modus ponens, we can, for each patient Pi, deduce the facts
Pi lsigns arelease(H signs ; Pi signs i;H;A) . Using these newly generated arelease
policies and the monotonic declassication rule, we can again use modus ponens to get
the declassied aggregate information as the fact H lsigns srelease(H signs ;H;A).
Another possibility for the hospital is that a peer C, for whom H does not have any
anonymity results, requests for the aggregate data. The hospital now cannot use the
monotonic declassication rule to release the aggregate to C. At the same time, H cannot
release the rule '1 to C, because it contains sensitive information about the patients. To
prevent H to release ' to C, there should be a release policy over the rule ' so that it
will be released only to authorized peers.
5.5 Discussion
Real world information dissemination control requirements are inherently complex, which
makes the corresponding release policies complex as well. With increased complexity of
policies, human users can easily specify the policies incorrectly, and sometimes such mis-
takes are almost inevitable. To avoid releasing aggregated information without permission
from the owners of the original data sources, we restrict the srelease predicate so that it
can only be derived with the monotonic declassication axiom. Without such a restriction,
the user can mistakenly write a srelease policy that ignores the necessary aggregate and
arelease conditions, which subsequently violates the original data owner's privacy.
Although our policy language is expressive enough to support a number of complex real
world release policies and handles declassication with exibility, it has limited capability
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to support the opposite of declassication { \reclassication". As an example, if Alice
has made a piece of information  available by signing srelease(Alice signs ; X; Y ),
our logic does not provide a way to restrict it so that \Alice signs " can only be sent
to Bob. This limitation is inherent with the monotonic nature of our logic. In real
world implementation, we can add another layer of meta policies to further control the
information owner's behavior, e.g., add some update mechanism so that people can change
their policies.
Our policy language by itself does not prevent inference based attacks against aggre-
gated data. For example, a hospital does HIV tests for a number of patients, and reports
the total number of positive tests after assuring to the patients that report will remain
anonymous. If later all the patients who are negative publish their results, they can gure
out that the others patients are all positive based on the reported number. To counteract
this particular attack, we can, prior the tests, have the patients sign agreement not to
publicly release their results. We plan to add support of negations to our logic so that this
kind of policy can be modeled with ease. While our current release control mechanism is
tied with a particular underlying logic language, we plan to separate it out so that it can
easily plug into other access control frameworks.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter we presented an extension to the PeerAccess authorization framework to
deal with dierent kinds of release policies. The new constructs for dening release poli-
cies provide exibility for the user to dene policies to meet the requirements of his or
her application, ranging all the way from freely reusable and re-disseminable information
(immediate declassication) to permanent ability to veto the release of any conclusions
derived from a particular piece of information, no matter where the information ows
(super-sticky policies). Under our approach, release policies for newly aggregated infor-
mation can be derived from the original information's release policies and the local release
constraints imposed by the creator who has aggregated the new information. Our release
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policies are structured so that a user cannot intentionally or unintentionally override the
policies of other parties whose information he has used, thus avoiding unintended declassi-
cation. We provided three example scenarios that show the use of our approach in open
source software distribution, digital rights management and patient record information,
as an illustration of how to create policies and generate proofs in our logic.
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Chapter 6
Related Work
This research is related to many aspects of trust management and authorization in open
distributed systems, including trust negotiation, distributed authorization, proof construc-
tion, privacy protection, and information ow. A great deal of research has been done in
each of these areas, many of which have directly or indirectly inuenced our research. In
this chapter, we describe the work that impacts our work the most, and the work that
directly contrasts with our solution approaches.
6.1 Trust Negotiation
Winsborough et al. introduced the concept of ATN [80, 83], as a way to establish trust
between two strangers by exchanging credentials. As credentials are sensitive, both parties
in the negotiation have a credential access policy (CAP) to protect each credential. The
authors described the basic architecture of a trust negotiation system and introduced the
notion of negotiation strategies, which laid the ground work for trust negotiation research.
This seminal work inspired a number of researchers; since then, a growing body of work
has been done in the area of two-party trust negotiation, including [72, 92, 84, 74, 73,
30, 42, 17]. We build on their work by extending their basic concepts such as disclosure
sequences and strategies to work in an environment with more than two parties.
Seamons et al. [72] proposed negotiation strategies to limit the disclosure of credentials
and access control policies during trust negotiation. The authors showed that access
control policies can contain sensitive information, and therefore measures need to be taken
to reduce unnecessary disclosures. In the relevant credentials set strategy, each party
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only requests for credentials that are of immediate relevance to unlock the credentials
requested by the other party. No access control policies are disclosed in this strategy; yet
more credentials can be disclosed than strictly necessary. The all relevant policies strategy
reduces credential disclosures by disclosing relevant policies. Based on the access control
policies received from the other part, one can search potential proof trees, and nd the
minimal set of satisfying credentials to disclose. The latter strategy is less ecient than
the former, and the search for a minimal credential set can become extremely slow in the
context of MTN. UniPro [91], proposed by Yu et al., improved on this work by modeling
polices as rst-class resources and protecting them in the same way as credentials. The
authors also showed that UniPro can work with practical negotiation strategies without
sacricing the strategies' completeness guarantee.
Yu et al. [93] proposed the disclosure tree strategy (DTS) family of strategies to address
the interoperability between dierent negotiation strategies. Previously proposed negoti-
ation strategies are often incompatible with each other, which means that a negotiation
can fail if the two parties are employing dierent strategies, even though a safe disclosure
sequence does exist. With DTS, however, a negotiation is guaranteed to succeed if a safe
disclosure sequence exists, as long as both the two parties are employing a strategy within
the DTS family. Thus the DTS family gives the two participating parties some level of
autonomy in choosing which negotiation strategy to use, without jeopardizing the com-
pleteness of the negotiation. This aspect of autonomy will also be desirable in MTN, and
remains an interesting improvement for future MTN research.
Seamons et al. [74] identied privacy vulnerabilities in on-line trust negotiation, argu-
ing that even though both negotiators' access policies for credentials are enforced during a
negotiation, their privacy is not necessarily protected, as one negotiator can infer sensitive
information like whether the other party possesses a certain credential and what kind of
attributes the credential might have, by observing the other party's response to credential
requests. The authors proposed modications of negotiation strategies to help prevent
inadvertent disclosure of credential information, including refraining from responding to
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possession-sensitive credentials, pretending to possess a certain credential, and dynami-
cally modifying policies. Eective as these techniques are, they have side eects such as
breaking the completeness of the negotiation strategies and increasing runtime complex-
ity. Li et al. [52, 82] proposed acknowledgement policies as a way to prevent undesirable
inferences: only after satisfying a certain acknowledge policies, the requester gets to know
the other party's response for the request. Irwin and Yu [36] proposed a centralized policy
database to store policies for possession sensitive credentials. A resource owner who does
not possess a certain credential randomly draws a policy from the policy database. Thus
the distribution of policies is the same for any possession sensitive credential between
those who possess this credential and those who do not, which prevents the negotiators
from inferring sensitive information from the other party's negotiation behavior. Other
researchers have utilized ontology and generalization (e.g., [45, 76]) to avoid disclosing
specic credential attributes and achieve privacy. All of this research is orthogonal to our
work, and can be leveraged to increase the privacy protection in MTN.
There are prior eorts to apply ATN to establish trust specically in P2P systems.
Ye et al. [89] proposed a collaborative ATN scheme that uses locally trusted third parties
(LTTPs) to solve circular policy dependencies during negotiation. One of our goals is
to be able to handle certain common types of circular dependencies without relying on
trusted third parties. Bertino et al. [13] proposed Trust-X as a comprehensive framework
for ATN in a P2P environment. Trust-X oers a number of innovative features, such as
trust tickets, to speed up the negotiation. Both of these projects support two-party trust
negotiation only, and cannot concurrently carry a negotiation among multiple parties.
The research in distributed credential discovery and proof construction is the closest
to our work. QCM [32] and its successor SD3 [37] are trust management systems that
can automatically and recursively contact a remote party to gather credentials during
the policy evaluation. Li et al. [53] designed a goal-directed credential chain discovery
algorithm for their RT family of role-based trust-management systems, which was further
enhanced to support parameterized roles and constraints [56]. Bauer et al. [7] designed a
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lazy proof construction algorithm that places the burden of proof on the credential issuers;
later they revised this algorithm to improve performance [8] through techniques such as
pre-computing delegation chains. Compared to these proof construction algorithms, MTN
better supports autonomy for each peer with respect to which message to send, and more
naturally ts environments where peers employ customized negotiation strategies based
on their own constraints such as privacy sensitivity and resource availability, and only
provide best-eort service. A second dierence is that MTN bases its authorizations on
iterative asynchronous message exchange, instead of the recursive RPC used in distributed
proof construction approaches. This simplies implementation and lowers runtime costs
for maintaining the complex state of recursive RPCs. The third dierence is that the end
result of a proof construction algorithm is a proof of authorization, encoded as a tree or
list of rules, facts, and derivation rules, which the resource owner has to verify. Parts
of the proof may be repeatedly veried by dierent peers while the proof is constructed.
MTN, however, uses only signed facts in disclosures, and eliminates the need for proof
delivery and verication.
Multiparty negotiation has been a research topic in multi-agent systems and business
intelligence. CONCENSUS [21] uses multiparty negotiation for conict resolution in con-
current engineering design. Querou et al. [65] presented an iterative method for generating
Pareto-optimal solutions in multiparty negotiations. Both of them are based on mathe-
matical models for quantitative conict resolution, while MTN is driven by authorization
policies specied in logical formulas.
6.2 Distributed Authorization Framework and Proof
Construction
PolicyMaker [15] was developed by Blaze et al. as a trust-management system that em-
braces the principle of using credentials to directly authorize actions, instead of dividing
access control into authentication and authorization. An important goal of PolicyMaker
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is to make the system lightweight and analyzable. A major contribution of PolicyMaker is
making it part of the trust management system to support proof of compliance. In Policy-
Maker, credentials and policies work together as assertions, which are fully programmable,
and can be encoded in any programming language that can be \safely" interpreted by a
local environment. While not settling on a specic language gives PolicyMaker open-
ness and exibility, the need to execute potentially arbitrary foreign code raises security
concerns, and makes it hard to formally analyze PolicyMaker policies and reason about
their runtime behavior. Not having a standard policy language also presents integration
and interoperability issues. KeyNote [14], introduced as a descendant of PolicyMaker,
follows the same principles as PolicyMaker, but with additional goals of standardization
and ease of integration. KeyNote chooses a specic, simple, and human-readable asser-
tion language. This language requires a lightweight interpreter with a small footprint,
which makes it easy to enforce resource usage restrictions, and yet satises the needs
of KeyNote's evaluation model. KeyNote does not interpret the meaning of credentials
or their attributes in policies, does not consider protection for sensitive credentials, and
provides little runtime support for credential discovery.
Derived from SPKI [26] and SDSI [66], SPKI/SDSI 2.0 [20] provides a distributed trust
management system based on digital certicates. SDSI proposes a simplied public-key
infrastructure and a means of dening groups and issuing group-membership certicates
for security policy specication. Instead of relying on a hierarchical global name space,
SDSI takes an \egalitarian" approach to use local name spaces and allows one local name
to be linked to another. As fully qualied SDSI names start with dierent public keys,
global uniqueness is guaranteed without coordinating among dierent naming authorities.
SPKI adds authorization certicates to SPKI/SDSI, where a certicate's purpose, just as
in PeerAccess, is mainly for authorization, as opposed to authentication. Credential dis-
covery schemes for SPKI/SDSI have been proposed in [25] and [20]. While their discovery
process is centralized, we use distributed credential discovery and optimizations like proof
hints to expedite proof construction in PeerAccess.
121
The Secure Dynamically Distributed Datalog (SD3) trust management system [37]
is closely related to PeerAccess. SD3 allows users to specify high level security policies
through a policy language. The detailed policy evaluation and certicate verication is
handled by SD3. Since the policy language in SD3 is an extension of Datalog, security
policies are a set of assumptions and inference rules. SD3 can automatically contact a
remote party to gather further credentials during the evaluation of a policy. SD3 is the
successor of QCM [32], which also does automatic credential retrieval. As a variant of SD3,
D3log [39] extends QCM by treating recursion and intensional answers. Dierent from
PeerAccess, D3log describes the whole possible space a server can non-deterministically
search before responding to a query , but does not provide any mechanism like MultiTrust's
QRRs to congure a server's behavior to selective conne its search space or to balance
the burden of credential retrieval between the server and the client.
Li et al. [49, 50] introduced the RT framework, a family of role based trust management
languages for specication of distributed authorization policies. RT also has a Datalog-
based semantics, and oers an elegantly uniform treatment of policies and credentials.
On the aspect of role based access control (RBAC) [71], RT supports parameterized roles,
logical objects, and manifold roles, and brings the expressive power of RBAC into attribute
based trust management. The RT work also addresses issues related to delegation of
authority, which is similar to PeerAccess's handling of delegation, but in a less expressive
way. In [51, 53], the authors proposed credential discovery algorithms based on credential
types: the type of a credential indicates where it is stored, at a party reachable in a chain
starting from the issuer, from the subject, or both. If both, a preference among the two
is given. As in real-world authorization scenarios, there is often no visible relationship
between the actual issuer of a credential and the place where it is stored, such typing
constraints are over restrictive and cannot be used to model usages like storing a credential
in a third party repository. In MultiTrust, we use QRRs to specify where to look for
credentials, and we decouple query routing from credential types.
Oasis [88], developed by Yao et al., is also a role-based trust management system.
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Compared to RT, Oasis has more RBAC features, including support for appointment cre-
dentials that represent administrative roles, and the concept of a session, which represents
a mapping between a user and an activated subset of assigned roles. Inuenced by Oasis,
Becker and Swell designed Cassandra [10, 11] as a language and system for managing
access control policies and used it to implement a national electronic health record sys-
tem. Cassandra features a small and expressive policy language with a formal semantics,
also based on Datalog with constraints. Similar to Oasis, Cassandra does not support
sticky release policies on credentials, and does not provide as exible runtime support for
credential retrieval and proof construction as PeerAccess does.
Bonatti and Samarati [16] introduce a uniform framework and model to regulate ser-
vice access and information release over the Internet. Their framework is composed of a
language for expressing access and release policies, and a policy ltering mechanism to
let the parties exchange their requirements. PeerAccess extends this work by proposing
more comprehensive meta policies to customize a peer's runtime behavior, and giving a
proof construction mechanism to reason about authorizations based on the access control
policies.
Appel and Felten [3] introduced a distributed authorization framework that uses
higher-order logic to express application specic access-control policies. An authentication
request carries a proof expressed in the higher-order logic that can be easily veried by a
checker. Based on this framework, Bauer et al. [9] develop a web page access-control sys-
tem that supports automatic certicate retrieval similar to QCM to construct proofs. This
proof construction mechanism is enhanced in [7], where peers fully cooperate to construct
proofs. PeerAccess supports local autonomy instead of requiring full cooperation, as we
nd the latter unrealistic for an open system. PeerAcess also supports a much broader,
congurable way of retrieving certicates than these systems, which retrieve certicates
only from their issuers. For example, a server can choose to let its clients nd all the
credentials they need, by omitting QRR rules for those credentials. A client can install
QRRs that cause it to launch an extensive network search for every credential it needs,
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do no network search at all, or do a limited search that is tuned for each particular kind
of credential. Compared to this work, PeerAccess's proof construction is more realistic in
that it can retrieve certicates not only from the issuers, but also from any other party
who is believed to be likely to possess them. More importantly, the retrieval process
supports local autonomy. For example, a server can choose to let its clients nd all the
credentials they need, by omitting QRR rules for those credentials. A client can install
QRRs that cause it to launch an extensive network search for every credential it needs,
do no network search at all, or do a limited search that is tuned for each particular kind
of credential.
Lee, Minami, and Borisov [44] adopt an approach that is related to ours, but takes a dif-
ferent perspective in addressing the proof construction problem. Their focus is on privacy
preservation during the proof construction process, while we concentrate on completeness,
autonomy, and exibility. The deductive networking work by Loo et al. [55, 1, 96] supports
declarative policy denition for networked information systems. They focus on providing
the capability of modeling real-world networking routing protocols, and resolving routing
queries eciently. Instead of modeling routing rules, our solution uses query routing rules
to customize proof construction for autonomy and eciency.
There are other noteworthy trust negotiation systems not described here (e.g., [67,
41, 30, 6, 17, 79]). In general, PeerAccess could be used to provide them with a more
general, locally-customizable means of credential retrieval and ecient, non-repudiable
policy evaluation when the relevant policies and credentials are distributed among dierent
peers.
Contrasting with the ABAC approach that we take, there are IBAC solutions that
attempt to build an Internet-scale identity system, including Shibboleth [75], Liberty Al-
liance [54], Microsoft CardSpace [19], and most recently OpenID [61]. Assertions produced
within the Shibboleth and Liberty Alliance frameworks can be passed between parties as
statements in Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0 [70], a framework for
exchanging authentication and authorization data between security domains. All these
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identity systems support identity federation, basing authentication on multiple identity
service providers, and achieve single sign-on across dierent domains. Distributed identity
service providers and single sign-on have respectively improved the scalability and usability
of identity management systems, yet there are still unsolved issues, some of which are in-
herent to IBAC. While single sign-on provides ease of use, a single identity poses concerns
about privacy: it is now easier to track one's activities in cyberspace, and compromise of
a single password puts all accounts at risk. Realizing that access cannot be based on iden-
tity alone, IBAC systems are incorporating more ABAC features. For example, once an
authentication is established, Shibboleth relies on an identity's attributes, provided by an
attribute authority, for authorization, and identity is just one of these attributes. At this
level, we see a move toward convergence of IBAC and ABAC, leaning toward the direction
of the latter. We expect ABAC features like MTN to bring gradual and interactive trust
establishment to identity federation systems, as strangers are unlikely to trust each other
until they have disclosed veriable attributes to each other.
6.3 Declassication and Reclassication
Previous work in this area has involved the creation of appropriate languages to describe
and enforce policies for access control, privacy, and digital rights management, as well
as facilities to help organizations track and monitor the information in their possession
through the use of sticky policies.
Graubart [31] proposes Propagated Access Control Lists (PACL) to enforce ORiginator
CONtrolled (ORCON) access control policies. PACLs are associated with the originator
and the objects it creates, and are propagated along to any new object created based on
the original objects. PACLs are sticky policies in essence. The simplicity of access control
lists limits the expressiveness of PACLs. Also, the unconditional propagation of PACLs
is too strong: although the author discusses how PACLs can be reset by a third party, no
mechanism is provided for the originator to control how its PACLs can be relaxed.
P3P is the best known of the privacy policy languages, though it was designed for hu-
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man consumption rather than for rigorous logical reasoning [90]. P3P policies are static
(i.e., they do not change depending on the current context) and are declared up front by
an information provider and consumer. To make the policies easy for humans to under-
stand, the format of a P3P policy allows the expression of a fairly limited set of conditions,
though humans still nd P3P policies hard to follow [2]. While P3P allows an organization
to declare its information-handling practices, there is no guaranteed relationship between
an organization's stated P3P policies and its actual information-handling practices. Most
importantly for our purposes, once the organization discloses information about an indi-
vidual to a third party, the third party is not obligated to behave in accordance with the
organization's P3P policy; in other words, P3P policies are not sticky.
The sticky policy paradigm has been introduced for use by individuals and enterprises
in controlling the ow and usage of information within and between organizations [40].
This earliest version of sticky policies records the user's preferences regarding applica-
ble policy and their selected opt-in and opt-out choices, without a specic enforcement
approach. The sticky policy is to be enforced no matter where the user's data go, i.e.,
if the data are disclosed to another enterprise then the remote enterprise would also be
bound to follow the sticky policy. Other researchers have suggested a way to enforce the
sticky release policy paradigm, together with auditing and logging of disclosures and ways
to prevent tampering with sticky policies [58]. Under their approach, an individual dis-
closes obfuscated information about himself or herself to another party. The obfuscated
information only becomes visible if the other party proves that it is authorized to view
that information. Their approach relies on identity-based encryption and a small core of
trusted computing hardware.
These and other early work on sticky policies led to IBM's proposed EPAL policy
language for privacy policies. EPAL [4], whose major antecedents are PRML (Privacy
Rights Markup Language) [64] and EPML (Enterprise Privacy Markup Language) [27],
allows organizations to specify sticky policies for privacy-related information handling,
for use as information ows within and between organizations. EPAL is intended to
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bridge the gap between policy specication and enforcement that is found in P3P, so
EPAL provides an enforcement engine for run-time enforcement of declared policies. Both
P3P and EPAL have inspired a great deal of follow-on work by researchers who have
investigated the formal properties of these languages, their expressiveness, and how well
humans can understand them.
XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language) [86] is an extension of XML
for expressing security policies. It also has predened functions and types which can be
used to implement the policy. Several policy combination algorithms have been specied
for merging XACML policies. These algorithms arrive at an authorization decision given
the individual results of evaluation of a set of policies. XrML (eXtensible Rights Markup
Language) [87] is an XML-based usage grammar for specifying rights and conditions to
control the access to digital content and services. Anyone owning or distributing digital
resources (such as content, services, or software applications) can use XrML to identify
the parties allowed to use those resources, the rights available to those parties, and the
terms and conditions under which those rights may be exercised. Similar to our approach,
XrML has a rights object that is used to specify what action a principal can perform on an
object or how it can use the object. In particular, the XrML Content Extension species
derivative works rights, which govern the reuse of digital works to create new works. This
rights object corresponds to the sticky release predicates in our work. However, all the
rights have to be specied before the information exchange takes place. There is no way
to specify run-time inference and creation of new rights, which makes it dicult to specify
the kind of declassication that we propose in our framework.
The US Department of Defense describes declassication as the process of making
formerly secret documents available to the public. The super-sticky release policies intro-
duced in this chapter can serve as declassication rules, albeit with a dierent purpose:
we focus on the possibility that information can become sanitized to the point where its
original owner no longer is interested in controlling what is done with it. Once such a de-
classication policy is satised, the original owner no longer controls the dissemination of
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derived data. For example, a patient can approve the release of non-individually-identied
medical information (such as the number of occurrences of a disease in the county) in such
a way that information derived from that data (such as the number of occurrences of that
disease in the state) can be released without the patient's approval. This kind of policy
takes the form of an inference rule that we call monotonic declassication. The idea of
declassication [59, 60, 69] is fairly common in the language-based security literature [68],
where it is dened as the downgrading of the security level of the information under cer-
tain restrictions. Our approach is kindred in spirit, although the technical details and the
form of the policies look rather dierent from those used in the programming languages
community.
Bertino et al. [12] describe an approach for declassication in an object-oriented
database setting, using the invoke and reply exceptions. The invoke exceptions are appli-
cable during method execution, and the reply exceptions are applicable to the information
returned by a method. Together they are used to implement the correct declassication
policy. Minami et al. [57] propose a secure aggregation mechanism for a public-subscribe
system. Their approach addresses the condentiality and integrity of the aggregation
itself, while we focus on how to derive access control policies for aggregated information.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
We are living in a world with almost ubiquitous connectivity, thanks to the emergence and
popularity of the Internet and the underling networking technologies. Accordingly, open
distributed systems such as peer-to-peer le sharing, grid computing, and the Internet
itself, have become increasingly popular. Users of such systems exhibit an increasing level
of multilateral online interactions and have a strong need to share resources in a swift yet
secure fashion, regardless of the fact that they often come from dierent administrative
domains. Traditional identity-based access control (IBAC) bases its authorization on
authentication of known identities, and has worked very well in a closed-system where the
identies of all relevant users and resources are well-known. IBAC, however, has become
unsuitable for open systems due to their nature of being large scale, highly dynamic, and
open. Since users come from dierent security domains, an identity by itself does not
present sucient information to determine the right access privilege outside the domain
where the identity is dened. The job of managing the large number of user identies and
maintaining their consistencies across multiple domains is intrinsically hard to scale.
To overcome the limitations of IBAC, attribute based access control (ABAC) has
been proposed by many researchers. ABAC approaches such as trust negotiation and
proof carrying authorization largely eliminate the burden of identity-based user account
management, and provides the capability of on-the-y trust establishment based on the
properties of the service requester and provider, as attested to by their digital credentials.
Nevertheless, current ABAC approaches have their own limitations and more research is
needed to maturize this technology. Particularly, existing authorization approaches like
automated trust negotiation (ATN) assume that an authorization is between two parties,
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and cannot be readily applied to solve an authorization problem that concurrently involves
multiple parties, which is often the case in open systems. Other approaches either make
assumptions that cannot be generalized, or lack important features such as providing the
participating parties with autonomy and customization. Information sharing is common
and much needed in open systems; yet it happens quite often that people disclose a piece
of information aggregated based on sensitive sources, inadvertently leaking sensitive and
valuable information. There has not been any systematic solution to address the access
control needs for aggregated information.
Motivated by the need to advance the state of the art of ABAC in open distributed
systems, this research proposed new approaches to automatic, secure, and ecient trust
establishment among multiple parties. Our solution includes the MTN authorization
paradigm for interactive trust establishment and the PeeerAccess logic framework for
distributed authorization. PeerAccess can be used to reason about the runtime behavior
of a diverse set of participating parties, provides the capability of ecient and customizable
construction of authorization proofs, and supports redissemination control of information
already disclosed, and information aggregated from multiple parties. In the rest of the
chapter, we rst summarize the contributions we have made, and then suggest future
directions for this research.
7.1 Contribution Summary
ATN is a promising approach to establishing trust between two parties without any prior
knowledge about each other, yet cannot be applied to address the authorization needs
where more than two parties are concurrently involved. Inspired by the gradual trust
establishment approach of ATN, we proposed MTN as a new approach to multiparty
authorization. Particularly, we made the following contributions:
1. We formalized the concept of MTN, and proposed it as a new paradigm for au-
thorization in open distributed systems. Our solution approach addresses all key
aspects of MTN, including the policy language, negotiation protocols, and strate-
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gies. We reinvented the core concepts and theories of ATN, and addressed the new
challenges of automatically coordinating interleaved communication between par-
ties, detecting circular dependencies, and providing scalability in a decentralized
environment. Since MTN is based on iterative negotiation that gradually builds up
trust, it prevents unnecessary disclosure of sensitive information. The trust estab-
lishment is multilateral as opposed to unilateral in a client-server model; nobody
trusts any party until the other party discloses the requested credentials that attest
to the attributes specied in the access control policies.
2. Our proposed MTN policy language DARCL is the rst distributed policy language
that supports both authorization and release control in a unied way. DARCL
policies can take the source and destination of each credential disclosure into con-
sideration. This level of enhanced expressiveness is particularly useful in specifying
negotiation based access control policies, where it matters which party has disclosed
what credential. While DARCL was initially designed for MTN, it can also serve as
a general purpose access control language, and benet policy-writers by providing
the capability of specifying ner-grained disclosure control constraints than existing
languages.
3. The diusion negotiation protocol we presented is simple and ecient. Its lightweight
and decentralized nature makes it well-suited for peer-to-peer environments, where
the existence of a stable and trustworthy coordinator that moderates negotiations
among multiple parties cannot be reliably assumed. The protocol is also generic,
and can be a reliable vehicle to implement various negotiation strategies.
4. We provided two MTN negotiation strategies with dierent tradeos between pri-
vacy and negotiation speed. We proved that both strategies are safe and complete:
both guarantee that every participating party's access control policies are always
satised, and that the negotiation succeeds as long as a possible safe disclosure se-
quence exists. The eager strategy is suitable for users who want the trust to be
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established as fast as possible, and are less concerned about unnecessary disclosure
of credentials, as long as such disclosures are permitted by the according access
control policies. The cautious strategy, however, takes the other direction by inten-
tionally reducing the number of credential disclosures, and is thus suitable for users
who have a strong concern about privacy, but care less about authorization speed,
as long as the negotiation is guaranteed to succeed whenever possible.
These contributions show that MTN serves as a secure and exible approach to mul-
tiparty authorization. MTN's interactive nature, however, requires all the negotiating
parties to be online, and does not provide direct support for features like delegation and
re-dissemination control, which are considered desirable for open distributed authoriza-
tion. From a theoretical perspective, what is still missing is a general framework that
provides a rich set of authorization features, and can be used to model and reason about
the runtime behavior of a diverse set of peers in an open system. Our solution to this is
the PeerAccess authorization framework.
We proposed PeerAccess as a language for specifying distributed authorization policies
and a general framework to reason about the runtime behavior of peers in open distributed
systems. We showed how its base policies, release policies, and proof hints can be use to
serve the needs of a number of dierent authorization scenarios. More specically, we
made the following contributions:
1. PeerAccess is a generic and extensible framework for multiparty authorization. We
know of no pre-existing approach that allows one to reason about the runtime be-
havior of a very diverse set of peers, some of whom push information, some pull
information, and some mix the two paradigms. PeerAccess oers an extensible set
of features, including non-repudiable, veriable communications between peers, the
support for delegation and proof carrying authorization, the ability to model sticky
release policies, and potential easy extension of the underlying language.
2. PeerAccess supports peer autonomy in choice of run-time behavior, by encoding
it as a set of meta policies. PeerAccess allows one to model the local reasoning
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of individual peers who are unaware of the internal state of other peers. A peer
can make authorization decisions solely based on its access control policies, the
credentials it has received so far, and how hard it will work to answer the queries.
3. PeerAccess provides sticky release policies that can be used to specify dissemination
and redissemination control policies. This is essential to implementing access control
specied by the original owner, even when the information is retained by another
peer. While peers can easily describe their purposes in asking a query, the answering
peer can easily limit the purposes that the answers will be used for.
We are now able to use the PeerAccess language to specify desired authorization poli-
cies and to encode proofs of authorization. Nevertheless, we still need specic runtime
algorithms for controlling credential search and performing construction of authorization
proofs. The multilateral and distributed nature of multiparty authorization still makes
it dicult to construct such proofs. To facilitate distributed proof construction, we pro-
posed query routing rules, a stronger version of PeerAccess's proof hints, to allow each
peer to customize its proof search behavior based on knowledge about where to get a
certain credential. Specically, we made the following contributions:
1. We showed that query routing rules are exible and able to model the messaging-
passing behavior of well-known trust management systems such as QCM and RT0.
This makes PeerAccess the rst authorization framework that can be used to reason
about the runtime behavior of other trust management systems, and to reason about
the runtime behavior of dierent peers following dierent strategies. In other words,
PeerAccess, powered with query routing rules, oers an excellent base for mod-
eling, comparing, and experimenting with dierent credential discovery and proof
construction algorithms.
2. By proposing query routing rules, we further enhanced PeerAccess's capability in
supporting a peer's local autonomy and local customization in proof construction and
the degree and manner in which each peer is willing to search for needed credentials.
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Total freedom in peer behavior can lead to total chaos in run-time results and can
hurt the ability to nd all possible solutions; our soundness guarantee, however,
ensures at least any credential disclosure is secure and no authorization policies are
breached.
3. We gave a distributed algorithm to construct proofs of authorization based on query
routing rules. This algorithm limits the search space to that covered by the query
routing rules, and guarantees completeness of search within this space, providing a
signicant performance gain over brute-force search in an open distributed environ-
ment.
Finally, we presented an extension to PeerAccess's release constructs so that they
can be used to specify and reason about the dissemination and redissemination control
of aggregated information. This was motivated by the fact that it is common practice
that people aggregate and derive new information based on information received from
other parties, yet there was not any systematic way to derive access control policies for
aggregated information. In proposing the enhanced release constructs for PeerAccess, we
made the following contributions:
1. To our knowledge, the new release constructs we proposed made PeerAccess the rst
authorization framework to provide systematic access control for aggregated infor-
mation. Lack of an automatic way to derive authorization policies for aggregates
often leads to unintentional leaking of sensitive information and has to be addressed
before a peer feels comfortable authorizing other parties to access its sensitive infor-
mation, even for statistical and aggregation purposes.
2. The proposed constructs for specifying release policies provide exibility for a peer
to dene policies to meet the requirements of its applications, ranging all the way
from freely reusable and re-disseminable information (immediate declassication) to
permanent ability to veto the release of any conclusions derived from a particular
piece of information, no matter where the information ows (super-sticky policies).
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3. The structures of our proposed constructs prevent a peer from intentionally or un-
intentionally overriding the policies of other parties whose information it has used,
thus avoiding unintended declassication. Under our approach, release policies for
newly aggregated information can be derived from the original information's release
policies and the local release constraints imposed by the creator who has aggregated
the new information.
4. While the release constructs were directly based on PeerAccess, we designed them in
a way such that the same constructs can be applied to a variety of policy languages,
as a meta-level wrapper around the base policy language, to control of the release
of derived information.
We provided example scenarios that showed the use of release control in open source
software distribution, digital rights management, and patient record information, as an
illustration of how to create various release policies and manage the redissemination of
aggregated information. Secure information sharing is among the primary goals that lead
peers to interact with each other, and data aggregation is a common purpose for getting
access to information. The capability of automating release control for derived information
is essential to multiparty authorization in an open system, without which a peer will not
be comfortable keeping the system open and authorizing any qualied external party to
access its sensitive information for any practical use.
7.2 Future Work
The long term goal of this research is to advance the state of the art of multiparty autho-
rization by promoting innovative ABAC approaches and to enable simple, secure, exible,
and ecient trust establishment in open distributed systems. To this direction, our work
serves as a new starting point and can be extended in number of ways.
Our solution approach for MTN can be improved in various aspects. First, strangers
currently need a pre-negotiation stage to reach an agreement on what MTN negotiation
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strategy to use, because dierent MTN negotiation strategies do not interoperate with
each other. It would be interesting to nd negotiation strategies that respect the auton-
omy of each party while also guaranteeing completeness. Second, if a party sends a denial
message under the cautious strategy, the recipient can guess that the denying party may
not have the requested credential. Li and Winsborough [81, 82] investigated credential
information leakage problems and proposed acknowledgement policies as a way to prevent
unauthorized requesters from guessing sensitive information. One could extend the ac-
knowledgment policy approach to work with MTN. Third, it would be interesting to do
a performance study regarding the communication complexity, timing properties, as well
as the impact of message loss and dynamic arrival and departures of the parties. Finally,
for particularly sensitive credentials, additional protection could be provided by extended
versions of cryptographic techniques such as hidden policies and credentials [29, 46], which
greatly reduce the risk of interacting with strangers.
PeerAccess is designed with extensibility in mind. It would be interesting and valuable
to extend the underlying language for particular scenarios, such as constraint Datalog,
simple forms of negation, or additional types of metalevel rules. We proposed the concept
of exposure policies to lter out received messages that a peer either is not interested in
or considers as harmful, but are still to fully instantiate it. An exposure policy can be
encoded as an ECA rule, similar to QRR: when a message is received, triggering a message
arrival event, the properties of the message are used to match the conditions in an ordered
list of ECA rules. If one is matched, the message is either accepted or rejected, based on
the action of the exposure policy. Exposure polices are important for a peer to maintain its
performance and avoid denial of service attacks. Other types of ECA rules, such as audit
policies and quality of service polices, can be introduced to further customize a peer's
high level behavior and ne-tune its autonomy and exibility in providing authorization
services.
Since PeerAccess oers an excellent base for modeling, comparing, and experimenting
with dierent proposals for controlling peer run-time behavior, one could use PeerAccess
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to emulate a number of well-known trust management systems, and study and compare
their eciency, security, and exibility. To do a full case study requires implementing our
logic using existing logic programming libraries, which can be interesting in its own right.
Currently the proof construction algorithm we proposed caches all proofs; this can be
optimized to reduce the memory consumption. One could also develop a set of distributed
construction algorithms with the same interface as our algorithm, but radically dierent
proof construction strategies, such that parties can pick any algorithm from the set and be
guaranteed that the soundness and completeness guarantees we presented will still hold.
If such algorithms do not exist, it would be very interesting as well to actually prove that.
One valuable extension to our release control for aggregated information is to add time
constraints to policies so that it allows expiration of aged policies and enables time-based
declassication. It would also be interesting to migrate our solution approach into the
many authorization frameworks already in the literature, or to layer atop those systems
as a wrapper to bridge their lack of release control facilities.
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